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Introduction: Housing and Social Policy  
in a Landscape of Multiple Crises
Nikos Kourachanis1
The academic journal Social Policy (Koinoniki Politiki), published since 2013 by the Hellenic 
Social Policy Association (EEKP) with the support of Topos Publications, seeks to contribute 
to the promotion of scholarly study and research into social inequalities and the ways in which 
they can be tackled. This effort is carried out entirely on a voluntary basis, underlining the 
commitment of EEKP to serving the above purposes.
In this 14th issue, the Board of Directors of EEKP, on the initiative of its President, Associate 
Professor Costas Dimoulas, invited me to be the guest editor of a special issue on social policy and 
housing. As part of our effort to strengthen the outward-looking character and the international 
presence of Koinoniki Politiki, we have invited some of the most important scholars on housing 
studies in Europe and Greece to contribute to this issue. It is a great honor and a joy for our 
Journal that such internationally renowned academics have accepted our invitation to contribute 
to this special issue.
Housing and Social Policy
The theme of this special issue is social policy and housing inequalities in the European and 
Greek experience. Housing is an important field of social intervention. It is no coincidence that 
since the birth of social policy as an academic subject, housing has been one of its five main areas 
along with social security, health, education and personal care services (Hall, 1952). Access to 
decent housing is a non-negotiable condition for ensuring social participation and welfare. It is 
the springboard for meeting a number of important human needs, such as protection from natural 
and social hazards, health, the storage and use of basic material goods, personal hygiene, work, 
and the enjoyment of privacy and social relationships. (Clapham et al., 1990).
The importance of the home as a good for people’s dignified living is of great significance 
(O’Sullivan, 2020). However, housing stock in modern capitalist societies is produced and 
distributed primarily through market mechanisms (Harloe, 1995). It is this contradiction that 
makes housing a wobbly pillar under the welfare state (Torgensen, 1987). Other scholars comment 
1. Assistant Professor, Department of Social Policy, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, 
Greece. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9034-7902
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on housing as the cornerstone of the welfare state, precisely because of the consequences of its 
importance. For example, Kemeny (1995) argues that welfare states that develop a redistributive 
social policy tend to have lower rates of home ownership as social services support access to 
affordable housing. In contrast, welfare states with residual social policies show higher rates of 
home ownership, as it is the only means of protecting citizens from homelessness (Kemeny, 1995).
Housing in the Keynesian and Neoliberal Welfare State
Despite the long-standing dominance of the private real estate sector in the Western world, 
fluctuations have been observed in the housing policy welfare mix across different historical 
periods. The most emblematic development that can be reported is the shift from Keynesian social 
housing policies to emergency housing services, which has been systematically implemented since 
the 1980s (Forrest and Murie, 1988). These developments are a consequence of the restructuring 
caused by the transition from the Keynesian to the neoliberal welfare state.
The shifting of priorities from the value of Keynesian social cohesion to extreme poverty 
management in the neoliberal era (Hennigan, 2016) has had a negative impact across the 
range of social policy areas, including housing (Rolnik, 2013). The emergence of the concept 
of social exclusion was a dichotomous construct between insiders and outsiders. The focus of 
the dominant discourse on the underclass essentially implied that the rest of the social body is 
cohesive; it does not contain significant social inequalities and, therefore, no social intervention 
is needed to confront them (Levitas, 1996). Against the backdrop of social spending cuts, the 
management of extreme poverty has been a key goal of social policies since the 1980s.
The sharp wave of privatizations that accompanied the rise of neoliberalism from the late 
1970s onwards did not leave the housing sector unaffected (Redmond, 2001). The principle of 
social housing was dismantled in two ways: first, through the encouragement of home ownership, 
mainly by granting housing mortgages to those citizens who could afford them. Second, through 
the creation of homelessness services for those citizens who were unable to maintain affordable 
housing (Aalbers, 2008).
For example, in countries with a tradition of social housing, such as the United Kingdom, 
Thatcher’s “Right to Buy” policy resulted in extensive privatizations (Atkinson and Durden, 1990). 
In fact, the transfer of responsibility for housing benefits to the private market was accompanied 
by the qualification of home ownership as a more appropriate solution through the granting of 
housing mortgages (Rolnik, 2013). The stipulation of mortgages as the main vehicle for home 
ownership has had at least three negative effects. First, it led to the over-indebtedness of a large 
proportion of households that were unable to afford to repay their loan (Garcia-Lamarca and Kaika, 
2016). Second, due to high demand, it boosted property prices. As a result, their value made it 
impossible to buy a house without a mortgage. Third, the mortgage market has become a means 
of social and housing segregation, depending on the amount of bank lending (Aalbers, 2016).
The establishment of emergency housing services was intended to provide for those citizens 
who were not able to access affordable housing (Forrest and Murie, 1988). These services are 
usually accompanied by the provision of basic material assistance (soup kitchens, blankets, 
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emergency supplies) with a strong charitable orientation (Wacquant, 2010). In other words, 
the safety net was lowered from the protection of the home to the management of the extreme 
symptoms of its loss. The dominance of emergency services contributes neither to preventing 
nor to tackling housing problems (Arapoglou and Gounis, 2017). Instead, it traps the homeless 
in an abeyance mechanism (Hopper and Baumohl, 1994). This pattern was systematically 
reproduced in many European welfare states until (and after) the Great Recession of 2008 (for 
example Drilling et al., 2020), under the strong influence of neoliberal ideology.
Housing and the Great Recession of 2008
The Great Recession of 2008 had an adverse effect on modern European societies (McBride et 
al., 2015; Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2018). Housing insecurity has intensified, making it 
difficult for large sections of the population to access affordable housing (Rolnik, 2013; Scanlon 
et al., 2015). At the same time, the policies being developed are limited to the most extreme 
and publicly visible symptoms of housing problems. This has therefore been an economic 
recession with inherent paradoxes. The most important of these is the strengthening, instead 
of undermining, of the dominant ideology that caused it (Papatheodorou, 2014).
A fundamental effect of the economic crisis is the increasing trend in housing costs borne by 
households. This has led to an increase in the inability to maintain affordable housing, an increase 
in homelessness and an increase in housing insecurity among the weaker socio-economic strata 
(Wetzstein, 2017). At the same time, phenomena of gentrification and touristification drive up 
rental prices by indirectly expelling the lower social classes (Wachsmuth and Weisler, 2018). 
Therefore, the increase in housing costs is evolving faster than the increase in incomes which, 
in contrast, in many cases remain stagnant and/or diminished.
The effects of deteriorating housing conditions are reflected in a variety of ways. Many of these 
people are forced to live in overcrowded conditions, to return to their parental home, or search 
for forced cohabitation. Other people end up living in poor housing conditions (for example, 
old buildings without safety standards) or in inadequate housing (for example, houses without 
heating or even without electricity). In other cases, housing costs are such a burden on incomes 
that significant cuts to other day-to-day spending must to be made. In fact, these reductions are 
often made in vital areas, such as the quality of food, clothing and many other products that 
are intended to satisfy basic human needs. Especially for young people, the level of housing 
costs can be a deterrent to completing their studies or even starting a family (Wetzstein, 2017).
The most obvious manifestation of extreme inequality is the increase in the number of people 
losing their homes due to financial problems and the lack of adequate preventive social services. 
The phenomenon of neo-homelessness has witnessed a significant rise since the years of the Great 
Recession (Scanlon et al., 2015). In fact, the diverse and heterogeneous aspect of this important 
social problem has become even more varified. In the years of the Great Recession, homelessness 
is on the rise, including asylum seekers and refugees (Kourachanis, 2018), homeless families 
(Baptista et al., 2017), and other socially vulnerable groups whose poor housing conditions put 
them on the brink of homelessness.
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In addition to the effects of the Great Recession, housing insecurity is exacerbated by other 
parameters. One of the most important is the spread of short-term rental practices (Airbnb). 
Through this practice, a significant percentage of apartments are removed from the private 
long-term rental real estate market to be channeled into the short-term rental market. These 
developments result in an increase in the demand for the remaining properties for rent and, by 
extension, a clear increase in their rental price (Balampanides et al., 2019).
Developments over the last decade up to the Covid-19 pandemic, combined with the policy 
management framework of European and national institutions, have had a negative impact on 
the access of the lower and middle classes to housing (Scanlon et al., 2015). The new model 
favors an even greater removal of state intervention from the housing sector. As in other areas 
of the welfare state, housing has been affected by the mass dismantling of key social policy 
institutions and the mobilization of a range of policies aimed at expanding market discipline, 
competition and re-commodification (Rolnik, 2013).
Housing and Covid-19: Social Policy Challenges
The Covid-19 pandemic has emerged as a health crisis within a landscape of pre-existing crises 
and austerity policies (Dimoulas, 2020; Kapsalis et al., 2021). The model for managing the 
pandemic that has been adopted internationally makes access to housing a prerequisite for the 
protection of citizens (Rogers and Power, 2020). In other words, neoliberal governments explicitly 
state that they are not prepared to protect those citizens who cannot protect themselves if they 
do not have a home (Silva and Smith, 2020).
The prevailing formula for pandemic management focuses on the dimensions of responsibility, 
social distancing and staying at home, instead of adopting policies to stimulate public health, 
education, public transport (Horton, 2020) and, of course, social housing for those experiencing 
housing precariousness. The pandemic management framework focuses on the responsibility 
of citizens so as to maintain the trend for minimizing social protection systems and for the 
commodification of social goods (Kourachanis, 2020).
However, this particular way of managing the pandemic has negative consequences even for 
those who have a home. Quarantine and enforced incarceration result in major changes in daily 
habits, rhythms and interpersonal relationships in situations of cohabitation. During a period of 
economic downturn, psychological oppression, and lockdown, the effects of domestic violence 
or overcrowding making the house an unsafe form of protection (Rogers and Power, 2020). At 
the same time, many people who have suffered a loss in income will not be able to afford their 
housing costs (Judge, 2020; Goodman and Magder, 2020). Evictions are expected to increase 
the risk of infection during the Covid-19 pandemic and an adequate protection framework is 
needed (Benfer et al., 2020). These conditions are exacerbated and the long-term shortcomings 
and inadequacies of housing systems worldwide become more evident.
The negative effects of pandemic management through the spirit of self-isolation at home are 
more pronounced for poor households. Despite the widespread perception that the virus does 
not discriminate, recent research shows that the most vulnerable are the poor and marginalized 
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populations. This claim is supported by the stress and comorbidities related to poverty and 
job insecurity as well as the exclusion from access to health services, due to economic factors. 
Particularly from the perspective of housing inequalities, aspects such as poor housing conditions, 
limited access to personal space, and the phenomenon of housing overcrowding reduce the 
possibility of social distancing (Patel et al., 2020).
Inadequate housing conditions for poor households are associated with deteriorating health 
indicators and the spread of infectious diseases (Buckle et al., 2020). This seems to be the case 
with the current pandemic, as research findings show that countries with higher rates of poor 
housing have higher COVID-19-related mortality rates (Ahmad et al., 2020). COVID-19 has 
also exacerbated vulnerabilities such as poor housing quality and location, housing affordability, 
energy poverty, and a range of social, mental and physical health conditions (Horne et al., 2020). 
Particularly for extreme forms of homelessness, such as homeless people living on the streets, 
this particular model of pandemic crisis management that focuses on housing self-isolation at 
home and social distancing measures puts them at greater risk due to the lack of both adequate 
housing and health conditions, as well as the difficulties of social distancing (Tsai and Wilson, 
2020; Perri et al., 2020). As expected, similar risks threaten asylum seekers, refugees and 
immigrants (Ralli et al., 2020), Roma (Holt, 2020), people with mental health issues (Amerio 
et al., 2020; Lima et al., 2020), as well as people with HIV (Rosenberg et al., 2020). Of course, 
this concern relates also to many other vulnerable groups.
Structure of this Special Issue
With these initial thoughts in mind, the contributions in this special issue are dedicated to housing 
inequalities and social policies in the European welfare states with a special focus on the Greek 
case. The first part elaborates aspects of Social Policy and Housing in European Welfare States. 
Professor Eoin O’Sullivan underlines that the way in which we collect data on homelessness and 
how that data is presented has significant implications for the framing of homelessness, with the 
majority of countries measuring homelessness at a point-in-time, which provide little information 
on the dynamics of homelessness. Using the example of the Republic of Ireland, we can see 
that the stock and flow data on homelessness show very different patterns of the experience 
of homelessness. In the second article, Professor Matthias Drilling and his colleagues Semhar 
Negash and Berihun Wagaw argue that the concept of the social investment state is currently the 
guiding concept for transforming the European welfare states. Underlining the role of housing and 
neighbourhood, Drilling et al. claim that the social investment approach does not play an extensive 
role in positioning this policy field and, as such, it does not attach any importance to housing.
Eva Betavatzi and Éric Toussaint note that the increase in mortgage lending in European 
countries since the 1990s is symptomatic of a political determination to push households into 
buying rather than renting on the housing market. Banks benefit from this as it allows them 
not only to increase their loan portfolios but also to use loans as securities and sell them on the 
secondary market. Thus, the increase in private and public debts, and the principle that they 
must be repaid whatever the cost, have an impact on the right to housing. Isabel Baptista and 
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Miguel Coelho aim to provide a critical overview of homelessness service provision in Portugal 
– framed by EU-level developments with a particular focus on Southern European countries – 
within national policy dynamics, which in recent years have evolved towards the adoption of a 
national strategic approach to resolving homelessness. This topic has received little research 
and policy attention so far, which may partly be explained by the fragmented nature of the sector 
itself and by the very recent emergence of homelessness on the Portuguese political agenda. 
In the last article of the first part of our special issue, Ana Vilenica, Tonia Katerini and Maša 
Filipovič Hrast describe commodification patterns in Slovenia, Serbia and Greece by considering 
the diversity existing in the semiperiphery. In their paper, they show that Balkan semiperipheral 
territories must not be regarded as a passive background but as a landscape in which active 
agents participate in creating and transforming commodification patterns.
The second part of this special issue is dedicated to social policy and housing in Greece. 
Professor Thomas Maloutas notes that sovereign debt crisis in the early 2010s led to a standstill 
in the housing market due to the lack of demand. Problems of access to affordable housing 
re-emerged when the crisis retreated, and tourism boosted new demand for housing. The 
pandemic again stopped this process by radically reducing tourist flows. The question now is 
whether there will be an opportunity after the pandemic to make the protection of housing for 
vulnerable groups a priority on the political agenda. Vassilis Arapoglou, Constantine Dimoulas 
and Clive Richardson present the main findings from pilot research on the homeless population 
in six municipal areas in Greece in 2018. The project employed the “point-in–time” technique, 
combining counting by observation with interviewing where possible. The procedure succeeded 
in engaging local communities and NGOs to enumerate the homeless population.
Antonios Roumpakis and Nicholas Pleace present the findings from a two-year project which 
explored both the immediate and longer-term outcomes for families who received support from a 
pilot Family Support Service, designed to prevent housing insecurity and potential homelessness. 
They correlate their findings on the Greek housing and social policy responses in the aftermath 
of the sovereign debt crisis with the wider European context. In the last article of the second part 
Dr. Dimitra Siatitsa discusses the issue of youth housing in Greece, in a context of permanent 
insecurity and instability, due to the precarisation of labour and the ongoing conjuncture of 
“crises’’. Her paper provides an overview of the main issues discussed in the European and 
Greek literature, describes key dimensions of youth housing in Greece and sets the framework 
for further research.
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Measuring Homelessness: Implications for Policy
Eoin O’Sullivan1
Abstract
Who we define as experiencing homelessness and how we research the experience of homelessness 
may seem technical matters for statisticians and researchers to agree on rather than matters 
of public policy. In this paper I argue that the way in which we collect data on homelessness 
and how that data is presented has significant implications for the framing of homelessness, 
with the majority of countries measuring homelessness at a point-in-time, which provide little 
information on the dynamics of homelessness. Using the example of the Republic of Ireland, 
we can see that the stock and flow data on homelessness show very different patterns of the 
experience of homelessness, with the number of adults in emergency accommodation at a point-
in-time is determined by the numbers entering emergency accommodation, the length of time 
in emergency accommodation and the rate at which exits occur.
Keywords: point-in-time measures; dynamics of homelessness; homelessness in Ireland
Introduction
Policy responses to preventing an episode or a spell in temporary or emergency accommodation 
designated for those experiencing homelessness, the supports provided to ensure successful 
exiting from such accommodation or responding to literal homelessness is in part determined by 
how the issue is framed. The framing of homelessness is the outcome of the complex interactions 
between, for example, how the public perceives the issue, how the media report the issue, how 
we measure homelessness and how these presentations and measurements are interpreted by 
policy makers. That many of the public think that the appropriate response to homelessness is 
the provision of shelter and food, and that a significant number of NGOs provide such shelter 
and soup, suggests a framing of homelessness that is equated with literal homelessness or 
rough sleeping (Parsell and Watts, 2017). Recent research in Ireland (Crowley and Mullen, 
2019) and England (Crisis, 2018) for example, suggests that the dominant popular perception 
of those experiencing homelessness is that of a middle- aged man sleeping rough with addiction 
1. Professor, School of Social Work and Social Policy, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland.
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and/ or mental health issues. Certainly, those sleeping rough are the most visible and evocative 
manifestations of homelessness in cities of the Global North, and indeed the majority of press 
stories on the topic of homelessness are usually accompanied by an image of a rough sleeper 
or sleepers, thus reinforcing this popular perception.
In this paper, I wish to explore how homelessness is framed via measuring homelessness; that 
is the increasing efforts by local and national governments to estimate the extent of homelessness 
(see OECD, 2020 for an overview of these efforts), and the characteristics of those experiencing 
homelessness is an important contributor to how homelessness is framed. Using Ireland as a 
case study, the paper notes that research design issues such as using point or period prevalence 
measures, how broadly or narrowly homelessness is defined, presenting the rate as well as the 
number of those experiencing homelessness by for example age and gender, and the degree to 
which the dynamics of homelessness are captured are significant issues in how homelessness 
is presented by social scientists, statisticians and others.
Point prevalence studies are widely used in estimating the extent and characteristics of those 
experiencing homelessness in a number of countries, either as part of the national census in the 
case of Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018), or specific surveys of those experiencing 
varieties of homeless experiences in the Nordic countries (Benjaminsen et al, 2020) and the US 
(Henry et al, 2021) to name a few. As Shinn and Khadduuri (2020) acknowledge, this method can be 
useful for monitoring trends and identifying service needs, but minimizes the scale of homelessness, 
and period-prevalence surveys are required to more accurately estimate the number of people 
who experience homelessness over a time period. However they argue that time-frames (2020, pp. 
26-27) are critically important when researching homelessness as the numbers who experience 
homelessness and their characteristics will differ significantly depending on the time-frame used. 
Shorter time-frames largely capture those experiencing long term homelessness, with longer time-
frames capturing the significantly larger number of people who enter and exit homelessness each 
year. For example, Link et al. (1994) found that the life-time prevalence of homelessness was 7.4% 
in comparison to 3.1% over a five-year period. A recent study utilising a similar methodology in 
eight European Countries found a lifetime prevalence of nearly 5%, albeit with significant variations 
by country, with a 5-year prevalence of just under 2% (Taylor et al., 2019).
Homelessness is a dynamic process and capturing the experience of homelessness at a point 
in time does not reveal the fluidity of the experience of homelessness and that the majority who 
experience a spell in an emergency shelter, for example, will exit to housing and stay housed 
(Lee et al., 2021). This was demonstrated when an increasing number of researchers from the 
1990s onward, initially almost exclusively in North America, and subsequently in a number of 
European countries and Australia, utilising longitudinal research methods were showing very 
different patterns of homelessness than that found in cross-sectional research, with profound 
implications for policy, when exploring the experience of homelessness over time, both for families 
and adult-only households (Dworsky and Piliavin, 2000; Kuhn and Culhane, 1998; Klodawsky et 
al., 2007; Shinn, 1997, Waldron et al, 2019). The importance of subsidised housing, poverty, and 
other structural factors in contributing to homelessness rather than individual level dysfunctions 
came to the fore, with ‘residential instability’ rather than prolonged experiences of homelessness 
the typical pattern observed (Sosin et al., 1990, p. 171). Crucially this research also highlighted 
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that the majority of people who experienced a spell of homelessness did so for a short period of 
time and successfully exited to accommodation. A crucial observation from this research was 
that ‘[a]lmost everyone who will be homeless two years from today is housed now, and almost 
everybody who is homeless today will be housed two years from now” (O’Flaherty, 2010, p. 143).
Who is counted as experiencing homelessness varies significantly (OECD, 2020), with 
for example Australia and the Nordic countries comparatively unusual in counting not just 
those experiencing literal homelessness and staying in designated temporary and emergency 
accommodation, but also those in overcrowded accommodation or sharing with friends or family. 
Other countries aspire to measure these categories, but no statistical data is available for these 
forms of homelessness (Baptista and Marlier, 2019). However, the majority of OECD countries 
define homelessness more narrowly for the purposes of counting, largely only including only those 
experiencing literal homelessness or staying in accommodation designated as homeless services. 
Thus, comparative research on homelessness is particularly tricky given the wide variation in 
who is counted as homelessness. Who is defined is also important in terms of how homelessness 
is framed, as research designs that adopt narrow definitions tend to conclude that dysfunctional 
individual traits contribute significantly to the reasons why people experience homelessness, 
whereas broader definitions are more likely to indicate that dysfunctional social services and 
supports, particularly the lack of affordable housing, are more important that individual traits 
(Pleace and Hermans, 2020; O’Sullivan et al, 2020). Rates of homelessness are also important 
as they take into account population growth and demographic change (Johnson and Taylor, 
2020). Thus, dependent on the research design, capturing data at point-in-time or longitudinally, 
the definition of homelessness utilised will shape how homelessness is frame.
Measuring Homelessness in Ireland: A Case Study 
In the remainder of the paper these issues are teased out in respect of a case study of Ireland. 
Ireland is comparatively unusual in having a national integrated bed and case management 
system since 2013. The PASS (Pathway Accommodation & Support System), established in 
Dublin in 2011, was rolled out nationally in 2013, and this development allowed for data on 
number of adult individuals with accompanying child dependents experiencing homelessness 
and residing in designated emergency accommodation funded by Section 10 and Local Authority 
contributions during the third week of every month in each county to be generated on a monthly 
basis. The publication of these Monthly Reports commenced in April 2014 on a trial basis, 
and from June 2014, with some modifications, has been produced on a continuous monthly 
basis. Data is generated from PASS on the profile of households in the designated services by 
household composition, the gender, age and nature of accommodation provided for adults and 
the number of accompanying child dependents. While not a comprehensive figure of the extent 
of homelessness in Ireland, in that it only captures those households in designated emergency 
and temporary accommodation funded under Section 10 of the Housing Act, 1988, it nonetheless 
provided timely, detailed, reliable and consistent data monthly. In comparative terms, using 
the European Typology of Homelessness and Housing Exclusion (ETHOS) as a framework, this 
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monthly data provide provides data category 2, people staying in a night shelter; and category 
3, people in accommodation for the homeless. Thus, it is a very narrow definition compared to, 
for example, the Nordic countries (Benjaminsen et al, 2020).
In addition, from 2014 onwards, at the end of each quarter, Local Authorities, were required 
by the Department of Housing to produce Performance Reports providing data on a range of 
indicators, included the number of new and repeat adult presentations to homelessness services 
per quarter; the number of adults in emergency accommodation for more than six months, the 
number of adult individuals exiting homeless services, and the number of rough sleepers. The 
production of the Monthly Reports and Quarterly Performance Reports followed on from the 
publication in 2013 of a Homelessness Policy Statement by the Department of Housing. A number 
of indictors were identified to measure progress in ending homelessness in Ireland, which was 
the over-arching ambition of the Policy Statement, and the purpose of these indicators was to 
‘give a clearer picture of homelessness in Ireland: the rate of entry, duration and exits, together 
with the type and nature of accommodation’ (Department of Environment, Community and 
Local Government, 2013, p. 4).
Point-in-time Counts
Since mid-2014, each month a brief report is published by the Department of Housing providing 
data on the number of adults and their accompanying child dependents (if any) in State funded 
emergency accommodation during the third week of each month. This data source, more than 
any other information on homelessness in Ireland, is most commonly cited when describing 
the extent of homelessness by the media, service providers and academic commentators. 
The publication of these data attracts considerable media attention each month, and is often 
accompanied by a picture or a news clip of a rough sleeper (although those rough sleeping are 
not directly included in the data), particularly as shown in figure 1, the number of adults in 
emergency accommodation during a week in each month rose rapidly from mid-2014, reaching 
a peak of nearly 6,700 in late 2019 / early 2020 despite the narrow definition of homelessness 
used. The number then declined and plateaued to approximately 6,000 adults and 2,500 child 
dependents in emergency accommodation since mid-2020. On average 3,280 adults were in 
emergency accommodation nationally in 2015 rising to an average of 6,510 in 2019 before 
declining to 6,208 in 2020.2
The number in emergency accommodation in the Dublin region has fluctuated between 65 and 
70 percent of the total number of adults in emergency accommodation nationally over this period, 
and nationally, the number of adult males in emergency accommodation has fluctuated between 60 
2. It should be noted that were two modifications made to the Monthly Reports, the first was that from January 
2015, refuges for those escaping from gender-based violence (ETHOS category 4) - a total of 21 residential services 
with a bed capacity of approximately 250 transferred to the statutory Child and Family Agency (TUSLA), and these 
accessing these residential services have not been enumerated in the monthly data since that date; the second in 
2018 where 625 in what were termed ‘own door accommodation’ were excluded from the data as they were deemed 
not be in emergency accommodation. 
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and 70 percent of all adults, and those aged between 25-44 hovered at approx. 60 percent over the 
period. In terms of household composition, on average 75 percent were adult-only households, that 
is single person households and couples without accompanying child dependents. Families, that 
is couples and singles with accompanying child dependents, made up the balance. The number of 
families increased each month between 2014 and mid-2018, but has declined significantly since that 
point, particularly in Dublin where the number of families in emergency accommodation declined 
from nearly 1,300 in the Autumn of 2019 to just under 800 at the end of 2020. Thus, based on this 
well-known measure, homelessness in Ireland is largely experienced in Dublin, by male adult-only 
households, and the overall numbers have remained stubbornly high, but stable between 2018-
2020, following particularly sharp increases between 2014 and 2017.
In contrast to the increase in the number of adults in temporary and emergency accommodation, 
the numbers of rough sleepers, and we only have reasonably accurate and consistent point- in- 
time data for Dublin, have remained relatively low and stable, with a fluctuating minimum of 
between 90 and 150 individuals based on a biannual count over the past seven years. Between 70 
and 80 percent of those rough sleeping also use emergency shelters, so that a significant number 
are also recorded in the monthly reports, indicating that only a minority of those individuals 
sleeping rough at a point-in-time, only a minority were not engaging with the emergency 
accommodation services. 
Source: Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, 2021a.
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When we turn to look at the rate of adult homelessness baased on the point-in-time measure, 
we can see in figure 2 that the rate per 1,000 population aged over 18 increased from 0.71 in 2014 
to 1.74 in 2019, and dropping slightly in 2020. The rate of males in emergency accommodation is 
consistently higher than that of females and the decrease between 2019 and 2020 are driven by 
a decline in the rate of homelessness for those aged 18-24 and 25-44. Rates of homelessness are 
important, because as noted above, they take into account population change and demographic 
shifts. The overall increase in the rate of adults experiencing homelessness in emergency shelters 
between 2014 and 2019 was not due to population changes, rather other factors brought about 
this increase. Furthermore, the rate of homelessness for those aged between 25-44 is nearly 
double those aged 45-64, while the rate of young people aged 18-24 experiencing homelessness 
dropped from 2.2 per 100,000 population over 18 in 2018 to 1.7 in 2020. Largely due to increase 
in families experiencing homelessness, the gap between rate of homelessness for adult males 
and adult females narrowed with 1.6 males and 1.2 females per 1,000 adults in emergency 
accommodation in 2017, but this gap subsequently widened as the rate of male homelessness 
continued to increase, with rate of 2.1 males and 1.2 females by 2020.
Source: Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, 2021a. / Central Statistics Office.
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Source: Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, 2021a. / Central Statistics Office.
Source: Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, 2021a. / Central Statistics Office.
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In summary, the number and rate of adults experiencing homelessness in Ireland, despite a raft 
of policy initiatives to address the issue (see O’Sullivan, 2020 for a summary), rose remorselessly 
between 2014 and 2019, and have remained stubbornly high in 2020. The cost of providing 
services to those experiencing homelessness, not surprisingly, also increased dramatically with 
central and local government expenditure rising from just over €50m in 2014 to just over €225m 
in 2019, before dropping slightly in 2020 as shown in figure 5 (see O’Sullivan and Mustafiri, 
2020 for a more detailed analysis of expenditure on homelessness). Increasingly the bulk of 
expenditure was on the provision of emergency accommodation, accounting for over 80 percent 
of total expenditure in 2019 and 2020, much of going on the provision of rooms in private hotels 
and bed and breakfasts, as the capacity of the shelter services, particularly for families, was 
unable to provide the increase in demand for their services. 
Based on these data sources it is reasonable to conclude that the policy response to homelessness 
in recent years in Ireland has been an expensive policy failure. This may be in part explained by 
the characteristics of those in emergency accommodation. For example, O’Carroll and Wainwright 
(2019, p. 1) note that the international evidence is that “[h]omeless people also have high rates of 
mental-ill health with high rates of schizophrenia, depression and anxiety. This increased mental 
illness burden has resulted in higher suicide rates. Homeless people also have much higher rates 
of alcohol and drug-addiction than the general population” and conclude that “Irish studies have 
found similar high rates of addiction, poor physical and mental health.” Thus, part of the policy 
failure lie in the fact those experiencing homelessness have complex needs and are not amenable 
to an easy resolution, and indeed with a small number of exceptions, the numbers experiencing 
homelessness are increasing across the European Union (Serme-Morin and Coupechoux, 2021).
Source: Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, 2021a.
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Dynamics of Homelessness
However, as we noted in the introduction to the paper, the experience of homelessness is a 
dynamic process and point-in-time data such as described above may not offer much assistance 
in understanding homelessness and the appropriate public policies to prevent and resolve 
homelessness. In addition to the production of the monthly reports described above, local 
authorities are also responsible to producing what are referred to as Performance Reports every 
quarter since the beginning of 2014, and these reports provide data on the number of adults 
entering and exiting emergency accommodation, in addition to the length of the spell in emergency 
accommodation. In contrast to the Monthly Reports, the data in these reports have rarely if ever 
been reported by the media when published, and the majority of commentators, either service 
providers or academic commentators, equally rarely refer to these data. This in part to due to 
the fact they these reports contain a substantial amount of detailed data – for example the Dublin 
Quarterly Performance Report for Q4 2020 is 16 pages in length, containing 16 tables and 10 
figures of data - and are produced by nine lead Local Authorities; thus it requires an amount of 
work to summarize the data in these nine detailed reports each quarter. Although since quarter 
2 2019, the Department of Housing have published a report summarising some of the data 
contained in these reports, even these summary reports generate little or interest from the media.
The first key set of data in these reports are the number of unique adult entries to emergency 
accommodation for the first time over the period 2014-2020 as shown in figure 6. This set of 
data shows a different pattern than observed in the monthly data. Firstly, nearly 37,000 unique 
adults experiencing a spell in emergency accommodation over the period 2014-2020 for the 
first time, compared to the average of just under 5,000 in emergency accommodation at a point 
in time over the same period. Second, the flow of adults experiencing a spell in emergency 
accommodation for the first time increased each year until the numbers peaked in 2018 and 
decreased significantly in 2019 and 2020. Third, at a point in time, on average, 70 percent 
of those in emergency accommodation are in the Dublin; however, the flow data shows that 
almost equal number of adults entered emergency accommodation for the first time in Dublin 
and outside Dublin. The reason why the point in time figure shows 70 percent of all adults in 
emergency accommodation in Ireland are in Dublin is that they are more likely to get ‘stuck’ in 
emergency accommodation in Dublin than outside of Dublin.
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Source: Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, 2021a.
Figure 7 shows that at the end of 2020, 3,200 adults were in emergency accommodation for 
more than 6 months in Dublin, compared to less than 1,000 outside of Dublin. The numbers 
in emergency accommodation for more than six months in Dublin increased from just over 500 
at the beginning of 2014 with nearly 80 percent of all adults in emergency accommodation in 
Dublin there for more than six months, compared to just under 50 percent outside of Dublin. On 
the basis of this data we can see that considerably more adults experienced a spell in emergency 
accommodation than suggested by the headline monthly figure. This is in line with the observation 
from Shinn and Khaddurri (2020) that longer time-frames capture a significantly larger number 
of people who experienced a spell in emergency accommodation. 
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Source: Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, 2021a.
Exiting Homelessness
On the basis that the point-in-time data shows that was an average of just under 5,000 adults in 
emergency accommodation between 2014 and 2020, but 37,000 experienced a spell in emergency 
accommodation, then the majority must have exited their emergency accommodation. The data 
shows that just over 21,500 adults exited emergency accommodation to State subsidised housing 
in the 7 years between 2014 and 2020 – just under 10,000 outside Dublin and just over 11,500 
in Dublin. Others exited to various insecure forms of accommodation or to other institutions 
such as prison or a hospital, often in a long-standing institutional circuit of repeated episodes 
of homelessness (Hopper et al, 1997; Daly et al, 2018). The numbers of adults who exited to 
housing has increased steadily each year from just under 2,000 in 2014 to 4,000 in 2020 as shown 
in figure 8. The majority of the adults who exited to housing over this period, did do without 
any supports other than income supports for those exiting to quasi-secure tenancies, and the 
provision of an affordable unit of housing for those making secure exits. Only those exiting via 
the dedicated Housing First programme, and there were just over 500 Housing First tenancies 
in place at the end of 2020 (Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, 2021b), 
required intensive supports to exit and maintain their accommodation. 
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Source: Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, 2021a.
Not All Exits are Equal
Drawing on the work of Sosin et al. (1990) and Piliavin et al. (1996), we can think of exits from 
homelessness in Ireland as (1) secure exits, that is exiting to tenancies provided by municipal 
authorities or not-for-profit housing bodies that provide de facto security of tenure for life, and 
where rent is determined by income; (2) quasi-secure exits, that is tenancies provided by the 
market in the private rented sector, and although security of tenure is weak to moderate, the 
market rents are subsidised by the State, to allow the tenants’ contribution to be based on their 
income (Norris and Hayden, 2021); and dependent exits, that is returning to family, staying with 
friends or families or moving to other institutions such as prison or hospital. 
Taking the example of Dublin, between 2014 and 2020 there were nearly 16,400 exits from 
emergency accommodation, just over 6,700 or 40 percent were secure exits, 4,700 or nearly 30 
percent were quasi-secure exits and remaining 4,900 exits were dependent exits. In Figure 9, 
exits to secure social housing tenancies are shown. These are tenancies provided by municipal 
authorities and not-for-profit Approved Housing Bodies where rents are income related and 
capped, security of tenure is high, with tenancies de facto for life. Those exiting emergency 
accommodation to this form of housing are unlikely to return to emergency accommodation 
due to high degree of security offered by state or not-for-profit landlords and that rents are 
guaranteed to be low and predictable, and based on the income of tenant rather than the cost 
of providing the dwelling or the market rate.
Κοινωνική Πολιτική 14 • Ιούνιος 2021 • 29
Source: Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, 2021a.
Quasi-secure exits, shown in figure 10, comprised of 4 distinct schemes that support tenancies 
in the private rented sector, with municipalities either leasing properties from the private market 
and making them available to qualified households or more commonly, providing a source of 
state funding to either the tenant or increasingly the case, directly to the landlord, to bridge the 
gap between the market rent and ability of the tenant to pay. Security of tenure varies depending 
if you are living in a dwelling that is leased or either the tenant or landlord is receiving a cash 
subsidy to enable renting. The most common form of assistance is the Housing Assistance 
Payment where the local authority pays the full market rent (subject to certain limits) to the 
Landlord, with the tenant paying an income related contribution to the local authority. However, 
landlords have the legal right to terminate a tenancy if for example the landlord wishes to sell 
the property or the landlord or landlord’s family member wants to live in the property, alongside 
more the common reasons of breach of tenant’s obligations. As a result, exits to these tenancies 
are considerably less stable than the secure tenancies and with a low-moderate likelihood of these 
exits resulting in a re-entry to emergency accommodation.
30 • Κοινωνική Πολιτική 14 • Ιούνιος 2021
Source: Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, 2021a.
Finally, we have dependent exits, where exits are to other institutions or to family and friends, 
and these exits are inherently unstable with a strong likelihood that those who exit via this route 
will return to emergency accommodation when their time in prison or hospital ends, or when a 
sharing arrangement breaks down.
Source: Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, 2021a.
The flow data outlining the entries to and exits from emergency accommodation offers a 
very different interpretation of the nature of and responses to homelessness than does the 
point-in-time data. Given the scale of the entries it seems likely that entries to emergency are 
driven more by structural factors interacting with individual level vulnerabilities rather than by 
individual level vulnerabilities only. In terms of policy responses, the data suggests that very 
considerable success has been achieved in exiting adults from emergency accommodation, albeit 
not all exits are secure and depending on the type of exit, the likelihood of a further spell in 
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emergency accommodations ranges from low to high. The data also suggests that the massive 
expansion in the use of private emergency accommodation (hotels and bed and breakfast type 
accommodation), the construction of nearly 30 family hubs and the expansion of supported 
temporary accommodation (congregate facilities for adult-only households) was demand-led 
rather than the provision of such accommodation pulling households into homelessness. Adults 
were entering emergency accommodation as a consequence of the ending of their tenancy in 
the private rented sector and their inability to secure new accommodation, or that ‘sofa surfing’ 
arrangements became untenable rather than emergency accommodation acting as a pull factor.
In addition to the number of households in emergency accommodation at a point-in-time, 
we also have much larger number of households who are qualified for social housing, that is 
they are, for example, living in over-crowded, unsuitable or unfit accommodation, or have a 
reasonable requirement for separate accommodation and don’t have the financial means to 
acquire accommodation, but who are waiting for such accommodation to be made available 
to them. The over-all number of households who qualify for social housing has declined from 
nearly 90,000 in 2013 to just under 62,000 in 2020. However, this decline is largely attributable 
to changes in way in which households in recent of various rent supplements are treated. 
If you focus instead on the number of households living in accommodation that is unfit or 
overcrowded only as shown in Table 1, that is households in inadequate accommodation as 
set out in European Typology of Homelessness and Housing Exclusion (ETHOS), a more 
consistent figure is noted, with outstanding need in the mid-30,000s over the past number of 
years. These households, primarily in the private rented sector or staying with family / friends 
constitute a minimum population, whose economic precariousness combined with the shock of 
for example a relationship breakdown, or termination of tenancy, vulnerable to experiencing a 
spell of homelessness. 
Table 1. Households in Insecure / overcrowded Accommodation 
2013 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Unsuitable accommodation due to 
particular household circumstances
20,349 18,920 18,920 18,920 19,422 18,750
Reasonable requirement for separate 
accommodation
9,587 11,476 11,914 11,108 12,045 11,445
Overcrowded accommodation 2,896 3,517 3,544 3,465 3,649 3,551
Unfit accommodation 647 2,304 948 648 511 544
Total 33,479 38,397 37,536 34,141 35,627 34,290
Source: Housing Agency (Various Years) Summary of Social Housing Assessments. 
It seems plausible that the flows into emergency accommodation are coming primarily from 
this larger vulnerable population, and until the provision of secure housing for this larger group 
is addressed, there will a continuous flow of adults dislodged from their precarious housing into 
emergency accommodation. 
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Conclusion
The majority of adults who experienced a spell in emergency accommodation for their first time 
between 2014 and 2020 exited to housing and their likelihood of experiencing a repeat spell in 
emergency accommodation is low to moderate. On the other hand, those making dependent 
exits have a high likelihood of experiencing a repeat episode. For those making dependent 
exits and those getting ‘stuck’ in emergency accommodation, emergency accommodation is 
providing extraordinarily expensive poor quality shelter on either on an intermittent or long-
term basis without resolving their residential instability through the provision of appropriate 
secure and affordable housing. Thus, the point-in-time figure is disproportionately made up of 
those ‘stuck’ in emergency accommodation, largely due to a mis-match between their household 
composition, that is single person households and those households with large numbers of child 
dependents, and the available stock of either social or private housing, and those cycling in and 
out of emergency accommodation as part of the institutional circuit that they are traversing. 
The focus of much media and other commentary in Ireland in recent years in relation to 
homelessness has been on the relatively small number of adults experiencing literal homelessness, 
and to a lesser degree on the number in emergency accommodation at a point in time, but with 
little or no focus on the cumulative number of adults who experiencing a spell in emergency 
accommodation of the past 7 years. This has led to the neglect of understanding what factors 
contributed to 37,000 adults entering emergency accommodation for their first time between 
2014 and 2020, and a focus instead on the characteristics of the, on average, 5,000 adults in 
emergency accommodation at a point in time over the same period, and the just over 100 rough 
sleepers in Dublin at a point in time. How we measure homelessness has implications for how 
public policies are constructed and how the issue is framed. In the case of Ireland, a focus 
on the 37,000 adults who experiencing homelessness for the first time over the past 7 years, 
rather the traits of the significantly smaller number in emergency accommodation or literally 
homeless at a point in time would frame homelessness as a consequence of housing insecurity 
and precariousness rather than resulting from individual level frailties and dysfunctions, with 
profound consequences for responding to homelessness.
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Housing and the Social Investment State:  
An Underestimated Relationship
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Abstract
The concept of the social investment state is currently the guiding concept for transforming the 
European welfare states. With the objective of “preparing instead of repairing” and its outstanding 
significance of the labour market, it is a marked counter-project to the Keynesian-Beveridge 
paradigm where welfare is provided through a (re)distributive lens of compensations. Instead, 
Europe is continuously transforming the educational programmes, family friendly policies etc. 
towards a labour market oriented regime that subordinates social policy. This paper discusses 
the role of housing and neighbourhood: the social investment approach does not position this 
policy field extensively, which means that it does not attach any importance to housing. This 
understanding is criticized in this article using the example of forced migration. It is argued that 
housing is a central pillar for achieving the goals of the social investment state. Not investing in 
housing accordingly can be interpreted a failure of the social investment approach.
Keywords: social investment; neighbourhood; refugees; housing; Eritrea; Ethiopia; welfare state
Introduction
Throughout Europe the social investment concept is a future-oriented policy that invests especially 
in instruments and infrastructure to qualify for participation in the labour market and by thus 
preventing social problems associated with low levels of education (Busemeyer et al. 2018, EC 2018). 
Even when different social investment regimes can be described the social investment approach 
is currently the central normative vision for the restructuring of European welfare states and their 
social policies (Bonoli 2009; Deeming & Smyth 2015). The OECD reports (especially OECD 2011; 
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2015 and 2017) describe the basic problem of Europe as following: that economic internalisation, 
technological innovation, demographic ageing and changing family structures in the post-industrial 
age increasingly worsen life opportunities for large parts of the population (Hemerijck, 2018).
For a long time the shift from “repairing” the capitalist welfare state foremost by “compensating” 
its failures to “investing” in post-capitalist welfare states (Polese et al., 2015) has not been linked 
to scientific debates, nor is was even evidence based. Meanwhile the framework shifted and we can 
observe a broad scientific criticism of the social investment approach with regard to its implicit 
social norms (Ferrara 2009), its credo of “flexicurity and flexploitation” (Viebrock & Clasen, 2009), 
its moralisation of the poverty question, and its paradox that arises from the fact that poverty has 
not disappeared in Europe (Cantillon, 2011). Nevertheless its fundamental claim to frame the 
restructuring of the European welfare states with a paradigmatic turnaround has not been called 
into doubt by national politics (Garritzmann et al., 2017, Greener, 2018; Kovács et al., 2017).
Key policy areas that have been restructured in recent years particularly concern the 
labour market. With programs such as skill-oriented active labour market policy (ALMP) the 
focus is on pronounced individualized incentive-malus structures. At the same time, extensive 
infrastructures are being financed, especially in the areas of early child education and care, 
education and training over the life course, and social assistance. The narrative that is supposed 
to ensure acceptance revolves around the prevention of “new” risks. Risks arise from “precarious 
employment, labour market dualization, youth unemployment, difficulties of reconceiling work 
and family life, and single-parenthood” (Busemeyer et al., 2018, 801f.) or from a labour market 
that is to the detriment of mothers if they remain abstinent for too long (Nygård, et al., 2019).
It can be considered as an achievement of academic research to question whether the concept of 
the human being in the social investment concept follows a “one-size fits all” solution or whether it 
would not be more appropriate to focus on life courses and thus taking the individuality of modern 
societies into account. The transformation of welfare arrangements can thus not be described simply 
as a shift towards an activating welfare state, but as “centred on specific life course transitions” (de 
Graaf & Maier, 2017: 40). With this reorientation towards the life course, the social investment 
concept has reached an argumentative turn, which Porte and Natali (2018) position around 2011 
and call “the SI ‘moment’” (ibid., 837). Supported by academic expertise, it was possible to introduce 
a perspective on critical transitions during the life course into political conceptualisation: transitions 
from education into the first job, when aspire to have children and starting a family, drop out of the 
labour market, move to retirement (Hemerijck, 2018). On the one hand, the challenge became aware 
to make “transition pay” (Schmid, 2015: 71) and, on the other, to support the development of assets 
and skills that can cushion these critical transitions (Busemeyer et al., 2018: 802).
Having succeeded in this intervention on the part of science, another aspect appears on the 
horizon, which will be presented in more detail in this paper: Strangely the social investment 
concept is largely space-less. But leaving the parental home, entering the labour market, 
earning an independent income, deciding a partnership, having children, finding a home, 
forming independent opinions, taking responsibility for one’s self, etc., all of these changes a life 
course trajectories are depending of the place where a person lives and acts. But housing, the 
neighbourhood and the social environment has hardly any significance in the social investment 
approach, it is rarely mentioned and there are no political objectives. Consequently, housing 
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operates as a field of compensation in the classical sense of Keynes and Beveridge and is thus 
subject to continuous devaluation. 
This paper addresses those shortcomings and goes beyond the supply aspect of housing. In the 
following chapter, housing is defined more broadly than just the availability of an address or residential 
space. Rather, housing is understood as being embedded in local structures (e.g. the neighbourhood 
and the community) where processes of informal learning take place. Understood in this way housing 
becomes a pillar for social integration which is on the other side a mediator of a successful labour market 
integration. In a next sub-section we ask about the significance of housing in the social investment 
approach. We will find some short mentions on housing in the beginning of the EU position papers. 
And we will observe a current scientific activity for reinventing housing under the umbrella of the 
capability concept. This debate is based on the rising number of refugees and people being affected 
by homelessness and exclusion from the housing market. The empirical part of the paper is based 
on an ongoing research project on the potential of neighbourhood-based social integration of young 
refugees. Its preliminary results will demonstrate how attempts are currently being made to reduce 
the “new risks” and prepare for the labour market through embedding people into the microstructure 
of the neighbourhood. The last section of the paper is based on these findings and will conclude with 
an argument for a stronger programming of housing in the social investment concept.
Housing: From Commodity to Capability
According to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1991) housing 
goes beyond the mere possession of one’s ‘own four walls’ and ‘a roof over one’s head’. It is to be 
regarded as being able to live at a certain place in security and dignity. Adequate housing includes 
the availability of infrastructure such as water or energy, sufficient protection against heat, rain, 
wind and cold, and the accessibility of social facilities. Housing is not appropriate if it is located 
in a dangerous area or does not permit the expression of one’s own cultural identity. In a 2017 
report, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing called for an approach to 
nationally and locally adaptable, human rights-based housing strategies (Human Rights Council, 
2017). Strategies that do not just providing housing but also addressing gaps and inequalities 
in existing systems and reviewing and modifying existing housing policies and programmes in 
order to challenge possible stigmatisation, marginalisation and discrimination and bringing 
housing back to his “social use” and the “diverse set of social relationships that give it meaning” 
(Human Rights Council, 2017: 10). Both approaches from UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing does not just 
force governments to construct housing and does not just mean that people without housing may 
demand housing from the government. Rather, it requires governments to take all necessary and 
possible measures to ensure that the housing situation grants security, privacy, health and social 
embeddedness – a prerequisite for being able to choose and find work (UN Habitat, 2009: 9).
Alongside the political initiatives for more consideration of housing as the pillar of a person’s 
growth and development, various scientific disciplines are addressing the issue. “Housing is 
health” is the assessment of Bovell-Ammon et al. (2020) in their synopsis of the state of research 
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on public health with regard to life courses. They consider 4 domains as central: the quality of 
housing (heating, cooling, free of mold and other environmental hazards), the stability of housing 
(free from evictions, foreclosures, forced displacement), affordability (balanced increase in rent 
and wages, funding of programs) and the embedding in a neighbourhood (staple, safe outdoor 
spaces, access to transportation and jobs, community, social services). That health is considered 
worthy is due to the in-depth analyses commissioned in the course of developing the social 
investment approach (EC, 2013). Here it is elaborated that health is a “value in itself … It is also 
a precondition for economic prosperity. People’s health influences economic outcomes in terms 
of productivity, labour supply, human capital and public spending.” (ibid., 1) A corresponding 
significance for the policy field of housing is missing in the expert reports, which is why housing 
always occurs only as a function and has no “value in itself”. An appropriate living environment, 
contacts with neighbours, has at best “positive impacts on population’s health.” (ibid., 20).
This niche position of housing has recently been questioned in the context of the growing 
number of people who are affected by insecure and inadequate housing situations as well as by 
homelessness. Whereas forementioned concepts are based on theorists like Marshall, Rawls, or 
Beveridge, the new discussion is linked to Amartya Sen’s capability approach (O’ Shaughnessy et 
al., 2020). Following Sen and his assumptions (1999), the question of whether a person succeeds 
in leading a self-determined life (and thus having assets to respond to critical transitions in the 
life course) depends on the structure and equipping of a person with different abilities and 
competences; entitlements determine whether a person is able to exchange his competences 
into functioning (what a person does) and capabilities (what a person could achieve) and thus 
into a portfolio of options to realize a life course the person has reason to value (Drilling, 2010).
According to Sen and understood as a critique on the one sidedness of the social investment 
concept on the labour market, income is not a value in itself. Rather, income creates opportunities 
and these in turn create options to pursue a life. Poverty and risks thus can be understood as 
capability deprivation (Drilling, 2008). To establish social and territorial justice is therefore 
neither to be answered from his utilitarian perspective, nor from an exclusive view of supplying 
good, but above all from a capability perspective: capabilities that enables individuals to convert 
commodities into functionings (real achievements). Just as the loss of income leads houselessness 
to social isolation and exclusion from the kind of life citizens aspire to live. “Housing is generally 
discussed as a type of commodity or basic good to be supplied” summarizes Kimhur (2020: 266) 
in order to formulate the turn: “… rather than expanding a person’s capabilities or ‘valued being 
or doing’ (functioning) that a person can achieve by utilizing the resource housing” (ibid, 266). 
Approaches like housing first, accompanied housing, co-living or intergenerational housing, aging 
in place thus become a capability meaning whereas refugee camps, collective housing for migrants, 
night shelters for homeless people foremost deliver a supply. It is to distinguish “between doing 
something (achieved functioning) and ‘being free to do that thing (capability)” (ibid, 267). In the 
consequence the “social investment perspective (must) shift the focus of welfare state provision from 
ex-post income compensation to ex-ante risk-prevention and capacitation.” (Hemerijck, 2020: 282).
From this wider perspective on people’s capabilities to react on social risks, housing must necessarily 
be interpreted in a broader context of living in a residential environment, in a neighbourhood, with 
neighbours and social contacts, learnings, informal support etc. (see Drilling & Schnur, 2019). Of 
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particular interest in this argumentation are studies that focus on the importance of neighbourhoods 
for one of the groups referred to as vulnerable in the social investment state: young refugees, who 
have “little time to prepare for their transition to adulthood” (Schmittgen et al., 2017: 219).
There is a consensus that the neighbourhood in which immigrants live plays a key role in 
processes of the life course (Ager and Strang, 2008; Danzer and Yaman, 2013). According to 
Galster (2012) the process of socialisation is influenced through contact with native peers in the 
neighbourhood. The residents of a neighbourhood have an impact on the behaviours and informal 
education processes of their neighbours by means of social interaction. Neighbours thus form an 
important part of social networks by providing information, knowledge and other resources, which 
could increase labour market and other economic opportunities (Gould & Turner, 1997). In a 
neighbourhood context, “the degree to which a refugee is exposed to natives has an impact on 
acquiring language and other country-specific skills” (Dahlberg & Valeyatheepillay, 2018: 2) and the 
ratio of educated individuals and high-income earners in the refugees’ neighbourhood contributes 
to their access to high-quality social networks through daily, local interactions (Spicer, 2008).
According to Dahlberg & Valeyatheepillay (2018) the policy of dispersal of refugees among 
communities implemented by the authorities plays a central role because the “initial individualized 
neighborhoods of placed refugees are characterized by more integration than what is the case for the 
non-placed individuals” (ibid., 31), and if refugees can choose their neighbourhoods, they “prefer 
neighborhoods with higher presence of immigrants over time” (ibid., 32). Furthermore, when refugees are 
segregated into specific neighbourhoods, they continue to be perceived by others “through a deficit lens 
within … ‘victim’ narratives” (Symons & Ponzia, 2019). The local authorities are therefore called upon 
to continue to use their dispersal policy to the extent that social integration processes are immediately 
supported in these places - and at the same time to make sure that temporary accommodation such 
as camps are by no means prerequisites for integration processes (Kourachanis, 2018).
From this line of argumentation, the intentions of the social investment state need to be grounded 
in a context of social space. Individual success in coping with critical events and the transition 
from one status passage to another are directly linked to the question of where a person lives, 
in which environment he or she can exchange experiences, which resources he or she has at his 
or her disposal thanks to his or her neighbours, and whether he or she can choose between the 
options offered by his or her place of residence or whether his or her place of residence does not 
have these options at all. In other words: neighbourhood and housing have to be programmed 
as an essential part of the social investment approach (Campbell et al., 2016; Katz et al., 2016).
Methodology
The research project “The potential of neighbourhood based social integration of young refugees 
from Eritrea and Ethiopia and the implications for multi-layer governance of social investment 
policy” questions the idealisation of the social investment concept that risks in the life course can 
be minimised or even prevented by investing in individuals and individual oriented infrastructure. 
Though social investment policy was designed to benefit disadvantaged social groups – including 
refugees. On the one hand, they individually do not have the equal access to funding instruments 
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and, on the other hand, they do not have the required qualifications for be entitled as an object 
of investments. This results in unequal living situations and can be observed in the case of 
refugees in Switzerland: After ten years of arrival, the employment rate of recognised refugees 
in Switzerland stood at 48% (and for provisionally admitted persons the rate is only 25%), and 
the social assistance rate for refugees was 86% (SEM, 2018). Refugees from Eritrea and Ethiopia 
dominate these statistics. Based on findings from neighbourhood research the project asks for 
the potential of local social structures for integration processes and the attempt of Swiss politics 
to restore the bridging function of social assistance by linking social investment, housing and 
neighbourhood integration. Methodologically the research follows a mixed methods design. In 
order to describe the living situation, the local social capital in the neighbourhood and the use of 
state and non-state assistance from the perspective of the refugees a quantitative questionnaire 
will be conducted; to realise the interwovenness of neighbourhood initiatives, volunteers, social 
services and refugees in concrete situations case studies in two municipalities will be carried by 
using ethnographic methods. To frame the question within the context of forced migration and 
to work out the relevance of housing and neighbourhood structures in the countries of origin 
interviews with experts working with refugees and a literature review have been conducted.
This paper is based on preliminary results of expert interviews and a literature review. A group 
of 10 experts from Eritrea and Ethiopia, who arrived in Switzerland as refugees and are now active 
as professionals in the field of integration, were asked about their own experiences of arriving in 
Swiss neighbourhoods. They were also given the task of explaining the importance of housing 
and neighbourhoods in their country of origin and the role housing and neighbourhoods have in 
economic and social integration there. Finally, the experts were asked whether the refugees with 
whom they work in Switzerland address housing and the neighbourhood and what expectations are 
associated with it. By the expert interviews the question can be answered, which influence housing 
in a social neighbourhood as a “space of arrival” have on the goal expected by the social investment 
state. Or in Sen’s terminology: in which sense the neighbourhood act to offer entitlement rights on 
a local and informal basis for enlarging capabilities and thus perform achievements like a first job. 
In a second step a literature review was carried out, which was intended to find out whether the 
experts’ statements are reflected in scientific research. For this purpose, the databases “Web of 
Science” and “Scopus” were searched. The search strategy used the keywords “neighbourhood”, 
“refugee” and “integration” in a full text search; furthermore, the search was geographically 
narrowed down to Europe, the origin of the social investment concept, as well as to the years 
2018-2021. A total of 78 results were generated. An abstract analysis filtered out those articles 
that focus in the abstract on the connection between refugees, neighbourhood and labour market. 
A total of 5 articles were thus subjected to a content analysis.
The Expert’s View of the Relevance of Housing and Neighbourhood
Housing in the context of its relevance to social investment goals is described by the experts as 
living in a neighbourhood and with neighbours. A neighbour is someone who lives directly, next 
or near to one. The other dimension of housing covers the social relationship or interactions with 
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the residents living in one neighbourhood. This is seen from different indicators like knowing 
each other, contact, communication, relationship, feeling near or close, feeling of belongingness, 
reciprocity, responsibility, friendship and emotional or material support. 
Many of the expert’s conception of the neighbourhood depends on the context it is being 
talked about. One expert explains the different pictures which come to her mind when she talks 
about neighbourhoods in Eritrea and Switzerland. While in the context of Eritrea, she thinks of 
the neighbourhood first as people who live there, in Switzerland, she associates this first with the 
physical objectives, like the bus station, the streets, or the children’s playground. The relationship 
with a neighbour is generally expressed by the experts as closeness knowing each other, feeling 
at ease to enter each other’s home and depending on each other, usually expressed through 
exchange of basic household essentials such as “salt or sugar”. The relationship is also mutual, 
where one can exchange information and understand each other and support which could be 
material but also emotional. Moreover, neighbourhood is also seen like a platform which gives 
people the opportunity to build friendship and create acquaintance.
The closeness or intimacy that there is among neighbours makes a neighbourhood resemble 
one’s own family. One example which reflects this statement is an example where the neighbours 
live by helping each other and being at the side of each other during bad and good times. 
According to another expert “the only difference between one’s own family and the neighbourhood 
is the degree of this responsibility”. The responsibility could be babysitting a neighbours’ child as 
well looking out for a general in the area. It could even go the extent of setting up savings and 
lending groups based on trust. Responsibility in the Eritrean and Ethiopian neighbourhood may 
have many forms. Although parents carry the primary responsibility of raising their children, 
neighbours have also shared responsibilities in socializing, disciplining, and teaching children in 
the neighbourhood. Furthermore, elderly people in the neighbourhood assume this responsibility 
voluntarily and they are accepted by the families in the neighbourhood to act so. To admit this 
view, the community expresses through a proverb that “Tell me where you live, I will tell you 
who you are” as a recognition of the effects of neighbourhood and local community on child 
and youth status. 
While the majority of our experts mention having no contact with their neighbours in 
Switzerland, one expert started to take her own initiatives. “I say hello and we drink coffee 
together, we talk about swiss, what is going on and the situation at the moment.” Another experts 
narrates about a support from a neighbour. “She offered me an internship. We started talking 
while waiting for the bus. She lived in different countries, that’s why she was open.” Other experts 
report about similar contacts with swiss people helped them to improve the language skills or 
got the opportunity to visit different places. 
What kind of neighbourliness is assumed to be good for integration in the sense of the social 
investment approach? One of the experts answered that a “good neighbourhood” should be deemed 
as follows: “…I can think of one case … with a family in … They have a neighbour who always 
supports them and according to them is almost like a part of the family. He comes into their home. 
And vice versa. He supports them, whether it is with letters or other things they don’t understand”.
Beside the bridging social capital that arises from face-to-face meeting in the context of housing, 
the contribution of formal neighbourhood organizations were mentioned in the interviews. 
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Although many experts believe that the Municipality is engaged at promoting various activities 
at the neighbourhood level they express that this is not enough to include the refugees or give 
them a better opportunity to use the resources they have. Most of the young refugees limited their 
contact with the municipality just to renew their ID or for any other administration purposes. 
One expert stresses the procedure of welcoming the newcomers and specifically the refugees. 
He complains the Municipality as not working to promote the relationship among the residents 
at the neighborhood, rather as primarily interested about the formal administrative works. He 
calls this system of the Municipality as, “In Rome be like Romans”.
At the end most of the refugees the experts are working with report that they feel lonely. 
Because they live in the middle of the neighbourhood but they do not have systematically access 
as members. Despite these difficulties and feelings, the refugees know how important it is to 
encounter the natives to learn about daily life and the neighbourhood life. For that they would 
like to invite their Swiss neighbours too, but not sure whether they would come. 
According to the experts, young refugees believe that the expectations of the host country 
and the residents in the neighbourhood has a negative impact on the freedom to act in a way 
they used to act as a free person: “Usually the fear dominates. Many people are afraid to make 
mistakes here because often we hear the critics about us. So rather than being ourselves or how 
we want to be, we lose our energy on thinking about how they perceive us. We spent a lot of 
time on thinkinghow they will react.” That is why the refugees think too much to avert public 
misjudgements and pre-existing stereotypes. “Instead of acting, expressing, and thinking about 
things by themselves freely, their mind is occupied by the host country’s culture and expectations 
to fulfil.”
Aside from private engagement and state investment on skills like language courses, civil 
organizations on the neighbourhood scale help young refugees by providing free language 
classes to improve communication skills and create opportunities for networking for those who 
are ready to contact the local community. Moreover, local structures help the refugees to learn 
and understand the culture and thus play a significant role in the integration process through 
bringing people together. “Once they know the system, young people will develop and change 
over time. The young people are shaped by the system. When young people enter the system, 
they will be changed economically, in their way of thinking and in their educational abilities - 
that is why it plays such an important role. It is the system that either integrates people quickly 
or lets them fall.”
On the other side, the local refugee community organizations can facilitate integration 
to the local community. Hereby social bonding seems to be important. Refugees could help 
one another and share experiences about the integration process and pathways. In this case, 
integration should be considered as mutual and the traditional perspective of integration can 
be changed – because refugees have something to give and some part of their values and norms 
should be recognized by the local residents. Living together can be achieved by recognizing 
and accepting each other’s values and norms but not by assimilation. People may learn from 
each other by living and spending time together. Indeed, the local structure nurtures the social 
capital of the local community.
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Contrasting Expert View with a Literature Review
The journal articles identified a strong link between social and economic integration and 
neighbourhood embeddedness (see Table 1). Andersson et al. (2018) and Klaesson et al. (2018) 
use panel and population data, respectively, to analyse the influence of the neighbourhoods to 
which refugees are assigned on their economic integration. They found significant correlations, 
for example that the success of a first job depends on the employment rate in the neighbourhood 
in general, but also among the immigrant group, and on the relationship between refugees and 
locals. Klaesson et al. (2018) attribute explanatory significance to these effects of “enclave 
quality” and “enclave size” for economic integration and provide important information on 
the informal networks and the spatial contexts in which refugees come into contact with the 
expectations of the social investment state. Andersson et al. (2018) summarizes that the port-of-
entry neighbourhood “make substantial difference in refugees’ employment prospects, though 
with crucial differences by gender and co-ethnic context.” (ibid., 30) They also indirectly question 
the distribution mechanisms of the welfare states, which do not take such characteristics into 
account and advocate “a more nuanced policy involving metro/neighbourhood … that discourages 
refugee settlement in certain types of places and directs/incentivizes it toward others.” (ibid., 30). 
The arrival neighbourhood (“port-of-entry neighbourhood”) and its provision with “arrival 
infrastructure” (co-ethnic networks, services, etc.) is the subject of Liempt & Miellet (2020) in 
their broader qualitative study on processes of homemaking in municipalities in the Netherlands. 
Where such infrastructures are considered insufficient by the refugees, they relocate to better-
equipped places in other municipalities. Through this study, it becomes apparent that there 
are also efforts on the part of the refugees to meet the expectations of economic and social 
integration. They also point to the importance of peers (whether from the country of origin or 
the host communities): “Small talks or ‘doing alongside’ … in and around the house and in the 
neighbourhood is perceived important support for resettled refugees and provides them with 
a sense of belonging and feeling of acceptance, especially in the early phase of settlement.” 
(Liempt & Miellet, 2020: 15). In their study on the political integration of refugees, Bratsberg 
et al. (2018) even venture a temporal prognosis: “Our findings indicate that the first 3 years 
after arrival may constitute a critical ‘integration window,’ in which context plays a key role 
in habituating modes of interaction with the host society” (Bratsberg et al., 2018: 12). They 
therefore suggest that “governments should take factors beyond capacity and dispersion into 
account when allocating refugees across a national territory.” (ibid., 12).
Finally, Mahieu & van Caudenberg (2020) evaluate a cohabitation project in which locals and 
young refugees live together. Here, neighbourly structures are found in a very confined space. 
In their qualitative evaluation of the programme in Belgium, they conclude that co-housing is 
both a supportive environment and a space for mutual informal learning. The daily encounters, 
the informal conversations and the ephemeral co-existence strengthen educational as well as 
communicative and emotional aspects and thus support processes of economic integration 
through social interactions. It is this low threshold that the authors discover in the forms of 
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Table 1. Housing and the Social Investment Concept: Searching for Relevance by Literature Review
Author Andersson, R. et al. Klaesson, J. et al. Bratsberg, B. et al. Liempt, I. van & Miellet, S. Mahieu, R. & Van Caudenberg, R.
Year of  
publication
2018 2018 2020 2020 2020
Focus impact of the first settled neighbourhood 
on the employment prospective
impact of the residence in an 
ethnic enclave for immigrants’ 
labour market integration
impact of the initial 
neighbourhood on political 
participation
how processes of homemaking 
evolve in the locations to which 
refugees have been dispersed
evaluation of an intercultural 





Refugees employed 5  
or 10 years after settling
immigrants 1993/94  
and 2005/06
refugees placed between  
1990 – 2012
between 7 and 14 months after 
settling
refugees living in cohabitation 
with locals between 2017-19




semi-structured interviews with 
refugees and locals (N=40)
Focus on Iran, Iraq, Somalia immigrating 1995 
-2004
immigrants from the Balkans 
(1993-94) and from Middle East 
(2005-06)
27 municipalities refugees from Syria resettled to 
the Netherlands




quantitative quantitative quantitative qualitative qualitative
Region Sweden Sweden Norway Netherlands Belgium
Relevant 
results
socioeconomically weaker refugees tend 
to sort into own-ethnic enclaves after 
several years of residence in the host 
nation males have a significantly higher 
probability of being employed after 5 years 
and work more during their first 10 years 
than females those arriving at the port-of-
entry with social welfare or parental leave 
benefits experience inferior employment 
outcomes refugees with a higher share 
of co-ethnic neighbours decrease their 
probability of being employed after 5 years 
negative effects of co-ethnic concentrations 
are almost entirely the result of female 
refugees
probability to get a first job 
influenced by (1) overall 
employment rate, (2) share 
of the respective immigrant 
group over all residents, and 
(3) employment rate of the 
immigrants’ own immigrant 
groupemployment rate of 
immigrant group in the vicinity 
facilitates labour market 
integration of new immigrants 
people with relatively low 
education continue without a job 
the longest
neighbourhood exert path-
dependent effects on immigrant 
political integration initial 
placement within a politically 
engaged neighbourhood is 
associated with an increase in 
refugees’ downstream selectorial 
turnout turnout among neighbours 
and peers is influential early 
exposure to politically engaged 
peer networks plays a key role in 
shaping political integration the 
first 3 years after arrival constitute 
a critical ‘integration window’
respondents associated 
larger cities with greater 
opportunities to find work or 
complete (higher) education 
and with the presence of co-
ethnics, relatives and friends 
after 2 years, one in 5 refugees 
has moved to another region 
than that to which they were 
dispersed making new 
contacts is important, but also 
reconnecting with one’s own 
friends and family is crucial for 
homemaking
cohousing is a supportive 
environment: (1) small gestures 
such as sharing, lending or 
donating household items, 
(2) accompanying to formal 
institutions, (3) emotional 
well-being cohousing is a 
space for mutual informal 
learning: (1) language learning, 
(2) communication skills, (3) 
learning about Belgium and the 






gender effects; co-ethnic effects; 
relevance of port-of-entry neighbourhood
enclave quality; enclave size;  
local-peer-effects
peer-effects; neighbour-effects support level and arrival 
infrastructure in dispersal 
municipalities
low-threshold effects
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Conclusions
The aim of this article was to focus more on the spatial aspects of the social investment approach 
in order to highlight their importance. While housing and neighbourhood environment were 
still important policy fields in the early papers of the EU, they became less and less relevant as 
fields of active investment policy compared to the labour market, early child care or education. 
In recent years, housing has been treated more as a commodity and applied in a compensatory 
sense: a roof over one’s head was sufficient to meet the demand for housing. The fact that this 
fundamentally contradicts various international initiatives, such as those of the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or the Human Rights Council, was appropriately 
deduced. Adequate housing and embedding in a neighbourhood thus acts as a catalyst for many 
goals of the social investment state, is to be valued as a capability and builds agency; especially 
through low-threshold encounters with locals, the associated informal learning situations and 
assistance, which can lead to options on the labour market. The example of refugees chosen 
here confirms this in practice (interviews) and theory (literature review). This has consequences 
for the current implementation of the social investment approach:
(1) The social investment approach lacks its spatial grounding. Social or economic integration, 
critical life events, discontinuous transit, etc: all this does not happen in a place-less way, but 
occurs in a temporal and spatial setting. Housing and neighbourhoods have important influences 
on life trajectories and integration patterns. Housing requires investment and should not be 
reduced to its functional aspects by the social investment approach.
(2) The social investment approach’s focus on housing as a capability or option structure 
also implies an opening of the approach to soft factors such as social capital, trust in the 
neighbourhood, collective action, etc. This implies the need to search for appropriate indicators. 
This requires the search for appropriate indicators, which can be located on the level of previous 
“hard factors” such as school leavers, NEET, or employees. Creating an appropriate database 
that can be combined at the various scal es (neighbourhood, municipality, state) is likely to be 
one of the key challenges in the further development of the approach.
(3) Up to now, the social investment state has mainly referred to government interventions. 
However, with the opening to a broader understanding of housing, non-state actors would also 
gain significance. The interplay between state-NGO-neighbours/civil society would require the 
social investment approach to widen into a multi-layer governance approach, understood as 
an interwoven activity of decisions ranging from central government up- and downwards to the 
supranational and civil societal level. According to Careja (2019), this view is interesting in 
two directions: on the one hand, it connects the actors in the direction of cooperation between 
institutions and the population (cross-level) and, on the other hand, it connects the different 
scale levels to the neighbourhood level (national-local).
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How Private and Public Debt Crises Exacerbate  
Housing Problems in the EU
Eva Betavatzi1 and Eric Toussaint2
Abstract
The increase in mortgage lending in European countries since the 1990s’ is symptomatic of a 
political determination to push households into buying rather than renting on the housing market. 
Banks benefit from this as it allows them not only to increase their loan portfolios but also to use 
loans as securities and sell them on the secondary market. This results in credit bubbles which 
affect the global economy, as was the case in 2007-2008. Since then, in order to recapitalize 
their banks, many states have opted for public debt without imposing any substantial controls 
on the banking system and its ability to grant credit. Households have felt the effects of this in 
two ways: first, they have been confronted with a lack of affordable housing on the rental market, 
which has been left largely in the hands of the private sector and with little public investment or 
regulation; and second, austerity measures have caused their incomes to fall in order to pay off 
public debts. Thus, the increase in private and public debts, and the principle that they must 
be repaid whatever the cost, have an impact on the right to housing. 
Keywords: Illegitimate, illegal, odious debts; mortgages; securitization; financialization and 
commodification of housing; credit bubbles
Introduction: Housing Policies Benefit Private Banks 
For a long time, states, which are supposed to ensure that everyone can enjoy their fundamental 
rights, among which decent accommodation, have in most cases chosen to place private property 
at the centre of their housing access policies (Di Feliciantonio & Aalbers, 2018). As a result, 
in many countries, adequate and affordable housing is best provided through purchase or 
ownership. This means that private banks benefit from a privileged position as they provide 
the necessary mortgages to most homebuyers. They work for the expansion of the residential 
1.Member of CADTM, Brussels, Belgium.
2.Spokesperson of CADTM International network, Liège, Belgium. Historian and political scientist with a PhD from 
the universities of Paris VIII and Liège.
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property market while having participated in its collapse, as was the case in the USA in 2007 
and later in other countries such as Spain. Indeed, by granting mortgage loans, credit bubbles 
were created and eventually burst. Public authorities still support private banks that are active 
on the housing market in several direct and indirect ways: tax measures favourable to landlords, 
public subsidies granted to these same landlords (renovation bonuses are an example), abandon 
of social or public housing (privatization of public housing stocks or lack of public investment), 
deregulation of the private rental market, but above all, insufficient control of banking activities 
despite the proven danger of credit bubbles.
Banks are private companies seeking profitability, and do not claim to guarantee access to 
decent housing for all, that is for the states to do. Between encouraging private property and 
investing in people’s right to housing, it seems that a choice has to be made and that our leaders 
and their predecessors have made their choice. They have chosen to disengage themselves 
from the fundamental rights of their people, and in particular from the right to housing, since 
they assume very little responsibility for it (Madden & Marcuse, 2016). As a result, millions of 
households are finding it increasingly difficult to find decent, affordable and adequate housing 
on increasingly competitive housing markets with soaring prices. In some countries, such as 
Greece, public authorities have completely abandoned their role and guarantee almost nothing 
(Siatitsa, 2019).
It seems obvious to us that in a democratic state, where the fundamental rights of people 
are considered and respected, private banks should not have had this essential role, private 
property should not have been at the centre of housing policies. In this sense, we believe that 
the disproportionate and abusive granting of mortgages to households, partly securitized and 
thus put on the altar of finance, has very strongly contributed to the exacerbation of housing 
problems, just as much as public debts that were used to recapitalize the banks after the 2007-
2008 crisis. They led to the dark years of austerity policies, further reinforcing the problem of 
disinvestment and disengagement of public authorities (Barbero, 2015).
We will try to explore the link between the housing issue and the private and public debts by 
shifting the focus to the banking system. It seems essential to us to highlight the responsibility 
of private banks in the processes of commodification and financialization of housing, which 
deprive several millions of people of the possibility of decent housing in Northern countries 
alone. The question is even more fundamental today, in the midst of a health crisis, because 
incentives to buy continue while policies in favour of private property have contributed to 
excluding a non-negligible part of the population from decent, adapted and affordable housing. 
Moreover, the macroeconomic effect of the mortgage bubbles has been disastrous since 2007 
and has affected citizens in a profoundly unfair way. The austerity imposed as a result of the 
recapitalization of the banks will remain an experience forever engraved in the memory of the 
generations that lived through the crisis of 2007/2008. We are amazed that no lessons seem to 
have been learned since then, as public authorities continue to disinvest from the social and 
public housing market. Control on banking activity is still almost non-existent, and household 
credit bubbles have remained the norm.
Our analysis will focus on the European territory. In the first part, we will explain the role 
of banks. We will also briefly examine the favourable context in which they were able to create 
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large credit portfolios and its effects on the economy as a whole during and after the 2007/2008 
crisis. Banks have proved unable to survive a financial crisis on their own, even though they 
were largely responsible for it, and seem to function as machines producing crises. It is through 
public investment and thus the increase of public debts that many of them have been able to 
remain active with serious consequences on the populations.
Illegitimate, Illegal and Odious Debts
The gap between a person’s income and expenses can be bridged by debt. When buying a house, 
a flat or another type of housing, prospective buyers will generate an expenditure that greatly 
exceeds their current incomes by asking their banks for mortgage loans. In exchange, they will 
have to promise part of their incomes for the next years or decades. A mortgage loan therefore 
constitutes a long-term promise of work, and even of income, which is already a problem in itself 
if we consider that the neoliberal capitalist economy is in perpetual crisis and that in this context, 
a promise of income for the years to come is largely a matter of speculation, regardless of the 
debtors’ own intentions. Indeed, the latter will be unable to control the effects of an economic 
crisis on their work and income, as shown by the situation of millions of insolvent debtors after 
the 2007/2008 crisis - the current situation linked to the Covid-19 pandemic could well be just 
as problematic for debtor households. If, in addition, future buyers have no choice but to go 
into debt to pay for housing, we are tempted to consider their debts as illegitimate (Garcia-
Lamarca, M. & Kaika M., 2016).
Since rental markets in most European cities have become highly competitive, even saturated, 
discriminating, expensive and unregulated, with supplies not always adapted to the circumstances 
of life or to the ways of living, buying appears as an alternative. It claims to offer the possibility 
of decent, adapted or adaptable, affordable, regulated and non-exclusive housing. However, 
things are not always that simple. For buying to be considered a real and free choice, renting 
would have to offer equivalent possibilities. Yet, from the 1990s onwards, households went into 
debt to a large extent in order to cope with a lack of public and social housing, of public policies 
aimed at regulating the rental market in the long term, and of political will to make the right to 
housing effective for all. This triple lack has remained hidden behind a social imaginary built 
on a neoliberal political ideal. In Belgium, the expression ‘to have a brick in the belly’ attests 
to the normalization of aspiring to private property and therefore to debt over sometimes 30 
years (Fares et al., 2020).
Today, more and more people are living in housing that is unsuitable for them, which may be 
unhealthy, overcrowded, too expensive or too far away from their places of work or activity, and 
the path to housing can be a difficult one for many people who suffer from social, gender and 
racist discrimination. As a result, millions of people are poorly housed, while thousands more 
are homeless. The above-mentioned lack of housing has had dramatic effects on a large part of 
the population, especially tenants, who have not had access to bank mortgages, encouraging 
those who can to go into debt at any cost (Desmond, 2016).
It is because the alleged choice made by many households to buy their homes was a result 
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of this lack that we can consider that mortgage debts may have been largely illegitimate and 
therefore should be cancelled. If debtors had been able to choose between two possibilities - 
renting or buying a suitable, decent, affordable house - and if creditors, the banks, had not only 
sought to satisfy their shareholders but to offer their services taking into account the debtors’ 
own needs and the national and global economic situation, the issue would have been different. 
It should also be remembered that before 2007, a large number of debtors were already unable 
to repay their mortgages; with the crisis, they were called upon to repay whatever happened, 
failing which they were evicted or threatened with eviction (European Action Coalition for the 
Right to Housing and the City, 2018).
When, for example, hundreds of thousands of households in the US and Spain took out 
mortgages that were far too large for their modest incomes, it turned out that these loans were 
largely illegitimate and sometimes even illegal. They were illegitimate, because they did not 
really benefit the debtors: they were too expensive, the debt contracts were clearly not to their 
advantage, the debtors had no alternative to buying their homes and were therefore forced 
into debt. A significant number of mortgages were even illegal, with abusive clauses in the loan 
contracts. The illegality of Spanish mortgages was revealed by the Platform of People Affected 
by Mortgages (PAH), one of the largest housing rights movements in Europe, which was born 
out of the Spanish mortgage crisis that began in 2008, the most violent on the continent (García 
Cabeza M. and De Weerdt J., 2015).
In Cyprus and other countries, banks were granting consumer credits to enable households to 
obtain a mortgage, abusing and even circumventing lending rules that required a certain amounts 
of equity capital. In the early 2000s another scam involved European banks granting mortgages 
in Swiss francs. The banks then demanded to be repaid in local currency. As the value of the 
Swiss franc rose, households found themselves unable to repay their loans and experienced a 
perpetual debt situation. One million debtor households in Poland, Slovenia, Greece, France 
and other Balkan countries were victims of that scam (Toussaint, 2019).
Such practices demonstrate two important things: on the one hand, that the banks adopted an 
odious attitude in order to make a maximum profit, and on the other hand, that they granted far 
more credit than they should have and that they were not sufficiently controlled, their activities 
not sufficiently reined in, thus demonstrating the responsibility of the States and, more broadly, 
of European and international institutions. When a creditor lends money for profit knowing 
that it puts the debtor in an impossible situation, this is called an odious debt (Ludington et 
al., 2010). The concepts of illegal, illegitimate and odious debts apply equally to private credit 
and public debt. It seems important to us to mention them because it is on the basis of these 
notions that we claim the need to cancel certain public and private debts and to get out of the 
dogma of repayment whatever the cost (Toussaint, 2017).
When governments chose to recapitalize private banks despite their dubious practices, this 
led to a significant increase in public debt levels in relation to GDP. It is the entire populations 
of the indebted countries that have paid the price. There is something fundamentally illegitimate 
in asking people to refinance, through increased taxes and austerity, a banking system that 
has for years taken advantage of their income and created the conditions for their dependence 
through the lack of alternatives to debt (Graeber, 2011). The public expenditure that has been 
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used to recapitalize the banking system has not been used to socialize the banks, even partly, 
or to subject them to stricter control or even to really limit their financial activity. Thus they 
continue to profit from household incomes in several ways: on an individual scale, since they 
grant loans to households and profit from their repayment, and on a collective scale, since they 
have been recapitalized with public money - via taxes and public debt.
The indebted populations seem to have gained nothing from recapitalizing their banks, they 
have avoided the collapse of a banking system that granted sometimes illegal, illegitimate and 
odious credits, without having succeeded in demanding any compensation, remaining exposed to 
new crises3. In this sense, the billions of euros injected into the banks, from Brussels to Athens, 
via Nicosia, Madrid, Lisbon and Dublin, have created illegitimate public debts that should also 
have been cancelled.
The worst part of this story is that bank recapitalization was not enough to save the banking 
system of the countries that carried it out, which provided investment opportunities for funds 
specialized in buying up non-performing loans, known as “vulture funds”. Vulture funds are 
private financial actors that have made insolvent public or private debts their business. They 
buy them in large quantities, at knock-down prices on the secondary debt market, and then try 
to profit from them in the most odious way possible. To do this, they have different techniques 
adapted to the contexts and natures of the credits they buy. For public debts, they demand 100% 
repayment of a bond they have bought back at a ridiculous price, sometimes as little as 5-20% 
of its face value. Thus, for a 5-billion-euro investment they can demand 100 billion euros in 
repayment from the debtor country and make colossal profits. To achieve their goal, they often 
rely on New York or London jurisdictions that systematically plead in their favour. In Belgium, 
a law against vulture funds limits their possibility of profiting and is unique in the world.
For private debts, vulture funds act somewhat differently4. They buy up non-performing 
loans from banks to ‘clean up’ their balance sheets, thus granting themselves quantities of 
loans (and therefore also of housing units in quantities that sometimes exceed a few thousand 
units) at exceptionally low prices, and after a few years, they sell their real estate assets per 
unit or, in the case of other debts, harass insolvent debtors to obtain repayment. It is easy to 
imagine the profit that this generates. In Europe, the ECB insisted that the banks agree to sell 
their non-performing loan packages to these funds because they felt they had to get rid of their 
rotten assets at all costs. This was the ECB’s watchword at a time when non-performing loans 
amounted to more than $1 trillion in Europe.
The activity of the vulture funds is very obviously odious and yet they have acted and still 
act freely almost everywhere in the world as well as in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus and 
Greece. They are also active in the richer countries of Europe, such as Germany, where the 
financialization of the residential property market has been and remains very aggressive in recent 
years, arousing the anger of growing social movements (Hoffrogge, 2019), especially in Berlin. 
Blackstone, Vonovia, Cerberus, Apollo, Deutsche Wohnen and many others are names that the 
inhabitants of European cities will not soon forget.
3. https://lareleveetlapeste.fr/73-milliards-deuros-en-plus-la-bce-fait-sauter-les-derniers-garde-fous-des-banques/
4. https://www.bastamag.net/Les-fonds-vautour-prosperent-la-misere-en-speculant-sur-l-endettement-des
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Methodology: Combining Action and Research
With the introduction of the notions of illegitimacy, illegality, odiousness, but also with the 
clarification of the roles of the different actors that revolve around the banks (public authorities, 
vulture funds, European institutions and in particular the ECB), we hope to have highlighted the 
way in which the transfer of wealth via mortgage credits takes place and the consequences of 
such a transfer on the right to housing. The centrality of banks in housing policies and thus the 
centrality of private property have no other ambition than this transfer. It is not impossible to 
imagine things differently, and it is even urgent to bring the housing issue back to its collective 
dimension.
Our research has two fundamental bases. The first is fuelled by our longstanding work on 
public debts within the Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debts - CADTM. It has allowed 
us to identify the main causes of the increase in public debt in Europe after the 2007/2008 crisis, 
of which bank recapitalization is one. Work on the analysis of Greek debt, developed within the 
Audit Commission for the Truth about Greek Debt in 2015 and continued thereafter, helped 
us build our case. Our smaller-scale analyses of other countries’ public debts have shown us 
that the public debts of Cyprus, Spain, Portugal and Ireland have similar characteristics (Truth 
Committee on the Greek Public Debt, 2015).
The second basis is our involvement in grassroots struggles for the right to housing. For years 
we have been following and supporting the struggles led by collectives that are members of the 
European Action Coalition for the Right to Housing and the City. We are also involved in local 
struggles in Belgium and actively participate in the defence of tenants against their landlords, 
many of whom could be considered as “tenants” of their banks. In this period of health crisis, 
we have seen that public policies for housing, even those that claim to be “urgent”, have proved 
to be more beneficial to the banks than to the inhabitants. This allowed us to verify, with much 
regret, that the observations we were already making a few years ago are still valid today, while 
the governments’ watchword in the face of the health crisis was to stay at home, which implied 
the possibility of having a home.
By combining the expertise we have developed on public debt and our investment in the 
struggles for the right to housing, we believe we can demonstrate the need to profoundly transform 
the banking system that affects our right to live in decent and affordable housing.
Relations between Financial and Housing Crisis in the Last Decade
Excessive public spending was not the cause of the 2007/2008 crisis, as European leaders have 
often claimed. It was the sub-prime crisis that caused it, i.e. the moment when the mortgage 
bubble created by US banks burst (Toussaint, 2017). To illustrate the extent of this mortgage 
bubble, let’s recall that in the United States, the number of new homes built in 2006 was 1.5 
times higher than in 2000, i.e. an increase of 800,000 homes in one year (European Action 
Coalition for the Right to Housing and the City, 2018). At some point, these homes remained 
empty because the supply did not meet any real demand. This overproduction of housing went 
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hand in hand with the desire to increase the portfolio of bank assets. With the securitization of 
mortgage debts, the subprime crisis soon became a global financial crisis and later a sovereign 
debt crisis in the North.
Similar crises were observed in several Central and Eastern European countries as well as 
in Ireland, the UK, Spain, and the Netherlands in 2011-2012. The increase in household debt 
between 2000-2007 could have been a precursor of what was to come. In Spain, for example, 
household debt as a percentage of GDP rose from 46% to 83% while gross public debt fell from 
58% to 37% of GDP over the same period. Similar trends were observed in Portugal where the 
percentage of household debt rose from 59% to 84% while gross public debt increased only 
slightly over the same period, from 49% to 63%. In Greece, the household debt rate, initially very 
low at 14%, rose sharply to 42% in seven years, while public debt, already very high, had barely 
risen from 104% to 106% of GDP (in 2011 it reached 162% of GDP). In the euro area as a whole, 
household debts have increased much less: from 49% to 54% of GDP, while public debts have 
fallen slightly from 68% to 66% (Toussaint, 2014). Comparing these figures, we can see that the 
increase in private household debt has been much larger in the EU periphery countries where the 
crisis in affordable housing due to unpaid mortgages that started in 2008 was more important.
After 2007, private banks limited lending to households and non-financial firms in these 
countries and continued to produce assets for non-financial firms. Gross public debt ratios 
rose sharply in all three countries between 2007 and 2011, from 37% to 62% of GDP in Spain, 
from 63% to 96% in Portugal and from 108% to 162% in Greece. The fact that private debts 
stagnated during this period while public debts increased illustrates in part the process of bank 
recapitalization discussed earlier.
Now, as the health crisis has lasted for more than a year, as EU stimulus packages announce 
new debts and as public deficits grow, sovereign debt figures have reached heights never before 
imagined. The debt levels of Spain, Portugal and Greece in 2011 may seem ridiculous. Yet, the 
budgetary rigour defined by the Maastricht Treaty required member countries until recently to 
limit their debt/GDP ratio to 60% and their public deficit to 3% of GDP. The rigour imposed 
by European regulations has paved the way for years of austerity.
The example of Greece is particularly revealing and helps to illustrate the impact of austerity 
on the right to housing. In Greece, austerity was imposed by the Troika on the government, 
which was put under guardianship for years without the country really coming out of it. Thus, 
the country’s creditors were able to demand legislative changes to benefit the banks, notably 
changes in the Katseli law (which was put in place to limit the eviction of insolvent households 
by seizing their main residence for unpaid debts) (Gotev, 2019). In February 2019, for example, 
the Eurogroup had openly threatened Greece with no interest payments on its ECB-held debt 
in exchange for a tough reform of the Katseli law. It eventually underwent numerous reforms to 
the benefit of the banks, facilitating foreclosures.
The same fate befell Cypriot legislation. The right to housing for households had been 
enshrined in legislation since 1965. In 2014, the government amended the law guaranteeing 
the right to housing according to the demands of its creditors. This allowed banks to evict 
insolvent debtor households after 60 days of non-repayment, the period defined for a loan to 
be considered non-performing. Insolvent debtor households still had the possibility to delay 
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their eviction by renegotiating their debt. In 2018, a new legislative amendment cancelled the 
possibility to renegotiate their credit and the eviction procedures were privatized and automated 
thus curtailing any possibility of appeal.
Insolvent households in Spain faced equally tragic situations. The existing legislation, which 
allowed banks to evict several hundred thousand insolvent households during the crisis years, dated 
from the period of the Franco dictatorship. It was particularly unfair in that it allowed eviction 
to take place before the property was auctioned off, unlike in other countries, and did not relieve 
households of their repayment obligation even after they had been evicted. Because of this law, 
evictions have been much faster in Spain. In 2018, Spanish banks held 3.5 million empty homes, 
those of people who could not repay their mortgages, of construction companies that produced 
housing units that did not correspond to a real demand and of those that went bankrupt.
These different contexts illustrate an extraordinarily strong pressure from creditors and states 
to dispossess insolvent households of their homes once they have been found to be unable to 
repay their mortgages. It also demonstrates the responsibility and the centrality of banks in 
both lending and dispossessing insolvent debtor households. Banks and their shareholders 
have always refused to accept their responsibility for the crisis of 2007/2008, and therefore for 
the inability of households to repay their loans, and have wanted to recover all the promises of 
repayment made to them despite their recapitalization by the taxpayers, and therefore also by 
the debtor-households via taxes in particular. In this sense, the evictions (without repayment 
of the parts of the loans that had been paid) and the foreclosures were profoundly unjust and 
appear to be a form of bank recapitalization too.
Today, it might be surprising to find that in some countries, mortgage debt is still extremely 
popular. In Belgium, for example, private mortgage debt is equivalent to 54.7% of GDP. In 2018, 
Belgian banks had granted a total of €242.7 billion in mortgage loans, of which €60.9 billion 
were securitized (Aalbers, 2019). At present, 3 million people owe the banks for having taken 
out mortgage loans, i.e. 55% of the active population5. In 15 years, property prices have almost 
doubled across the country, and access to mortgage credit for less wealthy households has 
decreased6, further contributing to the problems of access to housing. This means that Belgian 
banks have not restricted the granting of mortgage debts despite the fact that in Belgium too 
the state had to recapitalize major banks, including Dexia, now known as Belfius.
In Spain, the incentive to buy resumed as of 2019, as if nothing had happened, while between 
January and August of the same year, 100 evictions were taking place per day for unpaid rents, and 
42 for unpaid mortgages7. Cerberus, Blackstone and other vulture funds had invested in 2012-2013 
in the non-performing loan stocks of Spanish banks to the point of owning enough homes to influence 
a large part of the residential market and drive up prices creating rent bubbles. Six years later, the 
vulture funds wanted to resell houses acquired at low prices but per unit, considering that the rent 
bubble had reached its limits and that they would make more profit in the acquisition market8.
5. https://www.nbb.be/en/publications-and-research/employment-statistics-trends/summary-tables/labour-force
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In Greece, the “Hercules” programme introduced in October 2019 has allowed banks to 
reduce their stock of non-performing loans from 43% in 2019 to 27% at the end of March 2021. 
The European Commission welcomed this and approved the extension of the programme until 
2022, despite the health and economic crisis caused by Covid-199. As in Spain, Greek banks have 
in fact securitized their non-performing loans, making them circulate on the financial markets 
and opening the door to vulture funds with state guarantees amounting to 12 billion euros for 
the extension of the programme alone. The country’s inhabitants will probably suffer the same 
consequences as those of the Spanish state.
Concluding Remarks: Socializing Banks is Necessary for Making  
the Right to Housing for All Effective
Today, fourteen years after the subprime crisis, the consequences of the 2007/2008 financial 
crisis continue to impact on people as the processes of commodification and financialization of 
housing continue. Like the housing sector, the health sector has also been impacted by years of 
privatization, budget cuts, financialization and in some cases vulture funds. As a result, it was 
not sufficiently equipped to deal with the health crisis caused by Covid-19, which meant staying 
at home. Access to housing was already severely compromised for a large part of the population.
Residential property markets in several cities in peripheral countries, but also in central Europe, 
have been impacted by vulture funds. This is the case in Berlin, where the Berlin government was 
forced to react by introducing a five-year rent freeze last year. It was recently overturned by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, which ruled that the Länder were not competent to limit rents, 
and thus affirmed the “right” of landlords to charge their tenants too much rent. In the neo-liberal 
doctrine the right to property is stronger than the right to live, since it helps to fuel the banking system.
The social issue of housing should have been considered with more interest. It would have 
been easy to imagine that everyone could benefit from an adapted, affordable and safe housing, 
through the regulation of the private rental market, the limitation of private property (rent control, 
primacy of use to avoid, for example, the touristification of cities, etc.), the investment in social 
and public housing. There would have been no need to give such a role to the banks, nor to 
force so many people to resort to mortgage loans. We have reasons to fear that new bubbles 
are being created whose bursting will have far worse consequences than those described in our 
analysis. The urgency of thinking about housing policies that do not favour the use of household 
debt has been there for a long time.
There is also an urgent need to fundamentally transform the banking system and to impose its 
socialization. The banks, as they operate today, reinforce social inequalities. It is the poorest who 
bear the brunt of the crises they provoke, as shown by the hundreds of thousands of evictions 
for unpaid loans that took place in Europe during the second decade of the 21st century. Rising 
property and rental market prices in most cities are also the result of credit bubbles created by 
excessive bank activity.
9. https://www.reuters.com/article/eu-greece-banks-idUSL8N2M229F
60 • Κοινωνική Πολιτική 14 • Ιούνιος 2021
The non-performing loans should not have been securitized and sold to vulture funds. They 
should have been written off for the benefit of the debtor households since the States, via taxes, 
and therefore via taxpayers’ money, had already recapitalized the banks. If a European state had 
wanted to prevent a bank from selling off its non-performing loans, to ensure that households 
kept their homes and did not pay the price of the crisis, it would have had to take control of 
the banks by ensuring that it was at least a majority shareholder, and confront the European 
institutions and more generally its creditors.
Thus, the questions raised by the cancellation of illegitimate, illegal and odious private and 
public debts are fundamentally linked. They presuppose a profound questioning of the banking 
system and the role of the states. Instead of guaranteeing the profits of bank shareholders, the 
latter should ensure that everybody can enjoy fundamental rights, including the right to housing. 
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Homelessness Service Provision in a Southern European 
Country: An Evolving Sector Framed by the Portuguese 
National Homelessness Strategy
Isabel Baptista1 and Miguel Coelho2
Abstract
This article aims to provide a critical overview of homelessness service provision in Portugal 
– framed by EU-level developments with a particular focus on Southern European countries – 
within the national policy dynamics that in recent years have evolved towards the adoption of 
a national strategic approach to resolving homelessness. The article maps the organisational 
and operational changes which the provision of homelessness services has undergone in recent 
years, while also highlighting the stabilities that continue to shape the sector. The analysis 
provided will mainly draw on national evidence on the role and operation of the homelessness 
sector in Portugal and on available reviews on the adoption and implementation of the two 
national homelessness strategies. The topic has received little research and policy attention so 
far, which may partly be explained by the fragmented nature of the sector itself and by the only 
recent emergence of homelessness as an item on the Portuguese political agenda. 
Keywords: Portugal; homelessness; service provision; national strategies; Southern Europe
Introduction
This article aims to provide a critical overview of homelessness service provision in Portugal 
– framed by EU-level developments with a particular focus on Southern European countries 
– within the context of the overall policy dynamics, which in recent years have evolved 
towards the adoption of a national strategic approach to resolving homelessness. We thus 
aim to map the changes which the provision of homelessness services has undergone in 
recent years and also highlight the stabilities that continue to shape the organisation and 
operation of the sector. 
1. Independent social policy expert, Lisbon, Portugal.
2. Independent researcher, Lisbon, Portugal.
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The topic has received little research and policy attention so far, which may be partly 
explained by the fragmented nature of the sector itself and by the very recent emergence of 
homelessness on the Portuguese political agenda. The analysis provided will thus mainly draw 
on national evidence collected by the authors for the annual comparative studies of the European 
Observatory on Homelessness (EOH) between 2018 and 2020 on different aspects of the role 
and operation of the homelessness sector in Europe as well as on the available reviews on the 
adoption and implementation of the two national homelessness strategies, ENIPSA 2009-2015 
(ENIPSA, 2009) and ENIPSSA 2017-2023 (ENIPSSA, 2017).
The first section examines the trajectory of homelessness-related policies in Portugal within the 
overall context of the European Union, with a particular focus on the similarities and divergences 
between the Portuguese experience and that of other Southern European countries. Section two 
examines the interconnections between the evolution of the homelessness sector in Portugal and 
predominant patterns of service provision, the dominant definitions of homelessness and the 
cultural responses which have been shaped by different images of homelessness. The research 
findings are organised into different sections, exploring specific areas (e.g. data collection, 
governance structures, patterns of service provision, the quality and regulation of services, 
staffing issues, responses to COVID-19 crisis) that characterize the evolving trajectory of the 
homelessness sector in Portugal and the impact of the adoption of a strategic policy approach, 
introduced in 2009 with the approval of the first national homelessness strategy. 
Portugal’s approach to tackling homelessness within the EU:  
a singular convergent trajectory in the European South
Over the last decade, homelessness has emerged – or has been consolidated – as a specific target 
of public policy across the EU. A recent study (Baptista and Marlier, 2019) has shown that 
consistent progress is being made in the adoption of strategic policy frameworks to prevent and 
tackle homelessness across Europe, although geographical imbalances are apparent. In 2019, 
sixteen of the 28 EU Member States had adopted national or regional local level policies aiming 
at the delivery of integrated strategic responses to homelessness. According to Allen (as cited 
in Kourachanis, 2019) Southern European welfare states have traditionally been characterised 
by the underdevelopment of their social protection systems, particularly as a consequence of 
the residual development of social assistance schemes and social housing policies. This results 
in extra pressure on the informal solidarity (familiar) networks, whereby public policy assumes 
or insists that households must bear the principal responsibility for their members’ welfare 
(Baptista and Sullivan, 2008).
As a consequence, high levels of housing insecurity and the resort to self-housing practices 
were common across Southern European countries. The introduction of mild neoliberal reforms 
in Southern European welfare states in the 1990s led to new, publicly visible forms of poverty, 
namely homelessness. At the time, social support for these new groups of poor was mainly 
provided by faith-based organisations, due to the traditional residual state intervention in this 
area (Arapoglou and Gounis, 2017). Emergency services were often driven by civil society 
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initiatives and the core of the social support services tended to be short-term and aimed at 
addressing extreme forms of social exclusion, such as rough sleeping.
Over the last decade there has been evidence of changes in the understanding of homelessness 
among key stakeholders across the four Southern European countries. Since 2009, Portugal, Italy, 
Spain and, more recently, Greece have developed specific national strategic policy frameworks 
for tackling homelessness (Baptista and Marlier, 2019).
In 2009, the National Strategy for the Integration of Homeless People 2009-2015 (ENIPSA 2009-
2015) represented a breakthrough in the Southern European approach to tackling homelessness 
as it was the first “southern” strategy to be adopted in this policy field, following a path initiated by 
other European countries (Baptista, 2009). The ‘Guidelines for Tackling Severe Adult Marginality 
in Italy’, and the Spanish Comprehensive National Strategy for Homelessness 2015-2020 (ENI-
PSH) were both approved in 2015, with the active involvement of the respective governments. 
The singularity of the Portuguese initiative introduced six years earlier must be highlighted 
at different levels: (i) it represented an important shift in the traditional (minimal) role of the 
Portuguese state in policy orientation in this field; (ii) it illustrated the impact of EU policy 
orientations on national policy-making processes, namely by explicitly acknowledging the role 
of several tools developed through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in the field of 
social inclusion; and (iii) it steered a change in the provision of homelessness services at the 
local level, namely with regard to enhanced and more effective governance structures and to 
more innovative approaches to tackling homelessness. 
The 2009 ENIPSA initiative represented the state’s first attempt (in partnership with relevant 
actors in the homelessness arena) to devise a coherent and integrated approach towards 
homelessness policy. Until then, measures to address homelessness had been, as already mentioned, 
largely fragmented and the state’s role in mobilizing partnerships and in enabling and regulating 
homelessness service provision was rather weak. Homelessness services had traditionally been 
dependent on faith-based organisations, charities and NGOs, whose action was mostly steered 
by internal purposes and objectives, inextricably linked to poverty alleviation and the provision 
of social support. Although embedded in a social welfare model (Baptista, 2009) (Baptista and 
Sullivan, 2008), the first Portuguese national strategy initiated a path that aimed at strengthening the 
focus on housing needs and responses, introducing a more strategic role for the state in regulating 
the provision of homelessness services. Concurrently, the ENIPSA aimed at strengthening the 
evidence-based nature of homelessness practices and policy making and enhancing interagency 
cooperation, mutual responsibility and accountability within a participatory governance structure. 
This latter development was already clearly in line with EU policy orientations – explicitly 
acknowledged in the 2009 document and later reinforced by the 2017-2023 follow-up national 
strategy – as well as the adoption of a definition of homelessness based on the European Typology of 
Homelessness and Housing Exclusion (ETHOS). Since then, policy developments at the EU level (e.g., 
the EU Social Investment Package, 2011 and 2014 European Parliament Resolutions, the European 
Pillar of Social Rights) have highlighted the need for integrated strategic approaches to homelessness, 
at both the EU and national levels and for the adoption of harmonised definitions of homelessness.
The drive for change in the provision of homelessness services and the introduction of 
innovative approaches, such as the implementation of Housing First projects and programmes 
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– already present in the 2009 ENIPSA – are important common elements within the three 
Southern European integrated strategic frameworks. Over the last decade, all three countries 
(Italy, Portugal and Spain) – and perhaps particularly Italy, through Housing First Italia, have 
moved towards an expanding use of Housing First services, although still on a smaller scale 
than in some Northern and Western EU countries.
The convergent trajectory of the Portuguese strategic approach to tackling homelessness 
in relation to EU policy developments has nonetheless been affected by both advances and 
setbacks. By 2013, the ENIPSA was confronted with a set of obstacles in its operationalisation 
and political support, within an unfavourable wider societal context (e.g., the financial crisis, the 
adoption of austerity measures, a right-wing coalition government and corresponding ideological 
shift regarding the role of social policy) (Baptista, 2018).
Yet, the potential for change, boosted by the 2009-2015 national strategy, also led to enduring 
positive dynamics in the homelessness arena, namely at the local level (e.g., the mobilisation of 
local stakeholders to adopt local policy agendas on homelessness, the adoption of more integrated 
delivery of homelessness services, the increasing support for housing-led approaches). 
By 2017, the Portuguese state became engaged once more by relaunching the strategic 
approach to homelessness which was made possible as a result of intersecting factors, such as: 
the (re)emergence of a political agenda centred on rights-based approaches towards social issues, 
the mobilisation of civil society organisations and other non-governmental actors involved in 
the ENIPSA trajectory, the visibility of positive developments in the provision of homelessness 
support fostered by the strategy’s proposed intervention model and governance structures, 
and the active engagement of important stakeholders within the political arena (Members of 
Parliament and the newly elected President of the Republic). 
The ENIPSSA 2017-2023 preserves the initial vision and main principles of the first national 
homelessness strategy, confirms the 2009 official definition based on rooflessness and (some) 
houselessness categories of ETHOS and upholds the commitment to developing quality 
preventative, support and resettlement services. More importantly, for the first time, the current 
strategy makes a relevant contribution towards the need to strengthen housing-based policy 
responses, establishing a clear link to housing policies. Challenges still remain, however, namely 
with regard to a clear allocation of adequate resources, the inability to establish consistent and 
effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, weak horizontal coordination at the state level, 
the persistence of a funding model which does not enhance organisational cooperation and 
integration of services, and the weak organisational and political capacity of the homelessness 
sector to influence policy design and implementation.
It is important to highlight that the mere adoption of “strategies” does not ensure success in 
implementing effective responses to homelessness and in bringing about actual change in the 
delivery of homelessness services. As already mentioned, one of the main obstacles to the whole 
process have been the lack of robust evidence-based mechanisms to assess the implementation 
progress of the two Portuguese national strategies.
Such limitations also seem to affect a significant number of existing strategic approaches to 
homelessness in other EU countries (Baptista and Marlier, 2019), including the implementation 
of the Guidelines for Tackling Severe Adult Marginality in Italy (Jessoula et al, 2019) and the 
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Spanish ENI-PSH 2015-2020 (Cabrero et al, 2019). The assessment of the situation with regard to 
the implementation of existing strategic approaches to homelessness and housing exclusion across 
Europe, including in these Southern European countries, reveals the importance of significantly 
strengthening demonstrably effective evidence-based policies which require robust political and 
institutional commitment, shared responsibility, extensive cooperation and coordination, robust 
data collection and reporting mechanisms, and adequate resourcing (Baptista and Marlier, 2019).
The (winding) trajectory of the Portuguese approach towards the adoption of overall strategic 
policy instruments to address homelessness created the potential to improve outcomes for homeless 
people and to reduce homelessness over time, although this has not yet been fully realised.
The Provision of Homelessness Services –  
Continuities and Change within an Evolving Sector 
The provision of homelessness services in Portugal has been characterised by a strong focus 
on the provision of non-housing focussed services (Pleace et al, 2019) within a predominantly 
‘housing ready’ model, although in recent years there has been a rise in Housing First projects 
and programmes. Such a profile cannot be dissociated from predominant – and even official – 
definitions of homelessness, which shape the understanding of “what homelessness is” and of 
“what support should be provided”. 
Since the approval of the 2009 National Strategy, the official definition of homelessness has 
increasingly become a point of reference used at the local level (GIMAE/ENIPSSA, 2018). The 
definition is based on a narrow adoption of ETHOS categories, focusing on a relatively restricted 
group of situations that cover only rooflessness and some houselessness categories (including 
people living in rented rooms and hostels paid for by social services providers). Although both 
strategies have highlighted the importance of developing preventative services and identifying 
risk trajectories and conditions that may trigger homelessness (e.g., people living in refuges for 
women escaping domestic violence, people living temporarily with family and friends due to 
the lack of housing alternatives), the current definition still tends to perpetuate a specific image 
of homelessness which inevitably shapes, at least in part, the design and implementation of 
responses to homelessness in Portugal. 
Homelessness service provision in Portugal has mostly been focused on providing for the 
basic needs of homeless persons, with an emphasis on the emergency side of assistance and on 
temporary support. This approach has been clearly embedded in a social welfare model that 
addresses homelessness mainly from a social exclusion perspective, rather than from a housing 
one. Social welfare support linked to promoting access to permanent housing solutions has always 
had an extremely limited scope (Baptista and O’Sullivan, 2008). NGOs (including charities) have 
constituted the bulk of homelessness service providers in Portugal with an increasing presence of 
municipalities playing an important role in the provision and funding of homelessness services.
The adoption of a strategic approach to homelessness at the national level has prompted 
some progress in conceptual and policy guidance in the homelessness arena. The local level 
implementation of the national strategies – namely through the setting up of Local Homelessness 
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Units (NPISA)3 – has contributed greatly to a strengthened cooperation between and integration 
of services among organisations and support workers within a traditionally fragmented and 
weakly organised homelessness sector.
These local units, which integrate both public and private actors, have gained increased 
responsibility with regard to planning and monitoring the provision of homelessness services, 
whereas responsibility for the provision (either direct or through commissioning) of homelessness 
services continues to lie heavily with NGOs and other private non-profit organisations. 
A recent review of homelessness services in Europe (Pleace et al, 2019) has developed a 
European classification based on two main dimensions of the support provided: the housing 
or non-housing nature of the support and the intensity of such support. Figure 1 presents the 
typology proposed by the authors.
Figure 1. Typology of European Homelessness Services 
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Source: Pleace, N., Baptista, I., Benjaminsen, L. and Busch-Geertsema, V. (2018), Homelessness Services in Europe, 
Brussels: FEANTSA
3. In January 2021, the official site of the ENIPSSA identified a total of 24 NPISA operating in the whole territory. 
The NPISA are local platforms comprising all relevant public and private actors who have the responsibility to plan 
and operationalise all homelessness intervention within their local territory, in line with the strategy’s orientations.
Κοινωνική Πολιτική 14 • Ιούνιος 2021 • 69
The use of the typology as a reference tool to better grasp the diversity of patterns in the 
provision of homelessness services in Europe has already proved helpful for comparing the 
nature of service provision across the continent. (Baptista and Marlier, 2019).
A closer look at the situation in the Southern EU countries shows that a staircase model of 
service provision prevails across Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain with a predominance of low 
to medium non-housing focused support services. Some differences are nonetheless perceptible 
among the four countries. In Italy and Spain there is evidence of shifts occurring in service provision, 
as more intensive services are provided, together with access to permanent accommodation 
(housing focused support services). In Portugal, there is evidence of small-scale initiatives also 
providing housing-focused support services with access to permanent accommodation, which 
have recently been strengthened as a response to the impacts of the COVID crisis. Indeed, the 
central government has just announced that, as regards housing first model services and shared 
apartments projects, 300 new units have already been installed across the country4.
Greece is the only country where such shifts are not yet apparent and where low to medium 
non-housing focused support seems to prevail among the provision of temporary accommodation 
services for homeless people (Baptista and Marlier, 2019).
Overall, the homelessness sector in Portugal has remained largely dominated by the presence 
of social support focussed services (non-housing low to medium support) concentrated on the 
provision of an array of non-residential support (e.g. day centres, outreach activities, access 
to food and personal hygiene services) and emergency accommodation. Support with access 
to temporary or permanent accommodation or preventative services still represents residual 
responses within the Portuguese homelessness sector (GTMA/ENIPSSA, 2020). Over the last 
decade, there has been an increasing development of housing-led (e.g., Housing First) services 
although still on a much smaller scale than in countries like Italy or even Spain (Pleace et al, 2019).
Recent developments in this area include the strengthening of the Lisbon Homelessness 
Municipal Plan, which foresees the expansion of 320 Housing First units (in addition to the 
existing 80) to be implemented by five new projects. The implementation of these projects was 
accelerated as a response to the pandemic with 260 housing first units already installed and 11 
more in the shared apartments program5. 
Finally, the Portuguese Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) foresees the development 
of a structured and transversal response for people in need of emergency or transitional 
housing solutions. Portugal plans to invest 1.6 billion euros in housing, highlighting the goal of 
supporting 26,000 families by 2026. Among the investments to be made in the housing sector, 
the government mentions the National Urgent and Temporary Accommodation Exchange, with 
186 million euros, through which a national stock of 2,130 emergency or reception/transition 
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Methodology
The analysis of the role and functioning of the homelessness sector in Portugal, with a focus on 
the nature of the services provided, existing regulation, quality standards and relevant staffing 
issues will draw mainly on national evidence collected by the author for the annual comparative 
study of the European Observatory on Homelessness (EOH) between 2018 and 2020 on different 
aspects of the operation of the homelessness sector in Europe.
The evidence collected for the analysis of the national situation was based on a standardised 
questionnaire that aims to collect relevant available secondary data on the topic under analysis 
each year. Interviews were also conducted with relevant stakeholders (e.g., policy makers, 
organisational representatives, support workers, researchers) for the completion of the national 
questionnaires.
The analysis draws on the information collected for the three annual EOH comparative 
reports regarding the Portuguese situation, which covered three main topics:
 Þ 2018 – patterns of homelessness service provision and existing legal regulations;
 Þ 2019 – regulation and quality of homelessness services;
 Þ 2020 – staffing practices in services for homeless people. 
The contents of the three national questionnaires will be explored in detail throughout the next 
sections. The analysis of the national situation will be framed by the discussion provided in the 
previous sections, namely with regard to the impact of the overall strategic policy framework, i.e., 
the national homelessness strategy, on the operation of the homelessness sector. The development 
of the different features of homelessness service provision in Portugal will also be framed by 
elements of a comparative EU perspective, briefly outlined above. Whenever possible, specific 
comparative insights into the reality of other Southern European countries will be provided.
The final section providing a brief overview on the impact of COVID-19 on the operation 
of homelessness services will draw on the results of two standardised online questionnaires 
launched between May and June 2020. The aim was to collect information on how the sector 
was responding to the challenges brought about by the pandemic during its initial stage. The 
first online questionnaire was sent to all 22 NPISA (local homeless units) coordinators. A second 
questionnaire was sent to all NPISA partner organisations, to be completed by: a) the leaders 
of the organisations; b) professional workers directly working with homeless people; and c) 
volunteers. Sixteen NPISA coordinators responded to the first questionnaire, and 58 support 
workers/volunteers contributed to the second.
Understanding and Tackling Homelessness in Portugal:  
a Decisive Decade (2009-2020)
The drive for change opened up by the operationalisation at the local level of the national 
strategy’s intervention principles and methodologies enhanced positive developments in the 
organisation and operation of homelessness service provision across the country. One important 
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area of development relates to the collection of data on the number of people experiencing 
homelessness (according to the national definition), which started to be registered on a regular 
basis across all municipalities in 2017.
This annual exercise, coordinated by the Monitoring and Evaluation Group of the ENIPSSA, 
prompted a fruitful discussion around the official ENIPSSA definition of homelessness, its 
categories and the challenges arising from the collection of data at the local level. Since 2017, 
an enhanced progress has been observed in the procedures used to collect the data at local 
level, particularly with regard to the increased integration of efforts among local organisations 
(within or outside NPISA structures), thus ensuring a greater consistency of the information.
The latest available data published in 20206, gathered by the monitoring group of the 
ENIPSSA(12) reveals a total of 7,107 people living in the two categories covered by the official 
homelessness definition, i.e. people living in rooflessness situations (2,767) and people living 
in houselessness situations (4,340), which includes people living in emergency and temporary 
accommodation and in private rooms and/or hostels paid for by social security services or 
other social support services. The bulk of the total homeless population, 72%, is concentrated 
in the two metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto. The comparison between the 2019 and 
the 20207 data collection for the same 249 municipalities that provided information shows 
that there was an increase of around 21% in the total homeless population between these two 
years. The houseless categories are responsible for the greatest increase registered during this 
period, particularly in the Centre region (131% increase) and in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area 
(28% increase).
According to the latest ENIPSSA report (12) by the end of 2019, 67% of those people 
identified in a situation of rough sleeping in mainland Portugal had been assigned a case manager 
worker. This coverage was 89% for those people living in the different categories8 covered by the 
ENIPSSA definition (in 2014, only 45% of people in those two categories had been assigned a 
case manager worker) (ISS, 2107). These figures reflect a positive local response to one of the 
objectives of the national strategic orientations in the ENIPSSA regarding the need to improve 
the quality of existing support, namely by the adoption and mainstreaming of a case management 
approach in order to ensure that individuals’ unique needs are addressed.
Another area of progress fostered by the adoption of the two national strategies is the 
increasing number of Local Homelessness Units (NPISA) established over the past years. Since 
the adoption of the first national homelessness strategy in 2009, the number of NPISA grew from 
a total of 13 to 24 in September 2020. The setting-up of these structures was one of the measures 
already included in the 2009 Strategy. NPISA are responsible for the local implementation of 
the national strategy’s aims, based on local homelessness diagnoses and plans. These local 
governance structures are comprised of all the main local stakeholders (public and private) with 
planning and/or service delivery responsibilities in the homelessness arena.
6. Referring to 31 December 2019.
7. Referring respectively to data from 31 December 2018 and 31 December 2019. 
8. These include: people living in temporary accommodation centres (including Social Security accommodation 
solutions of limited duration and with no access to long-term accommodation), specific accommodation for the 
homeless, and private rooms paid totally or partially by social services or other social welfare organisations. 
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Along with an increasing presence of these local integrated homelessness structures across 
the national territory, it is also important to note the progress achieved through their direct 
involvement within the central governance bodies of the national strategy responsible for planning 
and monitoring the strategy’s implementation: currently, two representatives of the NPISA – 
elected on a rotating basis by the 24 local units – are part of the Executive Unit of the ENIPSSA.
This reinforced participation of the NPISA may contribute towards the more active involvement 
of their members, i.e., homelessness service providers (particularly NGOs and other non-public 
entities), at the level of the planning, coordination, regulation and evaluation of homelessness 
services, from which they have usually been disengaged over the years.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the design and implementation of social and housing policies 
in Portugal, including those directly pertaining to homelessness, continue to be characterised 
by a high degree of State centralisation, with a prominent role played by national public bodies 
(social services, housing and health) and local authorities (particularly in major urban areas). 
The regulation, monitoring and funding of homelessness service provision is almost exclusively 
the responsibility of public authorities (Baptista and Marlier, 2019).
The Operation of Homelessness Service Provision in Portugal
In general terms, the bulk of homelessness services in Portugal focus on the provision of 
transitional and temporary accommodation-based support, working within a ‘housing-ready’ 
model, along with a significant number of non-residential services. Housing-led approaches 
– including Housing First projects and programmes – have increasingly been implemented in 
different regions of the country, particularly in the greater Lisbon Area. Preventative services 
and measures are scarce, although preventing homelessness has been a declared goal of the 
National Homelessness Strategy since its earliest stages (Pleace et al, 2019).
The majority of homelessness services in Portugal fall under the remit of the social services 
legal framework which regulates service provision. Often, homelessness support is provided by 
NGOs and other social solidarity organizations (including charities) under commissioning from 
municipal or central state authorities (social security), through the establishment of cooperation 
agreements.
Cooperation agreements between the State and what are termed social solidarity institutions 
are also established by law and translate into specific commitments for the commissioning of 
services. Most homelessness services in operation within the national territory are funded and 
regulated under these cooperation agreements. Homelessness services can be more variable than 
other forms of service, which means that oversight must be flexible, adapting to the specifics 
of each agreement.
However, along with this formally established regulated sector, it is also possible to observe 
the presence of an unregulated sector offering support to homelessness people. These unregulated 
forms of support are not legally defined as ‘services’ and cannot be technically referred to 
as an unregulated ‘service sector’, because this does not have a specific, legal identity. For 
example, temporary accommodation provided through the provision of private rooms or hostel 
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accommodation is not considered a “service” and is not therefore subject to any quality control. 
Living standards in such premises are reported as being very low. Local charitable activity, such 
as the distribution of food, blankets and sleeping bags to people sleeping rough is also present 
in major cities and is often provided at the margins of any type of regulation.
Quality and Regulation of Homelessness Services 
Overall, the operation of homelessness services falls under the remit of the legal framework for 
social services and has mandatory licensing procedures. These procedures establish a set of 
rules and conditions (e.g. conformity of facilities and equipment, opening hours, admissions 
criteria, types of services provided, rights and duties of users, staff qualifications and experience). 
Compliance with these conditions is overseen by the Institute for Social Security (ISS) and its 
various regional structures (Baptista and Coelho, 2019). An additional legal framework for the 
quality of homelessness services is the Resolution of the Council of Ministers approving the 
National Homelessness Strategy 2017-2023 (ENIPSSA). This document establishes specific 
guidance for the operation of support services, focusing on the adoption and development of 
an integrated intervention and support model.
The guidance and recommendations provided within the framework of the National 
Homelessness Strategy exert considerable influence over the quality of homelessness services, 
issuing good practice guidance to promote greater consistency in intervention practices and 
enhancing communication among services. For example, a specific training framework within 
the homelessness provision sector is defined alongside tools for identifying homelessness risk 
indicators, setting criteria for the establishment of local homelessness units (NPISA) and defining 
the requirements for people employed as case managers. However, it is important to note that 
there is no actual monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of good practice guidance at 
the level of service provision and, as guidance rather than regulation, these recommendations 
are not legally enforced.
There is a very limited evidence base for the quality of homelessness services in Portugal. The 
only evidence on the availability and quality of homelessness services relates to the operation 
of Housing First programmes. Several studies9 have reported very good outcomes in relation 
to housing retaining rates and health and well-being outcomes. User satisfaction has also been 
positively reported by these internally run measurements.
However, supervision of services occurs via regular checks, at least once every two years 
and via priority inspections triggered by complaints or by problems identified during earlier 
inspections. These requirements are universal and legal sanctions, including fines, a temporary 
ban on operating and the closure of services are in place should standards be breached.
9. See, for example, “The role of perceived housing quality and perceived choice to recovery: An ecological perspective 
on a housing first program in Lisbon” available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/302779015_The_role_
of_perceived_housing_quality_and_perceived_choice_to_recovery_An_ecological_perspective_on_a_housing_first_
program_in_Lisbon
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Staffing and Capacity Building within the Homelessness Sector
People working in the homelessness sector in Portugal – and in Europe – are often qualified 
individuals working in contexts in which in-work training is available. In Portugal, homelessness 
sector professionals usually have a university degree in social sciences such as social work, 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, or social education. Moreover, the criteria established by 
the financing public authorities (i.e. the ISS and larger municipalities) regarding the profile of 
staff to be financed under the outsourcing contracts, ensures that organizations do hire qualified 
staff. Even so, a wide range of formal qualifications is often seen as a challenge as this work is 
usually not framed by a clearly defined intervention model. 
There are legal requirements for workers to complete a minimum number of training hours, 
although questions have been raised (Baptista and Coelho, 2020) around whether the level and 
nature of this training has the right focus and intensity. Indeed, training is available on topics 
that can be useful for intervention (immigration, addictions, mental health, social rights, etc.) 
but the lack of provision of training tailored to the roles that professionals perform is often 
reported as problematic: on the one hand, the heterogeneity of the population and the extreme 
difficulties to which it is subjected require specialization, while, on the other, the need to establish 
benchmarks for training for interventions in different types of services should also be stressed. 
The first training programme, specifically tailored for professionals in the homelessness sector, 
was implemented in February 2019 (currently in its 11th edition) by the National Strategy. This 
course, with a duration of 30 hours, is entitled ‘Prevention, Intervention and Support for People 
in Homelessness Situations in Portugal’.
The need for teams to have the time and the space to engage in training and action is crucial 
for helping them to cope with the complexity of their everyday tasks. Training gaps around 
innovative ways to work with homeless people were identified (Baptista and Coelho, 2020), 
within a context where the focus on specific metrics made it difficult for some homelessness 
services to think strategically. This lack of strategic thinking is common among professionals, 
but also among the managing bodies of organizations. The former can often be too focused on 
the individual scope of their action rather than on a more systemic perspective on the support 
work, while the latter are focused on fulfilling contracts and on issues related to the financing 
of the organization’s operation.
Supervision procedures tend to focus on the compliance with contract service agreements, 
with an emphasis on statistical measures of performance, rather than the daily staffing practices, 
staff working conditions, or the informational and emotional elements of providing support, i.e., 
the areas in which staff tend to be trained. Although the discourse around service evaluation 
has already permeated the sector, it remains very much focused on the use of process indicators 
(number of people, number of actions), rather than on assessing changes and the impact of the 
support work. 
Lately, there has been a positive development with regard to the communication capacities 
of the organisations in the sector – which is important for raising public awareness – as well 
as in their lobbying capacity in the political arena. There is, however, still much to be done in 
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terms of fostering collaboration among homelessness service providers, which continue to work 
on an individual rather than on a collaborative basis. A promising initiative in this domain is the 
establishment of an informal National Housing First Network composed of 12 to 15 organizations 
which either deliver or are interested in delivering Housing First projects. The first Housing 
First Conference in Portugal took place in early 2021. 
Responding to the COVID-19 Crisis – a Quick Snapshot
The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered changes in the responses to homelessness across 
Europe. The successive lockdowns and the need to protect people and contain the spread of 
the virus led to rapid responses from the homelessness sector in different ways. In Portugal, 
the main response to the pandemic was to significantly increase emergency shelter provision 
– 21 emergency collective accommodation spaces opened across the country, accommodating 
more than 500 persons10 – and to extend the operation of existing emergency shelters (those 
that operated overnight moved to 24-hour operations). Housing First services have also been 
modified in various ways in order to facilitate people at heightened risk from the virus to shield 
at home, for example by providing food parcels, and allowing meetings between support workers 
and people using the services to take place outside and in other socially distanced forms.
Exceptional and temporary measures to respond to the COVID situation in Portugal in 
relation to housing were also introduced11 during the first pandemic lockdown (all extended 
at least until the end of the first quarter of 2021 and, in some cases, until the end of the third 
quarter of 2021), including: the suspension of eviction and enforcement procedures12; the 
suspension of the termination of rental contracts during the pandemic5; a ban on terminating 
rental contracts due to arrears during the period of the state of emergency and the option to 
pay those rents in arrears during the 12 months following the end of the state of emergency in 
monthly instalments5; suspension of foreclosures on primary and permanent housing5; financial 
support for the payment of rent; and moratoria on the payment of mortgage instalments13.
The results of an online survey held between May and June 2020 and targeting all NPISA 
coordinators and NPISA partner organizations provide interesting preliminary insights into 
some of the challenges facing the homelessness sector during these first critical months of the 
pandemic. These include:
 Þ cooperation constraints in the provision of health services, particularly with the provision 
of mental health support which, as far as it was possible to ascertain, have still not been 
adequately responded to, as they also demonstrate pre-COVID-19 hindrances;
10. Between December 2017 and December 2019, the number of homeless people – defined as people sleeping 
rough and people in houseless situations who are using temporary accommodation facilities for the homeless and 
who have no access to long-term accommodation solutions – rose from 4,414 in 2017, to 6,044 in 2018 and 7,107 
in 2019 in mainland Portugal.
11. Law 1/2020 of 19 March
12. Article 8 of Law 1-A/2020 of 19 March
13. Article 4 of Decree-Law 10-J/2020 of 26 March
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 Þ although there are no reliable data on mortality rates or infection prevalence among 
homeless people, more than one in every two support workers considered that the risk 
of COVID-19 transmission among the homeless population was high, whereas two in 
every five support workers assessed such a risk as medium;
 Þ NPISA coordinators reported that almost all accommodation facilities had the ability to 
screen new admissions, to isolate infected users and to dispose of personal protective 
equipment/material (masks, disinfectant, etc.); 
 Þ worrying reports regarding the ability of accommodation services to test all users, 
including the fact that only half of the NPISA coordinators declared that the necessary 
conditions were in place to test all users, while a third of them claimed that no facility 
had such capacity.
 Þ when asked about proposed improvements following the pandemic, the majority of NPISA 
coordinators cited the need to strengthen the implementation of programmes that aim 
at providing stable and individualised housing solutions.
Overall, Portugal was initially successful in containing infection among people experiencing 
homelessness and the homelessness sector responded promptly, with a number of interventions 
to ensure that people could be sheltered with increased operational guidance to increase safety 
and a strong commitment from the staff within homelessness services. However, it is still early 
to say whether these short-term responses to prevent and reduce homelessness will provoke 
any shift in policies and practices within the sector. 
Conclusions and Discussion
The adoption in 2009 of the first national homelessness strategy (ENIPSA 2009-2015) was in line 
with EU developments for the adoption of overall strategic policy approaches to homelessness, 
which, at the same time, represented a policy breakthrough within the Southern European policy 
context. The official and formal recognition in Portugal of homeless people as a public deserving 
of a particular public policy also represented the adoption of a more active role by the state in 
the regulation of services addressing the needs of this population. 
The adoption of the national strategy was also a foundational moment, as it officially established 
the concept of “homeless person” in Portugal, following European guidelines by adopting the ETHOS 
typology framework. This definition has been progressively adopted at the local level and has had 
a positive impact in terms of enabling monitoring efforts and promoting better communication 
within the sector. However, by focusing exclusively on a restricted set of situations covering only 
the rooflessness and houselessness categories (including people living in rented rooms and hostels 
paid for by social service providers), the adopted definition does not enhance the identification 
of risk situations, namely “hidden homelessness” situations and may also render invisible some 
categories of people and trajectories, such as those of homeless women or families.
Nonetheless, by enhancing the establishment of new governance structures - the creation of Local 
Homelessness Units (NPISA) – the strategy has also introduced positive dynamics for mobilising 
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local stakeholders to adopt policy agendas across the sector and for the implementation of more 
integrated services. The creation of the NPISA strengthened cooperation between organisations 
and was crucial for the cohesion of the sector in a particularly difficult period – following the 2008 
crisis and the fiscal consolidation and austerity period – when the reorientation of the role of 
social policies by the new right-wing coalition government in practice froze the operationalisation 
of the Strategy. This political disinvestment was counteracted at the local level by the continuing 
implementation of the strategy’s aims and the continuing operation of the NPISA units. Since then, 
these units – which integrate both public and private actors – have gained increased responsibility 
with regard to planning and monitoring the provision of homelessness services, although the 
provision (either direct or through commissioning) of homelessness services continues to be 
mostly the responsibility of NGOs and other private non-profit organisations.
Between 2016 and 2017, homelessness appeared once more in the public debate, strengthened 
by a decisive contribution from the newly elected socialist government and from the active 
engagement of other important stakeholders in the political arena (e.g., Members of Parliament, 
and the newly elected President of the Republic).
The second National Strategy (ENIPSSA 2017-2023), although in terms of its content it was 
practically a reissue of the previous one, emerged with a new ambition for ensuring effective 
territorial implementation and the provision of practical tools to achieve this. This conceptual 
change, coupled with the intensification of the public debate around the most adequate responses 
for the effective eradication of homelessness, may have somehow contributed to the growing 
visibility and popularity of Housing First programmes, particularly at the level of public opinion, 
thus creating a favourable context for stronger investment in housing-led responses. 
Thus, by the end of 2019, the focus of supporting investment was significantly reinforced and 
targeted at the provision of more individualised responses, namely by expanding the case management 
approach, the implementation of Housing First services and the provision of shared apartments. In 
addition, Lisbon announced the strengthening of the budget initially foreseen for the Municipal Plan 
for the Integration of Homeless People, from approximately €5M to €14.5M, with about one third 
of the amount being allocated to the creation and reinforcement of housing-led solutions.
It should be stressed that the outbreak of the pandemic has had a positive impact in accelerating 
the implementation of these projects, particularly by refocusing the attention of the public and 
policy makers on the serious structural housing hindrances affecting Portugal, which previously 
did not often resonate in the homelessness policy debate.
Nonetheless, the regulation of the quality of homelessness services remains an area where there is 
room for improvement. The regulation of the majority of service provisions for homeless people falls 
under the remit of the legal framework for social services. Often, homelessness support is provided 
by NGOs and other social solidarity organisations (including charities) and is commissioned by 
municipal or central state authorities (social security), through the establishment of cooperation 
agreements. Although the discourse on the need to evaluate responses has permeated the sector, 
the actual practice is that quality regulation continues to be conducted in a non-specific way in 
this area, with a focus on compliance so as to process indicators (number of people, number of 
actions, etc.), rather than on assessing changes or evaluating the impact of the support work. 
Evidence-based information on the quality of homelessness services in Portugal remains scarce. 
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Financing entities may play a crucial role in this respect, e.g., by promoting quality services, 
both by contracting services that comply with the specific guidelines for the sector and that 
include outcome evaluation indicators and by promoting the outcome-oriented evaluation 
procedures, thus enabling the orientation of future funding investments towards evidence-based 
responses and services. Moreover, a lack of robust evidence-based mechanisms for assessing 
the implementation progress of the two Portuguese national strategies is, possibly, one of the 
main persistent hindrances.
The issue of the quality of services illustrates how the presence of the phenomenon in the 
public debate, although a necessary condition for the allocation of resources to the sector, 
is not a sufficient condition for an adequate and concerted allocation. At this level, it is 
important to recognise the crucial role of service providers. Although their priorities have 
necessarily been shaped by the commitments undertaken within the scope of the funding 
contracts, the paradigmatic case of the organisations developing housing first services 
shows their engagement in trying to actively participate in the development of policies for 
the sector or in channelling the resources and developing internal mechanisms to establish 
evidence-based practices. 
Although there has been a positive development with regard to the organisational communication 
capacities of the homelessness sector – crucial in order to raise public awareness – there is 
still room for improvement of the lobbying capacity in the policy arena, particularly as regards 
the need to enhance collaboration among homelessness service providers. Indeed, the lack 
of strategic thinking is still common at the organisational level, which often translates into a 
persistent trend to focus, for example, on an organisation’s individual scope of action or on the 
fulfilment of contracts, rather than on developing a collaborative approach that could magnify 
an integrated and shared vison from and for the homelessness sector.
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Housing Commodification in the Balkans:  
Serbia, Slovenia and Greece
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Abstract
In Balkans region, uneven development under global capitalism has led to significant differences in 
housing commodification patterns, related (social and housing) policy and associated inequalities. 
In this article we describe commodification patterns in Slovenia, Serbia and Greece by considering 
the diversity existing in the semiperiphery. We do this by comparing processes of privatisation of 
housing, development of the rental sector, strategies to homeownership and legal frameworks of 
protection of property and housing rights. We find some similarities in specific individual and familial 
commodification patterns and also pronounced inequalities but also semiperiphery diversity, which 
has been produced and maintained by the presence (or absence) of policies and state care provided 
for certain vulnerable groups. These diverse aspects arise from specific local, regional and global 
histories of housing struggles that mean the responses to them have varied. In this research, we 
show that Balkans semiperipheral territories must not be regarded as a passive background but as a 
landscape in which active agents participate in creating and transforming commodification patterns. 
Keywords: semiperiphery, housing, commodification, Greece, Serbia, Slovenia
Introduction
Although housing is traditionally described as one of the least decommodified goods in the 
welfare state (Fahey and Norris, 2011), a trend is apparent of the ever greater commodification 
of housing. Housing is increasingly unaffordable to large numbers of people, while in many 
countries the social rented sector has stagnated and is negligible with homelessness on the 
rise and new speculative developments visible all around. Housing commodification is a global 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, it has taken different forms around the world. This unevenness has 
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been often been made ‘exotic’ and ‘oriental’, such as in the narratives of the backward Balkans 
and the catching-up narratives created in advance to illustrate the difference and often inferiority 
of the countries in the Balkan region.
Recently, some researchers have offered world-systems theory as a framework that goes beyond 
these ‘culturalisations’ of housing issues by positioning the Balkan countries with respect to the 
dynamics of the world economy. While looking at Southern Europe (SE) as well as Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE), Bence Kovac (2020) showed the benefits of applying world-systems 
theory to the area of housing and that it can explain structurally created differences. Still, world-
systems theory has been regarded by some as deficient. The simplification entailed in the world-
systems approach overlooks the big differences within the region (Wiest, 2012: 832) that are 
largely caused by the different ways housing has been commodified. Our aim with this research 
is to present the diversity in the region so as help overcome such limitations. In this paper, we 
focus on the commodification of housing in Slovenia, Serbia and Greece to reveal similarities 
and differences reflecting their different geopolitical positions along with specific local factors 
arising from various historical and current developments. 
The article first discusses the housing commodification theory in relation to the semiperiphery 
status held by the region, before presenting in more detail three case studies of the dynamics of 
commodification of the housing sectors in Slovenia, Serbia and Greece. The conclusion discusses 
the differences and general characteristics of the housing situations on Balkans semiperiphery.
Housing Commodification on the Semiperiphery
In world-systems theory, the semiperiphery includes countries that are interdependent on 
countries of the centre and countries of the periphery of the world economy. The idea was first 
described by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, 2002) and further explored by Giovanni Arrighi 
(1986). In world-systems theory, countries are organised in a hierarchical system according 
to the profitability of their products where the favourable production of the core depends on 
the periphery’s disadvantaged position. The semiperiphery combines aspects of the core and 
periphery and makes the world economy more stable and less polarised. This idea of studying 
the international environment composed of three different strata has not gone uncontested. 
Namely, we are not the first to observe that the semiperiphery concept continues to be one of 
the most controversial of all in the world-systems morphology (Vieira, 2018: 10). Many authors 
have criticised the concept’s vagueness and diffused nature (Louranco, 2005: 179), while 
others claim this perspective has lost its heuristic vitality since the world has changed (Lee, 
2009). Even though one can extract some normative elements, many authors find it difficult to 
geographically locate the semiperiphery. Understanding the geographical concentration of the 
semiperiphery is made further complicated by the dynamic nature of semiperipheriality. While 
differences among regions are structurally created, they are not static, constantly changing 
along with the dynamics of the world economy (Arrighi, 1990: 26). Despite these conceptual 
complications, the tripartite global geography involved is still very useful for understanding 
contemporary circumstances.
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The world-systems approach’s greatest value in understanding the housing issue is that it 
shows the structural causes of differences between housing systems in core and semiperipheral 
countries (Kovats, 2020:4). The literature describes semiperipheral housing systems such as in 
CEE and SE but with little or no focus on systemic aspects. CEE housing systems are portrayed 
as being subject to the semiperiphery’s inability to catch up with the advanced housing systems 
of more advanced core countries (see Tsenkova, 2009; Hededus and Tosics, 1996; Stephens, Lux 
and Sunega, 2015 etc.) and, in SE, as due to weak industrialisation (Allen et al., 2004). In his 
article “Is there a core–semiperiphery in housing?”, Bence Kovats (2020) tested world-systems 
theory’s applicability to housing theory by conducting hierarchical cluster analysis on indicators 
measuring various aspects of semiperipherality. Those aspects are semi-proletarianisation of the 
workforce, lax building regulations together with the commodification, de-commodification and 
familialism of housing. Parallel to this, he also examined the Southern European and Eastern and 
Central European housing systems (SE and SEE). His analysis confirms his initial assumption 
that countries clustered along the core semiperiphery divide share similar indicators, except 
for Ireland that bears greater similarity with the semiperiphery than the core which it otherwise 
structurally belongs to. In these analyses, CEE, SE and Ireland are shown to possess a higher 
level of semiproletarianisation, a lower level of both commodification and de-commodification 
of housing, greater familialism in housing provision, and a more lenient soft state. 
To add to these discussions, in this article we focus on the aspect of housing commodification. 
Elements of commodification, such as property structure, are commonly held to be crucial for 
explaining different urban patterns (Bernt, 2016: 572). Yet, it is hard to exaggerate the significance 
of the mechanism of housing commodification for understanding housing inequalities. The 
commodification of housing is a process with a long history, from being a simple commodity 
to a complex financial technology holding significant effects for the world economy (Pattillo, 
2013: 512). Housing commodification is the outcome of political, economic and legal decisions 
that support reliance on housing as a wealth-producing asset. The commodification of housing 
has both macro- and microhistorical roots, manifestations and consequences. In Kovats’ study 
(2020) and previous research, housing commodification has been measured by the mortgage-
to-GDP ratio and the average mortgage interest rate, denoting accessibility of mortgages as 
commodification. As Kovats shows, CEE and SE have differences in the mortgage-to-GDP ratio 
where SE is closer to northern Europe than to CEE, which for him is not surprising. Here he 
points to the temporary halting of mortgage lending and the mass privatisation of public housing 
units in the early 1990s that led to a high level of debt-free homeownership, a reason already 
stated in other research (Kovats, 2020: 8; see also Norris and Domański, 2009; Stephens et al., 
2015). Nevertheless, Kovats reveals CEE is not lagging behind SE with respect to mortgage 
lending. This qualitative clustering approach also points to a stereotype that all CEE countries 
cluster along the classic post-socialist dividing line, which has proved not to be the truth (Kovats, 
2020: 9). To evaluate these conclusions and understand the micro- and macro-historical roots 
of housing commodification, including their effects on current and future housing inequalities, 
they must be seen in the light of more contextual data as well as policy tendencies. 
In Kovats’ study (2020), Serbia, Slovenia and Greece are recognised as semiperipheral 
countries of Europe. While the three counties share some commodification pattern histories, 
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they also differ considerably. To show the diversity of Balkans semiperipheral housing regions, 
we provide a more detailed insight into the development of such patterns in these countries 
from a historical perspective and their subsequent effects for housing inequality. These should 
be viewed more as illustrative examples and not as an all-encompassing account of the housing 
processes related to commodification in Serbia, Slovenia and Greece.
Methodology 
The selection of methods and countries for this study was shaped by several factors. Our aim 
was to show diversity of Balkans semiperiphery housing in order to overcome limits of regional 
approach which are reflected in regions homogenization. We chose the restricted number of 
countries with significant differences usually studied as part of different regions, South-East 
Europe (SEE), Southern Europe (SE) and Central Europe (CE), therefore allowing a more in 
depth and contextualized view of the housing patterns in the region. Our main axes of comparison 
was commodification of housing as a process which indicates the relationship between exchange 
and use value of housing. Housing commodification is a path dependent process and that’s why 
we study housing commodification in Serbia, Slovenia and Greece in historical perspective. 
As it was already shown, commodification of housing process provides an important element 
in explaining changing housing relations (Forrest and Williams, 1984) relevant for assessing 
housing inequalities in Balkans semiperiphery.
The main points of comparison included as important to understand this process were: 1) 
denationalisation and privatisation of housing, 2) development of the rental sector in general and 
social rental sector in particular, 3) strategies to homeownership and role of financial instruments as 
well as the role of informal instruments, such as family support, and 4) legal frameworks of protection 
of property and housing rights. The research presented here forms part of ongoing research on 
housing in Slovenia, Serbia and Greece which the three authors have been undertaking in the last 
10 years. It is based on three main types of material. The first is collected from written sources, such 
as national and international legislation, reports produced and published by international, state 
and civil sector organisations, and existing academic research on national situations in housing.
Serbia
To understand housing commodification patterns in Serbia, we must look at the social, political, 
and economic effects of the transformation since socialist experiment, and specific aspects of 
peripheral or dependant financialization (Vilenica et al., forthcoming). Local commodification 
patterns stem from the pre-WWII housing property relations, the 1945–1989 (non-aligned) 
housing modernisation project, the rapid privatisation of housing in the 1990s, other ‘transitional’ 
housing forms of privatisation, informal housing commodification paths, and particular forms of 
housing financialisation. These commodification patterns have produced complex intersecting, 
interlocking, intermeshing inequalities (see Belle, 2020).
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The privatisation of housing in Serbia was not an entirely neoliberal process. Like other former 
‘socialist’ countries, it started with a neo-patrimonial ‘give away’ privatisation to tenents in the 
early 1990s, which discouraged globally powerful players from entering the housing market 
(Olt and Csizmady, 2020). To allow privatisation to happen, the innovative Yugoslav form of 
societal property – a property without a proprietor – had to be ended by legally turning it into 
state property.4 The right to buy was first defined in the Law on Housing Relations of 1990. 
As Mina Petrović noted, this law is responsible for confusion between the right to housing, 
rights of occupancy, recognition of the right to private property over nationalised property, 
and recognition of the right to buy (Petrović, 2004: 151). The basis for mass privatisation was 
given by the Housing Law of 1992. This law enabled a further reduction of the redemption 
price based on social status. Nevertheless, this process did not prevent crystallisation of the 
inequalities that had already formed in socialism. Those who by this time had no acquired the 
right to a protected tenancy were neglected in the process. The privatisation of more than 90% 
of the housing stock of society was further assisted by hyperinflation. This process was used 
by governing structures to create the illusion of the properness of the property transformation. 
Privatisation drastically reduced the housing in the public sector and along with that the housing 
social protection measures. This led to increased informal construction and saw the informal 
rental housing sector expand.5
In the 2000s, Serbia experienced a quick increase in household debt levels, especially as 
concerned housing due to the individualisation of responsibility for home provision by the 
state. Housing has played a key role in household financialisation and there is a co-constitutive 
relationship between the housing financialisation and the new social and spatial inequalities 
in Serbia. Together with other post-socialist countries, Serbia has been a site for particular 
instantiations of financialised household lending that has promoted flows of capital across the 
4. There was an organised effort to introduce historically new types of housing relations in YU with new types of 
property, societal property and a democratic self-management structure (after the 1950s). Pursuant to the Housing 
Act of 1959, funds for housing construction were arranged in which shares of personal income and the surplus from 
industrial production were merged. The right to housing was guaranteed by law as the right to a protected tenancy 
(stanarsko pravo). The Yugoslav housing system had its own contradictions and inequalities that were followed by 
a chronic lack of housing (Archer, 2017). Informal self-building was also tolerated in YU as a ‘temporary’ solution 
to the absence of societal housing for the growing urban population. Individual property continued to exist in YU 
parallel to the new form of property relations. After WWII, initial partial nationalisation of the housing stock was 
performed in the cities (Law on Nationalisation, 1958). Nevertheless, during the 1980s social property in housing in 
Belgrade barely exceeded 50% of the overall housing stock (Vujović, 1987:97, quoted in: Archer, 2016:10). 
5. One area the two mentioned laws failed to regulate was the process of restitution. Restitution is the reprivatisation 
of housing assets that had been nationalised, expropriated or confiscated after WWII. The Law on the Return of 
Confiscated Property and Compensation was only passed in 2011. By 2019, according to the director of the Agency 
for Restitution, 997 flats, 1,058 buildings, in total making 6,706 spaces accounting for 506,000 square metres of 
area had been restituted, including 435 hectares of undeveloped urban construction land (see Politika 17.11.2019). 
The process of restitution saw many people suddenly finding themselves in another person’s home, even though the 
displaced person had been living there for 30 years or more (Vilenica forthcoming). This way of establishing the new 
‘property justice’ was not accompanied by the timely solutions for the tenants previously protected by the state. This 
has created a situation in which the right to private property is directly opposed to the right to a home. Although the 
Housing Law of 2016 promises to compensate the formerly protected tenants with suitable replacement apartments, 
the situation of these tenants today remains unresolved. 
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border and conversion between monetary forms (Mikuš, 2019). This peripheral form of housing 
financialisation has been based on foreign, mostly European, banks’ lending money at higher 
interest rates. Like elsewhere in Eastern Europe (EE) countries banks offered housing loans in 
foreign currencies at interest rates below those in the local currency for which the exchange risk 
was assumed by the debtor. Such loans indexed in Swiss francs proved to be especially toxic 
when by 2015 the exchange rate skyrocketed, seeing instalments increase by 250% (Vilenica 
et al., forthcoming). Hundreds of thousands of people accumulated unpayable debt. In 2019, 
the government enacted a Lex specialis that may be seen as a concession to the banks since the 
government committed to financing a large sum for the banks’ losses. 
As Brody and Posfai noted, the structure of lending has changed since 2015 to become more 
strictly regulated and targeted as a result of a middle-class with a stable income. Yet, consumer 
loans and personal loans increased in the aftermath of the global financial crisis as an engine of 
growth during times of the austerity measures on the periphery followed by capital disinvestment 
made by the core countries (Brody and Posfai, 2020: 5). The poorly developed social protection 
system in Serbia pushed many to ask for help from the banks. People have taken out loans to 
buy basics, pay bills, repay existing debts as well as to start a small business. In Serbia, one must 
guarantee a loan with all of one’s assets, including one’s only home. This means homes may 
be lost due to non-repayment of funds borrowed from the bank or for unpaid bills. The current 
wave of evictions in Serbia is due to privatisation of the eviction protocol and the introduction of 
new actors – public (-private) bailiffs – in 2016 in an attempt to resolve the problems of the low 
level of enforcement of court verdicts. These changes form some of the structural adjustments 
imposed by the EU as part of the process of the country becoming a member state. One of the 
biggest problems is that the public bailiffs act as private companies that profit of off their clients. 
Public bailiffs are creating a public image that evictions are the result of court decisions and the 
debts people have accumulated. Evictions are thereby represented as just punishment for the 
irresponsible behaviour of citizens.6 
Another significant pattern of commodification in Serbia is informal construction, with a 
particular set of laws which allowed this to occur (Seklulić, 2012) as its definitions leave room 
for different applications and interpretations. Informal construction took on the role of housing 
production in the 1990s, with 43% of new housing objects said to be have been built without 
permission by 2017 (Savković, 2020). This has made space for extreme precarity for potential 
buyers that stems from different forms of a misdeeds and even criminal acts such as selling 
one’s flat to multiple owners. ‘Extralegal construction’ (Seklulić, 2012) has not only been 
used by individuals and local investors, but been instrumentalised in state-led projects like the 
mega project Belgrade Waterfront that is being realised in a public–private partnership with 
the United Arad Emirates and that includes thousands of unaffordable housing units. In the 
construction process, the strategy ‘act first, then legalise’ was used. The General Urban Plan 
6. There is a principle of proportionality in the Law on Enforcement and Security, which means the executor must 
take care not to damage the debtor. However, if the debtor has nothing other than the home, this principle does 
not save them from losing their home. Those who are unable to take out a loan from a bank often borrow from loan 
sharks. These loan sharks create contracts for the loans and often they use valuable assets of the debtor such as a 
house or apartment as collateral. While this practice is forbidden by law in Serbia, it is very difficult to prove in court.
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of Belgrade was simply amended to fit the project and Lex specialis was introduced to legalise 
the expropriation of land that would otherwise be impossible. Nevertheless, not everything 
that was built was presented in the urban plan. Luxury restaurant Savanova, for example, from 
temporary structure (with temporary permit) in a month time became firm object with concrete 
foundation (see Savković, 2020: 50)7.
The commodification of housing goes hand in hand with state mechanisms that largely 
guarantee housing security in the case of private property in a setting of the absence of legislation 
and a practice of protecting tenants holding other housing statuses (see the similarities with 
Croatia in Marčetić, 2020). These patterns have created residualised and unaffordable ‘social 
housing’ and informal rental sectors where homes are rented under informal agreements without 
protection of the tenants.8 
The primacy of commodification over the right to housing is very visible in the reactions of the 
decision-making elite in Serbia to the pandemic. At the onset of the pandemic in 2020, two main 
measures directly related to housing were introduced. These were a moratorium on mortgage 
payments in the form of a 3-month break on instalment payments that was made possible by 
the National Bank of Serbia, and a recommendation to the Chamber of Public Bailiffs by the 
Ministry of Justice that paused evictions across the state as an exception. While these measures 
had some effect on easing hardship, their key role was to maintain the basic infrastructure that 
allows for the exchange value of housing to be a pivotal axis of capitalist circulation.
Still, not all have been affected by commodification patterns in Serbia in the same way. Many 
social groups have fundamental difficulty keeping or providing housing due to specificities in 
housing commodification. Race is very much a housing issue and an axis of exclusion due to 
commodification patterns in Serbia9. The widespread housing commodification has affected 
7. In parallel with the described deregulation, on election night (April 24, 2016) a group of masked men blocked 
Hercegovačka Street in Savamala neighborhood and used bulldozer to illegally demolish the facilities of the private 
companies Iskra, Transport Peroni and the Sava Express restaurant. There is a reasonable doubt that this act is 
related to meeting the deadline for preparing the terrain for the Waterfront project that was performed as a warning 
to all those that refuse compensation by the state (see Waterfront: a post-Ottoman post-socialist story, film by Miloš 
Jovanović and KURS). Five years later the investigation is still ongoing.
8. According to the Social Housing Act of 2009, anyone unable to resolve their housing needs in the market is entitled 
to social housing. Still, only a small percentage have been able to claim this right by applying for public housing, given 
that it accounts for less than 1% of the total housing stock in the country. There is no official estimate of how many 
people in Serbia need social housing, yet thanks to EUROSTAT data we know that more than half the population in 
Serbia is living in overcrowded houses, which for more than 71% of households housing expenditure poses a great 
burden; and 70% would be eligible to claim help from the state according to EU standards (Eurostat, 2019). The 
current Housing Act (Law on Housing and Building Maintenance SGRS 105/2016 and 9/2020) of 2016 sought to 
regulate the maintenance of the privatised building block instead of putting more emphasis on housing needs. The 
relativisation of social housing in this law is visible in the very language of the legislators who abolished the term social 
housing and introduced the term housing support instead. A significant number of social housing tenants in Serbia is 
burdened by considerable household debt that has built up due to the high costs of utilities. These tenants now face 
eviction because they are unable to repay this illegitimate debt that has accumulated over the years (Vilenica, 2019). 
9. Roma people have been seriously affected by the 1990s’ housing privatisation due to low income and the lack of 
means to exercise the right to buy. Many Roma moved to informal settlements, which became a new site of state- and 
capital-led violence. A significant number of Roma also report injustices related to the restitution process.
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women particularly strongly10. Migrants and asylum-seekers in Serbia are in especially difficult 
situations with no right to housing at all besides the collective accommodation in a state-run 
camp (Stojić-Mitrović and Vilenica, 2019)11. 
There has been an energetic housing movement in Serbia (Vilenica, 2017) that has emerged 
in reaction to above-mentioned patterns of commodification. People have been self-organising 
over the last 20 years to resist the privatisation processes, the ‘semiperipheral financialisation’, 
household debt, energy-related impoverishment, including issues associated with unaffordable 
social housing, evictions as well as housing alternatives12. However, notwithstanding the critical 
importance of housing infrastructure that has come to the fore especially during the Covid-19 
pandemic, the de-commodification of housing is still not on the political agenda in Serbia.
Slovenia
As is characteristic of the region, the commodification of housing in Slovenia is most prominent 
in the large-scale privatisation of public housing in 1991 following the country’s independence. 
Privatisation has meant the sale of dwellings below market prices to sitting tenants, often creating 
further inequalities, as not all could afford to buy these dwellings despite the lower price, and 
the proceeds have mainly not been invested back into the housing sector (Stanovnik, 1992; 
Sendi, 2007; Mandič, 2007). As Mandič (2007) stresses, the social function of a dwelling holds 
no important place in Slovenian housing policy and was subjected to the economic goals and 
economic function of the housing during the transition, while attention to the social aspects of 
housing has constantly lagged behind other more economic aspects.
The current housing structure indicates that homeownership predominates as the share 
of homeowners has been around 75% over the last decade (Eurostat, 2021). The share of 
households with a mortgage is relatively small. Despite having a small number of owners with a 
mortgage compared to the EU average, there was a significant rise in the share of owners with 
a mortgage from 1.5% in 2006 to 12.7% in 2019 (Eurostat 2021). The increase in households 
holding a mortgage potentially indicates that a bigger share of the population is at risk of 
eviction due to arears and also the growing presence of market-based resources in the housing 
10. This reflects their generally worse economic situations related to their weaker positions in the labour market. 
In Serbia, a woman is also less likely to be a homeowner than a man. Issues related to abuse and violence against 
women are interconnected with housing commodification patterns. Women cannot often step out from an abusive 
relationship because they cannot obtain secure housing.
11. This makes them particularly vulnerable to state and police violence in the unregulated housing rental sector 
where some of them reside for shorter periods.
12. In 2017, a new anti-eviction housing movement arose in response to a wave of evictions (Vilenica, Mentus, Ristić, 
forthcoming; Vilenica, Šljivar, Mentus, Murić 2020). By using direct action as a tool for resistance and taking part in 
public debates about housing, debt and eviction, the movement has managed to reconfigure the public narratives about 
housing. Representatives of the movement have attacked hegemonic natives about the right to private property as an 
inviolable right and numerous times pointed out that a just society will be impossible in the future without the right 
to a home. The landscape of the housing movement in Serbia has long been fragmented although there have recently 
been some attempts to bring the different initiatives together, such as the very new Movement for Housing Justice that 
gathers together different housing NGOs and grassroot initiatives in the struggle for the decommodification of housing.
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sector. Yet, as research shows, family resources (in the forms of land, financial support, and 
long cohabitation) also remain highly relevant for Slovenian households for obtaining housing 
(Cirman, 2006; Mandič, 2008). This is also illustrated by the large share of ‘users’ of housing, 
who live in housing owned by someone in exchange for low or no rent, and the fact the share 
of such households in Slovenia is higher than in the non-profit and non-profit rental sector 
combined, which demonstrates the important reliance on family support for housing (Mandič, 
2007, 29). Housing accommodation as a service is therefore highly familialised, which however 
can lead to poorer housing outcomes (see Fahey and Norris, 2011; Norris and Domanski, 2014).
The building of housing has generally stagnated while the high demand has seen housing 
prices rise (see Cirman, 2007), meaning even more difficult access to housing for vulnerable 
groups. Some attention to the difficulty of entering the housing market was paid by the National 
Housing Fund (NFF). This was done through mechanisms like housing subsidies and support 
for specific housing saving schemes, and since 2001 also the NFF building housing for the 
market and selling it at below-market prices (Cirman, 2007). With this latter instrument, some 
vulnerable groups have been listed among priority groups, such as families with children and 
handicapped. Yet, as household income was not part of the criteria this mechanism did little to 
alleviate the housing need of most vulnerable groups in society (see Filipovič Hrast, 2007). The 
focus on support to move into homeownership for those not yet homeowners and have difficulty 
obtaining their dwelling in a homeownership society may be labelled as ‘state intervention for 
social purpose’ (Fahey and Norris, 2011). Still, we can observe in these established mechanisms 
a relatively commodified approach to housing, with a focus on provision of housing for the 
market and for those with means to buy.
An important aspect of the commodification of housing is the shrinking social rental sector. 
The legal obligation to develop the social housing sector is the responsibility of the municipalities. 
Despite the planned development of the social housing sector, its development has been 
slow, with the municipalities responsible facing various problems in financing and advancing 
this sector, in turn producing long waiting lists (National Housing Fund, 2017; MOL 2017). 
Therefore, the share held by the social rented housing sector remains very small at around 6% 
(Pittini, 2019). However, the legal protection of tenants in the social rented sector is the most 
robust and clearly defined in the Housing Act of 2003. The process of terminating a contract is 
highly regulated and, as local case studies (for the largest municipality in Slovenia) indicate, the 
number of actual evictions is much lower than the number of claims made for termination of a 
tenancy contract, eviction and repayment of debt, with quite long court proceedings (Filipovič 
Hrast, 2018). Rent subsidies are available to those in the rental sector, which is an important 
measure that alleviates access to housing for the most vulnerable.
Another important development in Slovenia that may be seen as part of the commodification 
of the housing was the return of the previously nationalised dwellings to their former owners (i.e. 
dwellings restituted to their previous owners after they were nationalised during socialism), known 
as ‘denationalisation’. Those living in denationalised dwellings have a special protected tenancy. 
The rental agreements of tenants in restituted dwellings are for non-profit rent and permanent in 
nature, which means the new owners have no use of the returned property and are therefore not 
interested in continuing the contract, which can produce conflicts between renters and tenants. 
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Tenancy in denationalised apartments is regulated by the Housing Act of 2003. However, the 
status of tenants in denationalised dwellings has been deteriorating, with amendments to legislation 
and poorer tenant protection along with an increase in rent. FEANTSA (European Federation 
of National Organisations Working with the Homeless) filed a complaint against Slovenia that 
targeted the less stable housing security of 13,000 tenants of denationalised dwellings. An ECSR 
decision in February 2010 held that Slovenia had violated the rights of tenants in denationalised 
dwellings and emphasised the precarious position held by sitting tenants.
The last aspect of the low level of the decommodification of housing is shown by the attention 
of housing policy given to the most vulnerable groups in society with little or no attachment to the 
housing market. In Slovenia, this social part of housing policy is poorly developed. Homelessness 
has traditionally been primarily framed within social policy and as part of national social protection 
strategies and programmes, while little attention to housing vulnerability has been paid in the 
housing policy documents. The national housing policy has been slow to develop, with national 
housing programmes far between. Although acknowledging some basic right to housing, the 
government has adopted the goals, but done little (Sendi, 2007: 167). For example, the most 
recent housing policy document the Resolution on National Housing Programme 2015–2025 only 
to a limited extent notes the problem of the most vulnerable groups, yet it does generally deal 
with housing accessibility and strengthening of the rental sector. Some recognition is evident in 
the plan to share responsibility for emergency housing between municipalities and the National 
Housing Fund. However, since this resolution was adopted no significant changes have been 
made in this area, indicating the large implementation gap characteristic of many CEE countries 
in the area of housing (see Hegedus, 2011).
Due to the Covid-19 pandemic in Slovenia, there has been a temporary ban on eviction 
procedures, but otherwise no specific protection of housing rights has been established. aFor 
those in the social rented sector, however, the existing legislation already provides some 
protection against eviction in extreme unforeseen circumstances, such as unexpected loss of 
job, natural disasters and similar circumstances (Article 104 of the Housing Act 2003), and 
specific support for payment of housing cost is available, therefore offering some help in sudden 
financial difficulties that families might find themselves during the pandemic 
The advocacy of housing rights and the most vulnerable groups relative to housing is present 
in Slovenia within the NGO sector, with various national networks (e.g. a network of organisations 
that works on spatial policies). An important part in developing this sector was linking the 
organisations that work with homeless people within the umbrella organisation and the sharing 
of experiences, e.g. in the congress of homeless that is organised yearly. Still, a more significant 
breakthrough in housing rights protection has not happened despite the efforts of the NGOs, due 
perhaps to the persistent lack of decision-makers’ interest in this topic. Moreover, the position 
of NGOs in Slovenia is not perceived to be very strong, partly due to low professionalisation of 
the sector (see Rakar and Deželan, 2016). There seems to be a lack of research, of organisation 
and of a convincing narrative that would increase public attention to the issue of housing and 
housing vulnerability (Filipovič Hrast, 2019). One recent initiative in this area is the Housing 
for All project (led by the Institute for Spatial Policies), financed by the relevant ministries, that 
aims to implement advocacy campaigns for changing the housing policy. 
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Greece
From the 1950s up until the recent crisis, the housing problem in Greece was ‘solved’ by the 
strategies of individual families. Post-WWII urbanisation increased the demand for housing. The 
Greek state, but also the directives of the Marshall Plan, was to use the traditional culture of self-
housing – mostly coming from the Greek agricultural sector – as a basis for the commodification 
of housing (Kalfa, 2019: 12). In this period, thousands of people moved from the periphery to the 
big city because of the civil war and the devastation of the space for agriculture, with their initial 
approach being to reproduce the model of the individual family house. Especially for the poorest 
of the working class, this was carried out by way of the construction of illegal houses. The state’s 
intervention in the housing problem was to fully promote the private construction sector. Through 
a system not very common across Europe, small land properties were used by small or bigger 
construction companies to build multi-storey houses by giving the landowner a number of the flats 
involved (typically 20%-40%). The very low taxation on the housing companies also supported this 
dynamic. This mechanism saw the enormous production of houses at affordable prices and created 
a strong housing market that was a leading sector in the Greek economy. At the same time, the 
social housing policies covered a minimum share of needs (max. 3%). The state workers’ housing 
organisation (OWH) (which was closed as a demand made in the first memorandum which was 
imposed on Greece et al. - 2011) constructed these houses mostly using money that came from funds 
withheld from all worker salaries. The houses were distributed free of charge to the financially weak 
or they were given on interest-free loans to those with higher salaries (Koukoura, 2015).
Since 1990, the financial approach to housing needs has altered a lot due to the new bank 
policies. With large advertising campaigns, banks introduced mortgages to the market. The 
widespread use of loans doubled over a few years and in many cases real-estate prices tripled. 
Thus, by the time of the financial crisis in 2010, Greece had a level of home ownership of 85% 
(Data from ELSTAT). Within a decade, this figure has dropped to 74%, (Eurostat, 2016) with 
three main reasons for this change. The fact that many homes have been sold to allow the 
survival of their occupants, or been lost at auctions due to unpaid loans, but also the fact that 
the younger generations are no longer looking to own a home as neither saving to buy a home 
is possible due to the low incomes, nor is borrowing working because of the banking system 
crisis coupled with the fear of the experience of indebted households in the previous period. 
The model of individualised patterns of housing commodification that has worked for 60 years 
now is retreating. 
Therefore, we can say that Greece today faces an increased housing problem. More than 150,000 
households are over-indebted to the banks (Special Secretariat for Private Debt Management, 
2018) and face the problem of auctioning and eviction from their homes. In the last decade, 
over-indebted household laws have become increasingly stricter, reducing the safeguards of 
the first home. The new bankruptcy law passed in parliament in October 2020 does not give 
any possibility of protection of the first and only residence and its main concern is to look after 
the interests of the banks. Simultaneously, more than 1,000,000 people have debts with public 
and credit institutions, the non-servicing of which is also posing a threat to them losing their 
(Independent public revenue authority, 2021)
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At the same time and as the demand for rental housing is rising, the big entry of short-term 
rentals (such as Airbnb) in Greece has triggered a dramatic hike in rents, especially in cities of 
tourist interest. In Greece, apart from a short-term lease taxation policy, there are no measures to 
control the spread of Airbnb. The legal framework for the protection of tenants is also very weak, 
while the tenant movement, precisely because of the previous situation of high homeownership, 
is only just beginning (Balabanidis et al., 2019).
A special but not secondary issue with housing in Greece concerns housing for immigrants and 
refugees. Deficit policies and miserable conditions are the key features. Over 60,000 are living 
in tents or containers in camps. As Kourachanis (2018) states: “Staying in tents suggests much 
more than a poor housing situation that violates human rights. It works as a means of repelling 
new refugee flows, as, if they manage not to drown in the waters of the Aegean, they will live in 
conditions identical to those of death”. The UNHCR programmes that support housing needs 
for some refugees demanding asylum have been reduced by 20% in the last year and many 
refugees who took the asylum status, they were evicted the last 2 years. Especially in the Covid-19 
pandemic context, hundreds of refugees may be found sick in camps with minimal healthcare.
In the face of all these emerging housing issues, state and local government policies are virtually 
non-existent and consist of degrading rental allowances (EUR 70–150) which are only eligible for 
people living in extreme poverty. For one person with a personal income of less than EUR 580 per 
month, the support is EUR 70 per month whereas the cheapest single-room house costs EUR 20013.
At first glance, it seems this is all a result of the recent crisis in Greece, which assumed more 
dramatic features upon the imposition of the austerity policies through the three memoranda, 
which are continuing and will continue for many years (Kouzis and Dimoulas, 2018). However, 
because a crisis is often an opportunity for speculation, it is obvious that today’s transformations 
are taking place in favour of capital, which, as mentioned at the start of this section, are radically 
changing the housing situation in Greece (Kourachanis, 2020).
Banks and large funds are amassing the properties being sold at auctions but also the 
thousands of unused properties because of the crisis, properties that are sold in the market, many 
of which are converted for Airbnb purposes or used to obtain the ‘Golden Visa’. Greece offers 
citizens outside the EU the ability to take the EU Visa if they buy a house costing more than 
EUR 250,000. It is the lowest investment in Europe needed for obtaining a visa, explaining the 
great demand for real estate. We may thus expect that the gentrification strategies which failed 
in previous decades, as small ownership did not favour space control and central planning, will 
today, also assisted by changes in urban laws, become possible with the large concentration of 
buildings in the hands of the banks and real-estate companies as we have seen from the field 
research we have done as a Joint Initiative against Auctions.
The Covid-19 pandemic has increased the housing problems in many ways. The most important 
is that thousands of people have lost their jobs and only a small share of them have state support. 
Anyone working in an undeclared job, the long-term unemployed, the self-employed with small 
jobs/shops etc have run out of any kind of support. This situation is increasing the number of 
indebted people, people who cannot afford rent and basic energy needs. The government is 
13. See opeka.gr
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taking very few measures to protect the housing rights and only for those people who can prove 
they have been affected by the pandemic. This is not the case for everyone who was having 
economic difficulties before the arrival of Covid-19.
We should note here that although the European Recovery Fund includes actions for housing 
support, in the context of reducing the economic and social impact of the pandemic (as described 
in the presentation of the recovery mechanism) the Greek government does not have any plans/
proposals for the housing sector. This is not simply an omission but a very concrete choice by 
the state to not interfere in the benefits of the capitalist market in the housing sector. And this 
choice is characteristic of our semiperipheral, low productive economy where the construction 
sector remains very strong and financial capital and the bank system are dictating the rules. 
In this context, the movement for housing rights in Greece is preparing for struggles for the 
period after the Covid-19 pandemic and the occasional suspension of payment orders (banks, 
taxations, bills etc.) has come to an end. During the last few years, the housing movements have 
focusing on protection of the living house of indebted people and the housing needs of migrants 
and refugees. Many empty buildings were occupied between 2015 and 2018, but all except one 
have been evacuated the last 2 years. In the last 3 years, we have seen a growing tenant movement 
because of rent increases due to short-term leases (Katerini, 2019).
By the end of June 2021, we expect a big wave of auctions (as already announced on 
e-platforms) and the associated evictions that will follow. During the pandemic, we have had 
an opportunity to acknowledge how important it is for people’s lives to have a proper house. 
The movements should not step back from demanding the establishment of the right to housing 
and strong financial support for the housing costs of people with, low or no income, native 
people and migrants, and for new programme for social and public housing. At the same time, 
we are working to support everyone in danger of auctions and evictions trying to stop them (in 
some cases already successfully). In a more strategic perspective, it is important to take those 
actions that help gradually stop the roof over one’s head from being a commodity and a means 
of enrichment. Self-managed cooperative social housing programmes are at centre of interest 
with their focus on the reuse and social appropriation of thousands of vacant properties.
Conclusions
What these illustrative examples all show is that there is significant semiperiphery diversity in 
housing commodification patterns. These patterns differ partly due to these countries’ different 
commodification histories and geopolitical dynamic positions with respect to the EU and its 
core countries. If we borrow the terminology used by Ruvalcaba (2020), for instance, we may 
speak about the “high or strong semiperiphery”, or the “low or week semiperiphery”. We need 
to look deeper into the relationship among housing core, periphery and semiperiphery to 
further develop this potential theoretical approach. For now, we can only share the provisional 
conclusions based on our three illustrative case studies.
We identified five common points while talking about diversity in the semiperiphery housing, 
with most pronounced individual/familial commodification patterns, marketisation of housing, and 
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production of inequalities with housing commodification. Furthermore, it also seems that during 
the Covid-19 pandemic there was a reproduction of the status quo, and some commonalities are 
also found in movements and civil society organisations as new agents of de-commodification. 
Despite the commonalities there was also significant diversity, which has been produced and 
maintained by the presence (or absence) of policies and state care in general within the housing 
sector and in particular for certain vulnerable groups. Semiperipheral territories must not be 
regarded as a passive background but as a landscape in which active agents participate in 
creating and transforming commodification patterns. 
A common element of the housing commodification patterns is the individualisation or 
familialisation of commodification patterns that preceded financialisation. Serbia and Slovenia 
share the same Yugoslav housing heritage, one interrupted by the rapid and mass privatisation 
of societal flats and houses to individual users. Greece has a long history of mass individual ways 
of solving housing needs outside the welfare state during and since the 1950s. All three countries 
have continued to pursue the same logic while the (semi)peripheral financialisation of housing 
has entered the scene. In Serbia and Greece, this has led to households’ being overindebted 
and, in many cases, to ‘domicide’ by auctions and foreclosures. In Serbia, selling one’s home 
has become a way for repaying all sorts of debt, from household debt to different micro-loans.
In all three countries, the housing market has been presented as a primary way of providing 
a home and all have relatively low share of public housing. Due to the loss of homes the private 
rental sector has been growing in Greece, but with no social measurements to support those in 
need. Slovenia is the only country to have introduced rent reductions for those on low incomes. 
The market has been presented in all three countries as a quick fix for housing problems despite 
the alarming growing inequalities and unaffordable housing costs. According to Eurostat data, 
Greece is the champion in households overburdened by housing costs in the EU, with 39.4% 
of households spending more than 40% of their income on housing. 
Not all in these countries have been affected by commodification patterns in the same way. 
Commodification patterns have produced fundamental difficulties in providing housing among 
different social groups. In Serbia, race is very much a housing issue and an axis of exclusion. 
Many Roma people live in substandard informal settlements without basic means of survival. 
Similarly, Roma in Slovenia face severe exclusion from the housing market and often live in 
illegal dwellings. In Greece and Serbia, on the other hand, migrants and refugees live in miserable 
conditions. In contrast to Greece and Serbia, where the state has done very little to tackle 
homelessness issues, in Slovenia services have developed and housing strategies, while sparse, 
have also been adopted. Still, little has been done to implement them.
The pandemic highlights the importance of adequate and accessible housing. However, 
governments have not taken significant steps to improve housing conditions, even though 
they have recognised housing as a public health issue with the call to “stay at home”. The 
measures introduced differ in the three countries under study. A moratorium on debt arrears 
has been introduced in Greece and Serbia. Further, the Serbian Ministry of Justice has issued a 
recommendation to public-private bailiffs to halt evictions during the first lockdown. Similarly, 
in Slovenia there was a moratorium on evictions, while in Greece there have also been measures 
to support those unable to pay rent with rent subsidies. 
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A common demand made by Serbia and Greece’s movements is the de-commodification of housing. 
Groups like Roof Serbia and Stop the Auctions Greece call for a moratorium on auctions and evictions 
and for the right to housing before the benefits of the banks and big investors. In Slovenia and Serbia, 
people have gathered to think about housing de-commodification beyond social housing in groups 
Zadrugator from Ljubljana and Who Builds the City from Belgrade. A new cooperative movement 
has emerged from this along with other initiatives on the East Europe level. These groups have 
joined forces in a network of pioneering housing cooperatives called MOBA to increase negotiation 
power and reinvent affordability from the bottom up. There is a significant difference in the level of 
organising around housing issues in these countries and in Slovenia we cannot speak about a housing 
movement due to perhaps comparatively more developed housing de-commodification patterns.
References
Allen, J. (Ed.) (2004), Housing and welfare in Southern Europe. Blackwell Pub.
Archer, R. (209516), “Paid for by the Workers, Occupied by the Bureaucrats’: Housing 
Inequalities. In 1980s Belgrade”. In Archer, R., Duda I. & Stubbs, S. (Eds.), Social Inequalities 
and Discontent in Yugoslav Socialism. Abingdon: Routledge, 2016.
Arrighi, G & Drangel, J. (1986), “The Stratification of the World-Economy: An Exploration of 
the Semiperipheral Zone”. Review X, 1, 9-74.
Arrighi, G. (1990), “The developmentalist illusion: A reconceptualization of the semiperiphery”. 
In Semiperipheral States in the World-Economy (pp. 11-42). Green-wood Press.
Avakumović, M. (2019), Restituciji se nazire kraj. (Politika. 7.11.2019) http://www.politika.rs/
scc/clanak/442129/Restituciji-se-nazire-kraj#!
Balampanidis, D., Maloutas, T., Papatzani, E. and Pettas, D. (2019), “Informal urban regeneration 
as a way out of the crisis? Airbnb in Athens and its effects on space and society”, Urban 
Research and Practice, https://doi.org/10.1080/17535069.2019.1600009
Belle. K. S. (2020), “Interlocking, Intersecting, and Intermeshing: Critical Engagements with 
Black and Latina Feminist Paradigms of Identity and Oppression”. Critical Philosophy of 
Race 8, no. 1-2: 165. https://doi.org/10.5325/critphilrace.8.1-2.0165.
Bernt, M. (2016), “How post-socialist is gentrification? Observations in East Berlin and Saint 
Petersburg”. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 57(4-5), 565-587. https://doi.org/10.108
0/15387216.2016.1259079
Bródy L. S. & Pósfa, S. (2020), Household debt on the peripheries of Europe: New constellations 
since 2008 (No. 3; Periféria Working Papers).
Chatzimichalis K (2015), Debt Crisis and Land Robbery. ΚΨΜ Publications (in Greek).
Cirman A (2007), “Razvoj stanovanjskega trga v Sloveniji”. In: Sendi, R. (ed.), Stanovanjska 
reforma : pričakovanja, potrebe in realizacija, (Zbirka Urbani izziv). Ljubljana: Urbanistični 
inštitut Republike Slovenije. 
Cirman, A. (2006), “Kako dosegljiva so stanovanja za slovenska gospodinjstva? How accessible 
is Housing for Slovene Households?” In: Mandič, S., Cirman, A.(eds.). Stanovanje v Sloveniji 
2005. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, pp. 55-70.
96 • Κοινωνική Πολιτική 14 • Ιούνιος 2021
Eurostat (2021), Housing statistic. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/
view/ilc_lvho02/default/table?lang=en (accessed 17.3.2021)
Fahey, T., & Norris, M. (2011), “Housing in the Welfare State: Rethinking the Conceptual 
Foundations of Comparative Housing Policy Analysis”. International Journal of Housing 
Policy, 11(4), 439-452. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616718.2011.626606
Filipovič Hrast, M (2007). “Ranljivost na stanovanjskem področju : Slovenija v evropski 
perspektivi”. In: Sendi, R. (ed.), Stanovanjska reforma: pričakovanja, potrebe in realizacija, 
(Zbirka Urbani izziv). Ljubljana: Urbanistični inštitut Republike Slovenije. pp. 35-53
Filipovič Hrast, M. (2019), “Challenges to development of policy on homelessness in Slovenia”. 
European journal of homelessness, 13(2), 111-130.
Filipovič Hrast, M. (2018), “Evictions in Slovenia: legal aspects, data limitations and good 
practices”. In: Kenna, Padraic (ed.), Loss of homes and evictions across Europe: a comparative 
legal and policy examination, (Elgar land and housing law and policy series). Cheltenham; 
Northampton: E. Elgar. pp. 270-291
Forrest, R., & Williams, P. (1984), “Commodification and Housing: Emerging Issues and 
Contradictions”. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 16(9), 1163-1180. 
https://doi.org/10.1068/a161163
Hegedüs, J. & Tosics, I. (1996), “The Disintegration of the East European Housing Model”. In 
Housing Privatization in Eastern Europe (pp. 15-39). Greenwood Press.
Hegedus, J. (2011), “Social Safety Nets, The Informal Economy and Housing Poverty: Experiences 
in Transitional Countries”, European Journal of Homelessness 5(1) pp. 15-26.
Housing Act 2003, Official Gazette 69/3. Available at: http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/
pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO2008 (accessed 23.4.2021)
Kalfa, K. (2019), Self-housing now. Athens: FUTURA Publications (in Greek) 
Kotionis, Z., Mparkouta, G. and Kontaxi, E. (2016), Urban Solidarity Practices. Volos: Publications 
University of Thessaly (in Greek).
Koukoura S. (2015), “Evolution of urban planning models in the production of social housing 
in Greece”. University of Thessaly.
Kourachanis N. (2018), “Asylum seekers, hotspot approach and anti-social policies in Greece 
(2015-2017)”, Journal of International Migration and Integration, 19: pp. 1153-1167. https://
link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12134-018-0592-y
Kourachanis, N. (2020), “Homelessness Policies in the Liberal and the Southern European 
Welfare Regimes: Ireland, Portugal, and Greece”, Housing Policy Debate, 30(2): pp. 121-
136. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10511482.2019.1641733
Kourachanis, N. (Ed.) (2019), Housing and Society. Problems, Policies and Movements, Athens: 
Dionicos (in Greek).
Kouzis, G. and Dimoulas, C. (2018), Crisis and Social Policy, Athens: Topos (in Greek).
Kováts, B. (2020), Is There a Core-semiperiphery Division in Housing? Applying World-systems 
Theory in European Comparative Housing Research. Housing, Theory and Society, 1-20. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14036096.2020.1813801
Lee, K. (2009), “Towards a Reformulation of Core/Periphery Relationship: A Critical Reappraisal of 
the Trimodality of the Capitalist World-Economy in the Early 21st Century”. Perspectives on Global 
Κοινωνική Πολιτική 14 • Ιούνιος 2021 • 97
Development and Technology, 8(2-3), 263-294. https://doi.org/10.1163/156914909X423890
Lourenço, André Luís Cabral (2016), “Semiperiferia: Uma hipótese em discussão”. Economia 
e Sociedade, 14(1), 177-186. https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/ecos/article/
view/8643044
Mandič S. (2007), “Učinki tranzicijskih politik na stanovanjsko oksrbo v socialnem/neprofitnem 
sektorju”. In Sendi, R. (ued), et al. Stanovanjska reforma : pričakovanja, potrebe in realizacija, 
(Zbirka Urbani izziv). Ljubljana: Urbanistični inštitut Republike Slovenije.
Mandić S. (2008), “Home-leaving and its Structural Determinants in Western and Eastern 
Europe: an Exploratory Study”, Housing Studies 23 (4), pp. 615-636.
Marčetić, I. (2020), Stambene politike u službi društvenih i prostornih (ne)jednakosti. Pravo na 
grad.
Mikuš, M. (2019), “Contesting household debt in Croatia: The double movement of financialization 
and the fetishism of money in Eastern European peripheries”. Dialectical Anthropology, 43(3), 
295-315. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10624-019-09551-8
Mitrović, M.S., & Vilenica, A. (2019), “Enforcing and disrupting circular movement in an EU 
Borderscape: Housingscaping in Serbia”. Citizenship Studies, 23(6), 540-558. https://doi.org
/10.1080/13621025.2019.1634368
MOL (2017), Stanovanjski program mestne občine Ljubljana. (Housing Programme of Municipality 
Of Ljubljana) Ljubljana: Javni stanovanjski sklad MOL [Online]. Available at:  https://www.
ljubljana.si/assets/Seje/15494/7.-toka---stanovanjski-program-2017-in-2018-ns-jss-mol.pdf 
[Accessed 29 January 2019].
National Housing Fund (2017), Poročilo – ugotavljanje potreb o vrstah stanovanjskega fonda v 
občinah. (Report on Diverse Housing Needs in Municipalities) Stanovanjski sklad RS. 3.4.2017.
Norris, M., & Domański, H. (2009), “Housing Conditions, States, Markets and Households: 
A Pan-European Analysis”. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 
11(3), 385–407. https://doi.org/10.1080/13876980903158027
Olt, G., & Csizmady, A. (2020), “Gentrification and functional change in Budapest – ‘ruin bars’ 
and the commodification of housing in a post-socialist context”. Urban Development Issues, 
65(1), 17–26. https://doi.org/10.2478/udi-2020-0002
Pattillo, M. (2013), “Housing: Commodity versus Right”. Annual Review of Sociology, 39(1), 
509–531. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-071312-145611
Petrović, M. (2004), Sociologija stanovanja: Stambena politika izazovi i mogućnosti. Institut za 
sociološka istraživanja Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu.
Pittini, A. (2019), State of housing in the EU. Housing Europe, the European Federation of 
Public, Cooperative and Social Housing Brussels, September 2019.
Rakar, T. & Dezelan, T. (2016), “Opolnomočenje civilnodružbenih organizacij v Sloveniji. 
(Empowerment of civil organisations in Slovenia)”. Teorija in praksa – Theory and prasxis 
journal: revija za družbena vprašanja 53(2) pp. 449-468.
Ruvalcaba, Morales Daniel. (2020), “The Semiperipheral States in the Twenty-First Century: 
Measuring the Structural Position of Regional Powers and Secondary Regional States”. 
International Studies 57(1): 20–50. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020881719880769.
Sekulić, D. (2012), Glotz nicht so romantisch!: On Extralegal Space in Belgrade. Jan van Eyck 
98 • Κοινωνική Πολιτική 14 • Ιούνιος 2021
Academie.
Sendi, R. (2007), Stanovanjska reforma : pričakovanja, potrebe in realizacija, (Zbirka Urbani 
izziv). Ljubljana: Urbanistični inštitut Republike Slovenije.
Slavković, Lj. (2020), “From a blind field into a modus operandi: Legalizing the Wild City”. In 
Nonument (pp. 38–51). MoTa.
Stanovnik T (1992), “Obletnica stanovanjskega zakona: kaj se je zgodilo in zakaj’. IB revija 26 
(6-7), pp. 23-28.
Stephens, M., Lux, M., & Sunega, P. (2015), “Post-Socialist Housing Systems in Europe: Housing 
Welfare Regimes by Default?”; Housing Studies, 30(8), 1210–1234. https://doi.org/10.1080
/02673037.2015.1013090
Tsenkova, S. (2009), Housing policy reforms in post socialist Europe: Lost in transition. Physica-
Verlag.
Vieira, M. B. B. (2018), “Undocking and Collision: The recent Paths of the Semiperiphery in the 
World-system”. Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, 7(13), 10–47.
Vilenica, A. (2017), “Contemporary housing activism in Serbia: Provisional mapping”. Interface: 
A Journal for and about Social Movements, 9(1), 424–447. http://www.interfacejournal.net/
wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Interface-9-1-Vilenica.pdf
Vilenica, A. (2019), “Contradictions and Antagonisms in (Anti-) Social(ist) Housing in Serbia”. 
ACME: An International Journal for Critical Geographies, 18(6), 1261-1282. https://acme-
journal.org/index.php/acme/article/view/1731
Vilenica, A. (forthcoming), Belgrade: Housing restitution in Serbia. Mapping Against Restitution 
Project.
Vilenica, A., Mentus, V. & Ristić, I. (forthcoming), Struggles for care infrastructures in Serbia: 
Dispossessed care, coronavirus and housing, Journal for Historical Social Research, Special 
issue: Caring in Times of a Global Pandemic, (Eds.) Emma Dowling, Birgit Sauer, Ayse 
Dursun, Verena Kettner und Syntia Hasenoehrl.
Vilenica, A., Pantović, N. & Škobić, M. (forthcoming), “CHF-indexed housing debts in Belgrade 
and Novi Sad (Serbia): dependent financialization, housing precarity and the housing struggle”. 
City – Analysis of urban change, Theory, Action.
Vilenica, A., Šljivar, T., Mentus, V., Murić, P. (2020), “Solidarity as a Temporary Social 
Infrastructure: Anti-Eviction Struggles in Serbia during the Pandemic”. Radical Housing 
Journal 3(1). https://radicalhousingjournal.org
Wallerstein, I. (1974), Capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world-economy in 
the sixteenth century. Academic Press.
Wallerstein, I. (2002), The capitalist world-economy: Essays (Repr., transferred to digital print. 
2002). Cambridge Univ. Press.
Wiest, K. (2012), “Comparative Debates in Post-Socialist Urban Studies”. Urban Geography, 
33(6), 829–849. https://doi.org/10.2747/0272-3638.33.6.829
PART B
Aspects of Social Policy  
and Housing in Greece

Κοινωνική Πολιτική 14 • Ιούνιος 2021 • 101
Housing as a Social Issue in Greece  
before and during the 2010s
Thomas Maloutas1
Abstract
Housing in Southern Europe developed in different ways from the advanced industrial countries. 
In Greece, lower income groups in the early post-war period accessed affordable housing 
either through self-promotion or the ‘land-for-flats’ system. These alternative ways of accessing 
housing declined in the late 1980s and the 1990s and were followed by the rapid growth of 
housing credit and the increase in prices. The sovereign debt crisis in the early 2010s led to a 
standstill in the real estate market due to the lack of demand. Problems of access to affordable 
housing re-emerged when the crisis retreated, and tourism boosted new demand for housing. 
The pandemic again stopped this process by radically reducing tourist flows. The question now 
is whether there will be an opportunity after the pandemic to make the protection of housing 
for vulnerable groups a priority on the political agenda.
Keywords: alternative housing solutions; affordable housing; crisis; pandemic; short term 
rentals; tourism
Housing as a Social Issue
Housing is a fundamental component of living conditions and its quality is a key parameter that 
connects and affects not only everyday life, but also individuals’ prospects for social mobility. 
The need for housing and its role in the processes of social reproduction make access to decent 
housing a need which the state cannot ignore, especially for groups that either have no access 
to housing at all, or whose access is insecure and / or limited to low-quality housing.
The emergence of the social character of housing is intertwined with the development of 
industry and capitalism. The population that moved to the cities to work in the factories had 
not only to be housed close to their place of work but also to be housed in conditions that 
1. Emeritus Professor, Department of Geography, Harokopio University, Athens, Greece. ORCID: https://orcid.
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would not create problems for their labor productivity. However, the social nature of housing 
and the state’s obligations towards the provision of housing did not automatically arise as a 
rational solution to a problem of social organization - something that also applies to all welfare 
benefits (Venieris, 2015). Initially, the new working population was stacked in indescribable 
housing conditions in developing industrial cities; conditions that contributed to cities being 
considered places of morbidity, as confirmed by the extremely low life expectancy for workers 
in the industrial cities of the 19th century (Antonovsky, 1967). In contrast the countryside had 
to supply healthy young people to support the cannibalistic city that sacrificed them on the 
altar of development (Lees, 1985). It took many long struggles by those who suffered in these 
challenging housing conditions as well as changes in political power relations within the nexus 
of interests around housing to establish it as a social right. 
The social content of housing may have been quite different if it had not been affected by the 
catalytic impact of the two world wars and the deep crisis of 1929. Housing gained much more of 
a social character in the war-torn urbanized and industrialized parts of Europe, than in the more 
rural and much less devastated US, where it remained much more of an individual / family affair.
Housing as a social right is still not something that is unquestionably accepted and its status 
in this respect is constantly changing according to social and political power relations. This is 
confirmed by the way it developed historically, but also by the decline of housing as a social 
right in recent decades. 
The establishment of housing as a socially provided good is linked to the development of 
the welfare state after World War II, although the damages resulting from World War I and the 
crisis of 1929 had already paved the way. The intertwining of housing and the welfare state is 
concomitant with the more even distribution of income and wealth observed internationally - and 
especially in developed industrial countries - from the 1920s to the late 1970s (Piketty, 2014; 
Milanovic, 2016). The welfare state significantly developed during the first post-war decades, 
and housing was one of its main pillars. The huge war damage and the post-war political 
climate - including the rivalry between governments in capitalist and state socialist countries 
to win the support of their broad electorates - favored the management of housing as a public 
good. Western and Northern European countries had suffered severe damage during the war 
and were located next to the rival political camp, where housing was by definition considered 
a public good. The relevant policy promoted the significant development of the social housing 
sector through the construction of a very large stock of public housing available at affordable 
rents. Moreover, a variety of rental policies restricted the rights of landlords, so that affordable 
housing could meet the great housing needs created by both wars and by the large population 
movements to the growing industrial cities.
In other parts of the industrialized world - especially in the English-speaking countries of 
the New World - housing, as well as other welfare benefits were treated differently. Economic 
liberalism prevailed in those countries and wage increases were adopted instead of social 
benefits. The result was that many of these services - including housing - remained much more 
commodified than in Europe.
In Southern Europe, things turned out differently. Industrial development has been relatively 
slow and limited, with the exception of some regions such as Catalonia, Lombardy, and Piedmont. 
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At the time of the great post-war industrial development in the European continent, the southern 
countries contributed as areas of mass migration to the industrial center. Major cities in southern 
Europe grew significantly at that time, not as poles of attraction but as areas with more survival 
options for the fleeing rural population. Due to the overabundance of the labor force in cities, 
public concern for the housing of the working class was rather limited, as it was not a pressing 
issue for either employers or the state. Thus, Southern Europe has developed much smaller 
social housing sectors, within the residual local welfare states (Ferrera, 1996; Allen et al., 2004). 
Housing needs - which, however, were not less important in the South - were largely met in 
alternative ways. These ways systematically replaced welfare structures and services using the 
initiative of the settlers themselves, the organizational and other resources of their families, 
and policies that enabled such a model of social regulation and reproduction to become viable.
The Housing Question in Greece
Greece represents the archetype of the southern European model for the regulation of the 
housing issue, as the whole country participated in this in a similar way. The “alternative” ways 
of meeting housing needs (Maloutas and Economou, 1988) prevailed in this case more than in 
the other countries of the region.
The prevailing ways in which housing needs were met in the post-war period, when thousands 
of internal migrants gathered in the country’s large cities and especially in Athens, were the self-
promoted individual housing of lower income groups in the urban periphery and the ‘land-for-flats’ 
(antiparochi) system (Leontidou, 1990; Antonopoulou, 1991). The first was a solution for the 
initial settlement of a significant portion of poor internal migrants. The use of illegal construction 
was the extreme version of self-promotion, which was a massive, but highly individualized solution, 
for which the settler had to take the initiative, organize the process, take risks and, often, invest a 
significant amount of personal work and family assistance. In the turbulent post-civil war conditions, 
self-promotion was supported as a process for disciplining oppositional political views by investing 
in a path of converting proletarians to micro home-owners. Addressing housing needs in this 
way was linked to the massive and complex dealings within the clientelist political system. This 
option was not only supported by domestic power groups, but also actively sponsored by the 
US—which replaced the UK as Greece’s protector—in the early 1950s (Kalfa, 2018).
The second alternative way to address housing needs—the land-for-flats system—seems at 
first a solution that served the interests of small landowners and small building contractors. 
Although this is true, the main social effect of the land-for-flats system was that it significantly 
enhanced the supply of housing, to the extent that it made it accessible to a very large part of 
the social spectrum. The fact that the land-for-flats system had a specific broader social effect 
is not unrelated to the fact that it served the interests of small landowners and small building 
contractors. The policy protecting these small players in the house building realm from the 
competition of larger players—such private as banks, large landowners and big construction 
companies—whose activity in this domain was blocked by institutional and other barriers 
(Economou, 1988), created favorable conditions for the mass production of affordable housing.
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The period during which housing needs in Greece were tackled in these alternative—compared 
to the European welfare state model—ways was a period of intense economic growth and high 
social mobility. Access to housing, mainly in the form of affordable homeownership, was one of 
the components of the socially redistributive policy pursued in the first post-war period in the 
context of political stabilization efforts through the mechanisms of the clientelist state. However, 
the anemic presence of the welfare state, the individualized housing solutions and the initiative of 
the settlers for the implementation of housing outcomes did not mean more economic liberalization 
and greater market influence. The state remained sovereign, prescribing roles and boundaries 
for all parties involved. This not only concerned the consumption and supply sectors, but the 
development model of the country as a whole, with the result that a large part of the business 
sector developed with a complete dependence on government orders and purchases.
Changing Housing Policies
Much has changed internationally since the 1970s. Neoliberal policies are increasingly developing 
and, after the collapse of state socialism, have come to dominate completely. The welfare state 
has been a victim of its own success (Logue, 1979). From a certain point on, the impression 
was created that it was no longer necessary because it had managed to meet most basic needs. 
Today, after several decades of a shrinking welfare state, the recorded clear impact of these 
policy changes is the accelerating restoration of social inequalities, which are leading to a return 
to extremely high levels of inequality in the early 20th century (Piketty, 2014).
Welfare benefits have gradually shrunk, and housing has been one of the key components of 
this shrinkage. The decline of the welfare state elsewhere has been abrupt and violent—such as 
in the United Kingdom, for example, where much of the public housing stock has been privatized 
by selling it to those residents who could afford it—and elsewhere more measured, such as in 
France, Germany or the Scandinavian Countries. Even more drastic and violent were the changes 
in the countries of Eastern Europe, where the enthusiasm and optimism for the positive results 
of the introduction of market processes without many regulations led to the re-establishment of 
social inequality and housing segregation in a short period of time. 
The retreat of the welfare state in the housing sector did not have a negative impact just 
because it left exposed a large number of people who are being housed in a problematic way. A 
gradual introduction of what can be summed up as the neoliberal approach to housing policy—
that is, reducing the number of beneficiaries to those who “really” need it—has also led to a 
significant deterioration in the condition of those who remain beneficiaries. By recognizing only 
those in absolute poverty as beneficiaries, social housing areas are transformed into areas of 
absolute poverty, social exclusion and often stigma. The fate of many social housing complexes 
in Western Europe illustrates such a path. From modern residential complexes, which were 
a significant step up and an object of pride for their first inhabitants, they gradually evolved 
into problematic residential areas to be avoided. Their limited maintenance and the growing 
concentration of poor households—often young immigrants—have exacerbated their decline 
(Hess et al., 2018). At the same time, this policy has excluded from the social housing safety net 
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many lower middle-class groups who today encounter increased difficulties in finding affordable 
housing in many large European cities.
Such an approach to social housing is at the opposite end of the philosophy of housing in 
Sweden at the time when the welfare state was at its peak: housing should meet the demands 
of everyone, i.e. even of middle-class households. Middle-class households, being part of the 
beneficiaries, were housed in socially mixed neighborhoods with those most in need. Socially 
mixed neighborhoods and evenly distributed high-quality services—such as schools—created 
comparatively equal opportunities for children growing up in them. Today, Sweden is also far 
from its old standard, with housing segregation being a significant problem in its major cities.
Moreover, this political change was marked by a change in urban policies, especially in countries 
where significant housing benefits had been developed. The new policies, often under the banner 
of area-based policies, aimed at upgrading problem areas, and at first they seemed to be to the 
benefit of their vulnerable residents (Burgers & Vranken, 2003). Spatially focused policies are 
not necessarily positive or negative. However, in the general political climate of limiting social 
services and benefits, this policy shift marked a reduction in the allocation of housing resources 
to vulnerable groups, while an increase in resources for upgrading areas was often associated 
with gentrification processes and therefore had a different social effect (Lees, 2008).
In Greece—and in the rest of Southern Europe—the changes were milder, at least until the 
crisis. Deindustrialisation had fewer consequences because industrial development was not as 
important as elsewhere. Thus, the concentrated crisis in old industrial areas, such as the North 
of England and Alsace in the 1970s and 1980s or in the Scandinavian countries in the 1990s, 
was avoided to some extent, and there was a more gradual adaptation to the new conditions. 
These new conditions were not only related to changes in the general economic climate, but 
also to changes in the immediate international surroundings—the EU, where all countries of the 
European South were already members. For these countries, EU convergence policies, which 
translated into significant external funding, reduced the effects of economic restructuring to the 
extent that overall Community policy pursued social and territorial convergence objectives. With 
the change in the EU’s objectives and the designation of competitiveness as the main target, 
the impact of European funding on the countries of the South has also changed, as this funding 
has become increasingly conditional on the adoption of economic and social policies that are 
in line with the new objectives.
The course of changes in Greece was marked mainly by the policy of modernization, which 
was linked to the country’s membership of the eurozone. A policy of mild adjustment was 
followed up to the beginning of the crisis and the policies of the memoranda thereafter. During 
this period—mainly the 1990s and 2000s—housing changed significantly. Traditional ways of 
accessing homeownership—and especially self-promotion—were already beginning to decline, 
increasingly leading to socially unequal homeownership rates. At the same time, the 1990s were 
a time of dramatic decline in bank interest rates, which increased the significance of mortgage 
lending by commercial banks and made them an important regulator of the housing market. 
The mortgage lending boom boosted purchasing power, especially for the middle and upper 
middle class. This led to a rapid rise in housing prices, further widening social inequalities in 
access to home ownership (Emmanuel, 2004 and 2014). Moreover, the curtailing of tenants’ 
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protection measures, which eventually led to their complete abolition, further exacerbated social 
inequalities in housing.
The widening of social inequalities in housing, but also in general, was significantly enhanced 
in the 1990s with the arrival of a large number of poor immigrants from developing countries. 
These immigrants did not have the resources that would have enabled them to solve their housing 
problem in the traditional ways: they were not integrated into family self-help networks; they 
did not have the minimum required financial resources; they were not part of the local political 
networking, etc. As a result, they increased the number of poor tenants, for whom, at the same 
time, protection was reduced to a minimum. Vulnerable populations in terms of housing—
including migrants—were tenants either in low-quality housing on the outskirts of cities and in 
rural areas, or in run-down small apartments in city centers and especially in small apartments 
on lower floors in densely built neighborhoods in the center of Athens and some other large 
cities (Balampanidis, 2019).
At the beginning of the 1990s, the increase in social inequalities and the growing difficulties 
in securing acceptable housing conditions had not become particularly perceptible. The main 
reason—apart from the fact that the main victims were groups without political rights and a 
voice—was that this was a period of economic growth, during which unemployment was relatively 
low and even the inflowing immigrants found a place in the labor market. At the same time, 
local working-class groups developed rather limited housing needs due to the sharp decline in 
fertility and their reduced geographical mobility since the 1980s.
Housing during the Crisis
The crisis that began at the end of this twenty-year period (1990-2010) had an unclear impact 
on the long-running processes of widening housing inequalities. On the one hand, the crisis 
brought about the almost complete freezing of real estate transfers for several years, which 
favored the maintenance of existing relations and balances. On the other hand, by impoverishing 
a significant part of the population, it led to the development of defensive survival strategies, 
which also significantly affected the housing market. Many who could no longer meet the rent 
levels they used to pay either moved to smaller homes or shared houses with other relatives. 
Those who did not have such options negotiated lower rent levels. Lower rents gradually became 
possible, as demand levels fell and could not reach previous rent levels. The social composition 
of landlords in Greece also contributed to this adjustment. The small property owners, who 
constitute the vast majority, usually depend on the additional small income from their one or 
two rented properties and could not keep them off the market until better days had come. The 
difficulties of small landowners escalated with the large increase in real estate tax in the period 
2008-2012, which further pushed them to accept rent reductions and leave their properties 
vacant only when there was no alternative.
In a nutshell, the crisis has downgraded the housing conditions of households throughout most 
of the social spectrum and created particularly problematic situations for the most vulnerable, 
which is highlighted by the increased number of homeless people who are no longer a marginal 
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group (Arapoglou & Gounis, 2017). At the same time, the crisis put significant pressure on 
small property owners, reducing the income from their rented properties and increasing their 
tax obligations. However, the crisis did not lead to the massive dispossession of smallholdings 
due to the absence of demand and the complete stagnation in the real estate market.
Housing policies did not change at the beginning of the crisis. The traditional absence of 
support policies for access to acceptable housing conditions continued, with the underlying 
assumption that housing is an individual/family issue and housing problems are dealt with 
without the need of public support (Vatavali and Chatzikonstantinou, 2019). In fact, under 
pressure from the obligations of the memoranda, the only two bodies for the planning and 
implementation of urban planning and social housing programs—DEPOS (Public Agency of 
urban Planning and Housing) and OEK (Organisation of Workers’ Housing)—were abolished 
in 2010 and 2012 respectively, thus showing the limited importance that the political leadership 
attached to their mission and work.
The political change of 2015, when SYRIZA came to power, brought a gradual change in 
the treatment of the housing issue, activated by the catalytic increase in refugee flows in the 
same year. The refugee housing problem was such that it could not be resolved without an 
organized plan, even in a country with a traditional absence of housing and immigrant reception 
policies. The increase in the number of homeless people and the change in their profile—that 
is, the increasing number of homeless who had simply lost their jobs and did not have a kinship 
protection network—gave greater visibility and social dimension to the housing issue, even if 
housing in Greece had been treated for many decades as an individual / family affair.
However, even after the political change of 2015, tackling the housing issue remained rather 
awkward and fragmentary (Kourachanis, 2017). The housing of refugees, the limited resources 
available, and the disproportionate burden that Greece bears in this respect within the EU have 
led to the pursuit of external funding as well as organizational assistance from international 
organizations, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and the voluntary support of 
international and local NGOs (Kourachanis, 2019).
The central government contributed by mobilizing various resources - such as the armed 
forces - to alleviate the refugee population. This mobilization, however, remained within the 
logic of dealing with an emergency problem. Refugees were considered to be a population 
group that was in Greece temporarily and hence, with their departure, their housing problem 
would disappear. This is similar to the logic in dealing with the effects of emergency natural 
disasters, such as floods and earthquakes, as well as the effects of wars, for which emergency 
and temporary measures are taken. In the context of such an approach, military-type solutions 
were also adopted. It seems paradoxical, however, that these solutions were mainly applied to 
asylum seekers—that is, to those whose stay in the country was more likely—while those who 
were to move to other countries were provided with apartments within the urban fabric, which 
presumably could facilitate their integration.
The issue of refugee housing in recent years has highlighted the inability to tackle a major 
problem that is less temporary than it first appears, not only because a significant proportion 
of refugees will not leave Greece eventually, but also because many more vulnerable groups are 
facing a similar problem. The problem is both in the difficulty of allocating the necessary financial 
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resources and in the lack of organizational experience and know-how in an area where direct 
public intervention has been absent for decades and where the relevant public organizational 
structures, which could be involved in designing such policies and interventions, were abolished 
at the beginning of the 2010s.
Local government has also been involved in the issue of refugee housing and this involvement 
has brought significant experience in an area in which local government had not traditionally 
been involved. The absence of a comprehensive national housing policy, however, also leads to 
large differences among municipalities. The Municipality of Athens, for example, has developed 
important and innovative initiatives and collaborations in this field. These initiatives may be the 
basis for future actions that should now be supported by national resources, given the imminent 
departure of the main international agency (UNHCR) providing financial and organizational 
support. Other municipalities, however, did not follow a similar approach and some of them 
avoided becoming involved, consciously following a xenophobic approach.
Overall, the issue of refugee housing—despite the positive political climate created by the 
central government—highlighted the significant problem of limited financial and organizational 
resources but, above all, the problem of fragmentation in policy intervention. This could be 
much more effectively addressed if the refugee housing issue was part of a more comprehensive 
housing policy framework where this group of beneficiaries would be considered as among 
those who need support in terms of their access to decent housing conditions (Kambouridis 
and Planeteros, 2019).
Recently, actions have been developed for specific vulnerable groups, mainly the homeless, 
for whom an effort is being made to better document both their social profile and their location 
patterns (Dimoulas et al. 2018; Dimoulas and Karlaganis, 2019). These actions are positive but 
remain limited and piecemeal. A broader intervention, in terms of the number of beneficiaries 
and required expenditure, is the provision of a rent subsidy. This is a positive measure in a 
country where housing support has traditionally been in favor of homeowners (Emmanuel et al. 
1996). In the current situation, the most vulnerable, in terms of security of access to a decent 
home, are mainly among the tenants (Sapounakis & Komninou, 2019). The question, however, 
is whether this rent subsidy can protect those who are threatened by recent and upcoming 
developments in the housing market.
Towards a New Housing Policy
What can be a progressive and, at the same time, feasible housing policy today? In many 
European countries, where welfare housing policies have developed significantly in the past, 
current trends are varied and often ambiguous. A general trend is to reduce the public stock of 
rental housing, either by selling it or by demolishing old and dilapidated complexes in whole 
or in part and upgrading the rest.
This policy obeys the logic of disengaging the state from the significant cost of social housing, 
when this service is addressed to a significant part of the population, assuming that most can 
meet their housing needs through the free market. The reduction in public involvement (and 
Κοινωνική Πολιτική 14 • Ιούνιος 2021 • 109
expenditure) has limited the social scope of housing policies and—as mentioned earlier—has 
often stigmatized beneficiaries and their high-concentration areas, such as the large old housing 
estates of the social rented sector.
To address such problems, policies have been developed in several countries—such as 
France and the Netherlands—to prevent large concentrations of vulnerable populations by 
demolishing complexes in areas with already high concentrations or by imposing a percentage 
of affordable housing on new building programs. These policies have not worked very well. 
The spatial distribution of poverty with the demolition of complexes creates problems for the 
survival of the poor, often destroying their social networks, while the imposition of a percentage 
of social housing on new buildings has proved difficult to implement, especially in areas with 
high land and housing prices.
At the same time, the growing socio-spatial inequalities create housing problems for social 
groups that previously did not experience them. Young households belonging to the middle 
and lower middle classes—to occupational categories such as teachers, nurses, police officers, 
etc.—cannot be housed in large parts of metropolises, such as central Paris and London. These 
households need to search for housing outside of these areas, to where, however, they must 
travel to offer their services on a daily basis. This problem is often the result of gentrification 
processes that develop in different ways and to different degrees in post-industrial cities (Lees 
et al., 2008), making the issue of designing and implementing effective social housing policies 
more complex.
If the problems of implementing housing policies have become difficult in the countries that 
had a developed welfare state, in Greece they are even more complicated. The difficulty lies both 
in the absence of social housing infrastructure and in the absence of institutions, tradition and 
know-how for the required procedures. It also lies in the long absence of the housing issue from 
the political and social agenda, in which it has only become visible as a social issue through the 
need to provide housing for refugees. Poverty of resources is an important negative factor that 
complements other difficulties.
On the other hand, there are also some positive aspects. The absence of large old-fashioned 
social housing complexes means that Greece does not face significant problems of the concentration 
and ghettoizing of poor groups in areas of extreme deprivation and isolation. The favorable 
political climate for the development of policies in favor of the weakest groups, as well as the 
many solidarity initiatives in various institutional frameworks and beyond, can also be counted 
as positive elements inherited from the political orientation of the previous government.
Under these circumstances, it is certain that policies belonging to the times when the welfare 
state was at its peak cannot be developed and implemented today. The resources that would be 
required are not available, and their result proved to be problematic in the long run. However, 
there are many elements in the tradition of welfare policies that should not be erased due to the 
problems presented by these policies as a whole.
For example, addressing the housing needs of a wide range of beneficiaries serves not only 
the goal of avoiding stigmatization, but also endorses the approach to housing as a social right. 
However, the limited resources that could be made available inevitably narrow down the social 
targeting, something that neoliberal policies have advocated in terms of increasing social efficiency. 
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One aspect of the policies that should be developed, therefore, is careful social targeting that 
should combine serving those most in need with the housing needs and contributions of wider 
groups and ways of involving socially diverse groups in common and sustainable solutions. In 
practice, this means that housing solutions for particularly vulnerable groups, such as refugees 
and the homeless, should be included in actions involving other groups, in order to create 
synergies that facilitate the sustainability of actions, but also produce spaces for positive social 
interaction and cohabitation.
The size of the social group of beneficiaries of housing assistance is related to the question 
of selection criteria. The neoliberal political discourse has tried to contest the right to welfare 
benefits based on needs—and to some extent it has succeeded—by replacing it with the logic of 
access to deserved benefits, usually based on reciprocity. From such a perspective, supporting 
individuals and groups, even when in extreme need, ceases to be related to their right—which 
stems from their status as citizens or, when they do not have it, from their human identity—but is 
the outcome of others’ good will. The general political climate and the scarcity of resources now 
require a mixed approach: I am entitled because I am in need, but I will also contribute if I can.
The active contribution of the beneficiaries themselves, if they have the capacity and according 
to their capabilities, does not only address the question of lack of resources. One of the problems 
of the classic model of welfare services was their top-down design and implementation, with the 
beneficiaries being limited to the role of passive recipients. This raises issues of participation and 
democracy, which ultimately shape the political identity of welfare services. The benefits provided 
from above can easily be considered as charity, while their formation and implementation as the 
outcome of a participatory process makes them look more like relationships and practices of 
horizontal solidarity among equals. There is a fundamental difference in the political approach 
to this issue. The neoliberal political discourse lectures against the classic model of welfare 
benefits, but not because of objections to their undemocratic character. Neoliberal opposition 
mainly seconds the attempt to limit social spending through the disengagement of the state 
and the transfer of responsibility to civil society and the market. Under these circumstances, 
housing policies—as well as other welfare services—should combine public responsibility for the 
adequacy and equitable distribution of benefits with, at the same time, support for planning and 
implementation processes by various civil society organizations, public bodies (local government 
agencies, universities, etc.) and public-private collaborative schemes closer to local communities.
The design and implementation of housing policies must go beyond the old welfare model, 
where the relationship was limited between provider and beneficiary. The actors involved in the 
relevant processes are more numerous, but also the conditions in the land and housing markets 
have become more volatile. More actors are involved as public housing stocks are limited and 
a variety of other property owners are involved in the new housing policy schemes as housing 
providers. Conditions in the housing market, on the other hand, are more volatile as regulatory 
arrangements—such as the various forms of rent control—that were in place in the past have 
been constantly reduced in recent decades. This means that the more complex situations we 
are facing today cannot be adequately addressed by the simple and one-dimensional solutions 
of the past. It is doubtful if the rent subsidy, for example, which was promoted by the previous 
SYRIZA government as a groundbreaking housing policy measure, could achieve substantial 
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results without the support of other measures. In fact, what happened next was the limitation of 
funds for this policy by the conservative New Democracy party that returned to power in 2019.
All of the above advocate for the development of a housing policy in Greece that should not 
focus exclusively on housing and the benefit-recipient binary. The provision of housing support 
should be linked to other processes and measures that facilitate the integration of beneficiaries 
into local communities (labor market, local solidarity networks, training, etc.) in ways that will 
make them more of a resource for development and social cohesion and less of a burden on 
them. Such support policy schemes obviously need to respond to local conditions and cannot 
be uniform for the whole country. The question, however, remains the same whether we are 
referring to some central neighborhood of Athens, where various groups needing housing support 
are concentrated, or to some area on the outskirts of a small town, where a refugee camp has 
been established.
The fact that in recent years no housing policy with a comprehensive approach has been 
developed, even in a pilot form, is perhaps a missed opportunity. The positive political climate 
since 2015 and the flourishing of solidarity initiatives, together with international support 
and funding, have created a favorable environment for the development of housing and social 
inclusion schemes that are being tested in other countries as well. At the same time, the large 
number of vacant houses is an important resource that could play a central role in the viability 
of social housing policies under the prevailing conditions in densely built areas of downtown 
Athens (Arapoglou & Siatitsa, 2019). These vacant houses, beyond being the necessary physical 
structure for a housing support program, can prevent the stigmatization of beneficiaries since 
they are scattered within the urban fabric. Moreover, the owners of these vacant apartments in 
the city center could relatively easily agree to participate in such a program, since leaving their 
properties unused was not usually their own choice. It was rather a result of the loss of their 
tenants due to the crisis in combination with the poor maintenance of their properties, which 
made them unattractive. A further reason for the potential positive response of smallholders to 
such a program is the compensation that their participation could provide against the additional 
pressure they experienced due to the increased tax imposed on real estate properties.
The aforementioned “missed opportunity” mainly means that the conditions in the housing 
market are changing, something that has been happening at a very fast pace. The tourist 
attractiveness of Greece has increased significantly in recent years, resulting in a significant 
increase in demand for accommodation. Hotel beds are far fewer—and more expensive—than 
the average demand. The result is that a significant part of the housing stock is moving in this 
direction and leaving the rental housing market. Short-term rental platforms have greatly facilitated 
these changes and led to the massive reconversion of housing units to tourist accommodation, 
decreasing the supply and increasing rents in the conventional housing market (Balampanidis 
et al., 2019).
These developments made it difficult to work with a key player in potential housing and 
social inclusion programs in Greece—small homeowners—as the market redirected them, 
even temporarily, in other directions. The most dangerous potential development is that these 
changes are undermining the balances that were formed in the rental housing market in the 
previous decades. The largest share of those living in the most precarious housing conditions is 
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located in the center of Athens, in the small and disadvantaged apartments on the lower floors 
of the apartment blocks built by the ‘land-for-flats’ system. These apartments—if adequately 
renovated—become suitable for short-term renting. This could lead to the displacement of many 
in poor low-rent housing, for whom there is neither protection nor some obvious alternative 
housing option (Maloutas, 2018).
The COVID-19 pandemic since the beginning of 2020 and especially the consecutive lockdowns 
beginning in the spring of that year have created new conditions in the country’s housing market, 
particularly in the private rented sector. Tourist demand dropped vertically, and many units 
redirected to the tourist market after renovation remain either unused and waiting for the end of 
the pandemic or their owners are trying to get a foothold in the traditional private rented sector. 
Landlords in areas with high tourist demand—usually wealthier than the average landlord—will 
have to wait until the end of the pandemic, especially if their properties are located outside cities 
and, therefore, difficult to redirect to other markets. Those with properties in urban areas with 
substantial shares of affordable privately rented housing face several issues, such as: the low level 
of affordable rent by the average tenant in their areas; the renovation investment they potentially 
made to access the short-term rental market; the sizeable expenses for owners of idle properties; 
and the uncertainty of the timeline of the pandemic as well as uncertainty as to whether tourist 
demand will recover to the unusually high levels before the pandemic. Moreover, these issues and 
the dilemmas they produce are faced by different types of landlords. In the densely built areas of 
Athens with large shares of affordable housing for rent, landlords are usually of smaller size than 
the average landlord. However, there are also old landlords belonging to higher social groups who 
abandoned these areas and moved to the suburbs but kept their properties in the rental market. 
These landlords usually have the ability to abstain from the market for longer periods if they 
consider that conditions are currently unfavorable and that they will improve at some predictable 
point in the future. In more recent years, new landlords have also appeared in these areas. They 
are foreign investors, sometimes linked with the golden visa programs for middle-class investors 
from outside the EU, who handle properties as mere commodities, often unaware of their place 
and condition. 
The different social profiles of landlords do not simply classify them in terms of their ability to 
make strategic decisions concerning the use of their properties, with the large ones being able to 
take their properties off the market and smaller ones having to participate even when conditions 
deteriorate for them. In this sense, smaller landlords are a better partner for potential social 
housing projects since they can more easily accept compromise solutions. On another level, 
however, small landlords may be more difficult to partner with. Small landlords often live very 
close to the properties they rent and sometimes act as gatekeepers in xenophobic, homophobic 
and otherwise exclusionary ways.
Finally, the pandemic has put a complete stop to the pressure that tourist demand exercised 
on the rental market. At the same time, it has also ended the pressure for regulating measures 
to protect those groups in precarious positions within the housing market. When the pandemic 
finally ends, it is expected that the government will facilitate in every possible way the recovery of 
the market—with particular attention paid to the tourist market in a country highly dependent on 
this sector—and will downplay the need to protect vulnerable groups. The political profile of the 
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government itself and the deep recession produced by the pandemic will provide legitimation for 
prioritizing measures to promote growth and potentially treat regulating measures as obstructive 
to an economic recovery.
The growing difficulties in developing integrated housing and social inclusion programs and 
the missed opportunity to do so in recent years do not mean that the effort to implement solutions 
for social housing should be abandoned. On the contrary, such programs must be developed as 
soon as possible, taking into consideration the complex situation created by the receding effects 
of the sovereign debt crisis combined with the uncertainty and the ambivalent conditions created 
by the pandemic. The deepening of inequalities, in housing and in any other field, remains not 
only a problem for social justice but also for a sustainable future growth. 
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Counting the Homeless in Greece
Vassilis Arapoglou1, Constantine Dimoulas2 and Clive Richardson3
Abstract
We present the main findings from pilot research on the homeless population in six municipal 
areas in Greece in 2018. The project employed the “point-in–time” technique, combining counting 
by observation with interviewing where possible. The procedure succeeded in engaging local 
communities and NGOs in enumerating the homeless population. A large part of the housing needs 
of the homeless remains unmet, especially in the major metropolitan centres, despite increased 
provision of emergency shelters and services since 2012. Younger ages face alarming difficulty 
in accessing housing support. Financial hardship and unemployment contribute separately and 
interactively with other stressors to increased homelessness.
Keywords: Point-in-time, homelessness in Greece, unmet needs, hardship
1. Introduction
During the long-lasting sovereign debt crisis and the strict austerity measures imposed by creditors 
on the Greek people, public interest regarding the extent and the severity of homelessness increased 
and led to hot political debate. Politicians, NGO’s, public officials and the mass media presented 
different narratives and pictures as a description and explanation of this social problem. These 
arguments were generally contradictory insofar as they referred to the causes of homelessness and 
the size of the homeless population, as they stemmed from personal experiences and field work4.
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2. Associate Professor, Department of Social Policy, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece.
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4.The first known enumeration of homeless persons in Greece was conducted by the National Centre for Social 
Solidarity in 2009. It was based on estimation by local social services. Another effort to count the homeless, based on 
fieldwork by street workers, was implemented by the NGO “Klimaka” in Athens in 2012. Also, the Municipality of 
Athens conducted two enumerations in central Athens using observations from street workers in 2013 and 2016, and in 
2017 counted those who were roofless in the city centre by using the “point-in-time” technique under the supervision of 
Bloomberg Associates. The only reliable estimation of homelessness conducted before the survey presented here is that 
of Arapoglou and Gounis (2014), which combined data from the 2011 Census with those gathered from social services. 
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Traditional and well embedded views support the view that homeless people are, for the 
most part, addicted, mentally ill, ex-prisoners and marginal minorities. However, during the 
crisis, the argument that homeless people are ex-householders and new-poor became prevalent. 
Additionally, in the refugee crisis of 2015-16, the number of people sleeping in the parks 
and plazas of Athens and other Greek cities skyrocketed at a time when EU initiatives for 
Roma people were highlighting Greece’s housing deficiencies. This situation of acute hardship 
created conflicting opinions about the extent and severity of homelessness in Greece, most of 
them unsound because of the lack of any official definition of homeless people and of commonly 
accepted established procedures for their enumeration.
In order to monitor measures against social exclusion and increase their efficiency, the Greek 
authorities established in 2016 (Law 4445) the National Committee for Social Protection. Under 
the auspices of this Committee, the Ministry for Social Solidarity undertook the initiative of 
creating an official mechanism for monitoring the impact of policies and actions for supporting 
vulnerable and socially excluded groups. In this context a specific task force was established in 
the Ministry which suggested the creation of an institutional mechanism for gathering information 
and monitoring the problem of homelessness in Greece. The Committee proposed to adopt for 
this purpose the FEANSA approach to homelessness as elaborated by Bill Edgar (2009), and it 
assigned to Panteion University the scientific responsibility for a pilot project for counting homeless 
people in the municipalities of Athens, Piraeus, Thessaloniki, Heraklion, Nea Ionia and Ioannina5.
The aim of this pilot was twofold. First of all, to test the selected tools and procedures for 
counting homeless people in Greece and second, to engage local communities and NGOs in 
the creation and operation of a permanent mechanism employing mutually agreed institutional 
procedures for the regular enumeration of the homeless population.
After an initial investigation, the task force adopted the “point-in-time” technique as the most 
appropriate method for counting the homeless and prepared an initial draft questionnaire to be 
used as the official survey registration form. The Panteion scientific team undertook the task of 
clarifying, testing and refining the survey instruments so as to become robust and appropriate 
as official tools for the periodic counting of homeless people in Greece.
2. On the Methodological Issue
The enumeration of different social groups and the knowledge of their demographics and 
other crucial characteristics is a basic precondition for every effective public policy. Because 
of financial constraints, public services are forced to target their resources by placing priorities 
on their interventions which are founded on an evidence base of reliable and widely accepted 
data. Unfortunately, this is not an easy task, as many vulnerable and socially excluded groups 
are concealed from the public space and discourse.
According to Roger Tourangeau (2014:3), such populations are hard to sample, to identify, 
to find or contact, to persuade to take part in the research and hard to interview. Homeless people 
5. The Municipality of Trikala also participated in the project on its own initiative. 
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are characterized by most of these obstacles and their robust investigation is, in most cases, an 
unsuccessful effort.
Homeless people are not included in the normal censuses of population, which are based on 
housing registration. They lack any fixed address, very often they cycle through various living 
arrangements and are constantly on the move. When homeless people are staying temporarily 
in a residence, they are unlikely to be reported on a Census questionnaire. Additionally, some 
of them are hiding (from courts, police or other custodial and surveillance services), do not 
want to be identified and are vague about their sleeping arrangements because they want to 
keep their sleeping location private (Glaser et al., 2014: 183-84).
Because of their elusiveness, any research project trying to enumerate the homeless in a specific 
area faces three principal difficulties. First of all, for any enumeration based on observation, it is 
impossible to know whether all homeless persons have been accounted for; second, because of 
the spatial mobility of the homeless population during the enumeration it is uncertain whether 
a portion of them have previously been counted or not; and, third, the homeless population may 
fluctuate in size from time to time and so ad hoc research is not generalisable over time (Williams 
and Cheal, 2002:316; Berry, 2007: 170). As a consequence, there are no adequate sample frames 
for surveying the homeless and the research community is forced to try to enumerate them and 
investigate their characteristics using alternative approaches.
One of the most common techniques for enumerating the homeless is to use Service Based 
Enumeration, that is, to gather data from shelters, soup kitchens and other group sites. Although 
Service Based Enumeration can reduce duplicates (double counting) by using predetermined 
criteria (e.g. matching demographic data), it does not ensure their elimination as an individual 
could have been counted in a soup kitchen, at an outdoor encampment and at a homeless shelter 
(Glasser et al., 2014: 181-84).
Another widely used technique for surveying hard to reach groups is screening, that is selecting 
a sample from a larger population to identify members of the target population. This technique 
presupposes that the target population can be identified relatively easily and the selection 
probabilities are known (Kalton, 2014:401-423). Additionally, screening has to overcome two 
types of misclassification, that is, “false positives” (persons incorrectly identified as members of 
the target population) and “false negatives” (persons incorrectly classified as not belonging to the 
target population) (Kalton, 2014: 404). In order to minimize the false negatives an appropriate 
technique is location sampling which, according to Kalton (2014), presupposes that the population 
under investigation is more or less stable, which is not the case for homeless persons.
A third widely employed method for enumerating homeless persons is networking and 
snowballing techniques which are commonly used by NGO’s and local services for the homeless. 
This particular technique may provide the research community with valuable qualitative dimensions 
which must be taken into consideration as items that must be included in the questionnaire. 
In this method the sampling error cannot be defined whilst the sampling informants “may not 
accurately report the target population status of other members of the linkage, either deliberately 
or through lack of knowledge” (Kalton, 2014: 406; Berry, 2007: 171).
An innovative and highly promising method for measuring homeless person is the Capture-
Recapture method. Capture-Recapture utilizes information from duplicate cases to permit the 
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calculation of the number of people who remained unobserved (the “hidden population”). The 
technique rests on the principle of two or preferably more observations of the same population. 
These can be simultaneous observations of sources that represent approximately the same 
population, or observations of the same source at different time points (Williams & Cheal, 
2002: 317).
This method rests upon three key assumptions. Firstly, homogeneity: within each sample, 
each member of the population must have the same probability of capture. Secondly, observing 
an individual in one sample should not have any effect on the observation of that individual at 
the second or subsequent counts. Thirdly, closure: the overall numbers in the population should 
not be different at the time of each sample (Williams & Cheal, 2002: 317). Apart from its high 
cost and the issue of the proper choice of the time span for recounting, a potential deficiency 
of this particular method is the possible inaccuracy of identifiers used to match an individual 
between two sources (such as date of birth, gender, place of previous stay, etc.; Berry, 2007; 
Williams & Cheal, 2002). Personal interviews on the street which could minimize this are often 
not possible, and may prompt the homeless individual to avoid later contact with researchers 
(Berry, 2007: 168).
As regards the “point-in-time” method which was the technique initially chosen for counting 
the homeless in Greece, it is characterized by a high proportion of missing data on the homeless 
who are in places hidden from public view which, according to some estimates, may be more 
than 40% (Berry, 2007: 167). Additionally, “such a snapshot of the homeless population may 
only be of limited value, because the homeless population often changes in size and composition 
over time” (Berry, 2007: 170). On the other hand, it is an easily applied technique, efficient in 
terms of time and cost, while the researchers need not be highly trained.
3. Finalisation and implementation
After five months of intensive consultation between the task force and the Panteion scientific 
group, it was agreed to combine the “point in time” technique with Service Based Enumeration, 
and furthermore combining counting by observation with counting by interviewing where possible. 
The target group for enumeration and registration was defined as homeless people staying at 
night in shelters, in parks and plazas and on the street. This particular investigation excluded 
those living in camps, inadequate housing and occupied buildings (squats).
Additionally, the initial registration form was separated into three different questionnaires. 
The first was an observation form, composed of seven questions which were filled in by the 
investigators when they came across rough sleepers who could not be, or refused to be, 
interviewed. The second form was a questionnaire containing 19 questions which were filled in 
by the investigators for rough sleepers who consented to answer it. The third registration form 
was a more detailed questionnaire, consisting of 32 questions for the homeless who were staying 
in night shelters or were using the services of day centres for homeless people. All completed 
questionnaires were entered directly into an online platform via a specially developed app which 
also automatically recorded the GPS location where the registration took place.
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In order to minimize the unobservable homeless population, it was decided to carry out 
recording from 10 p. m. to 2.30 a.m. on one night in mid-May 2018. At this time of year in 
Greece, people are usually preparing at this time for rest and sleeping whilst many of them 
are awake and so the probabilities of being noticed by the researchers and also agreeing to 
answer the questionnaires are high. Furthermore, those who were staying in homeless shelters 
and dormitories on that particular night were recorded by an assigned social worker at each 
building. The following morning, from 6 a.m. – 8 a.m., five research groups visited the parks 
and registered any homeless that were there, also asking them if they had been interviewed 
during the previous night. Additionally, at noon on that day, 15 research teams visited the soup 
kitchens that were in active operation between 13.00-16.00 and asked everyone in the queue if 
they were homeless and, if so, would they agree to answer the questionnaire. If they refused to 
answer the questionnaire, the researchers filled in the observation form.
The counting procedures were implemented by 369 researchers who worked in 120 groups 
of three persons each and 21 coordinators. Most researchers (239 persons) were volunteers 
from municipal social services, four national social policy agencies and 19 NGO’s whilst 130 
were postgraduate students. Each research group included one student and at least one person 
experienced in contacts with homeless people, most of whom were social workers and street 
workers.
For the definition of the areas that would be investigated in each municipality participating 
in the project, social workers and street workers working in social services and NGO’s were 
asked to point out on a map all the places where they observed homeless people. Based on these 
observations, the Panteion research team defined the area surrounding those places as probable 
spaces for encountering rough sleepers. These areas were then divided into registration sectors 
of about 36 hectares, each of which included approximately 8,000-9,000 metres of streets and 
pavements. Every research group had to walk and “scan” all streets, pavements, and outbuildings 
in the area, and to record and interview rough sleepers.
One week before the night arranged for the count, all researchers participated in a training 
course of 3 hours’ duration. During the course they were educated on the content of the 
questionnaires and the procedures that had to be followed during the count. They were advised 
to visit the place which they had to scan a couple of days beforehand, in order to become familiar 
with it. Each researcher was also provided with written guidance.
On the night of the count, all teams met together two hours before the start of the investigation 
in a special meeting hall, where they were provided with detailed maps of their own registration 
sector and small snacks to offer to each rough sleeper they encountered.
4. Demographic characteristics and reasons for becoming homeless
The total number of apparently homeless people who were approached on the street was 317. 
However, 33 of these said that they did in fact have housing for that night and two claimed to 
have been interviewed already. Of the 282 remaining, 236 (83.7%) agreed to be interviewed. 
Only basic information was recorded by observation for those who refused, along with other 
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people who appeared to be asleep and were not disturbed, or with whom communication was 
not possible because of language or other reasons. The following day, a further 495 people were 
interviewed in facilities for the homeless, after checking that they had not been interviewed 
previously, and 172 in supported housing. Therefore, a total of 903 interviews were conducted 
and information on a further 393 apparently homeless people was collected by observation 
only (Table 1).
Table 1. Numbers of homeless people interviewed on the street,  










Athens 92 213 73 378 250 628
Thessaloniki 53 126 49 228 87 315
Piraeus 61 117 0 178 33 211
Iraklio 20 21 29 70 13 83
Ioannina 4 9 0 13 9 22
Trikala 4 5 11 20 0 20
Nea Ionia 2 4 10 16 1 17
Total 236 495 172 903 393 1296
Some basic characteristics of interviewees are shown in Table 2. People interviewed on the street 
and in facilities were in the majority (>80%) male, compared to 51% in supported housing. 
The median age was 53 years in facilities and 49 in housing, compared to only 42 on the street 
where a substantial proportion (15.6%) was under 25 years old. The street population included 
fewer Greeks, around half compared to three-quarters of the rest. About half of both the street 
interviewees and those in facilities claimed that this was their first episode of homelessness. 
The median duration of the current episode of homelessness was 12 months; 9.4% reported a 
duration of up to one month, 58% up to 12 months, and 21% over 3 years. 
Table 2. Distribution of basic characteristics of homeless people interviewed, by site
Street homeless In facilities Supported housing
Gender: Male 86.9% 81.7% 50.6%
Age: <40 43.0% 18.6% 26.7%
40-49 28.9% 22.8% 26.0%
50-59 13.3% 27.1% 26.6%
60+ 14.8% 31.9% 20.7%
Nationality: Greek 56.4% 74.7% 77.3%
First time homeless 45.8% 53.8% 61.2%*
* First time in supported housing
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Over half of both sets of respondents gave financial problems among the reasons behind their 
current episode of homelessness (whether or not it was the first episode) and large percentages 
cited unemployment or family problems (Table 3). In more than a third of cases in both groups, 
one or both of financial problems and unemployment were the only reasons mentioned for being 
homeless.
5. Local variations and policy responses
Research since the 1990s in the USA, where the most reliable data at local level is available, 
has detected a number of structural and individual determinants for the geographical variation 
of homelessness: rent levels, unemployment and poverty rates are consistently identified, and 
often coupled with demographic (% minorities and single person households), and mental health 
variables (reviews in Byrne et al., 2013; Hanratty, 2017; Lee et al., 2021).
Table 3. Reason for living on the street or homelessness (referring to the current episode), by site.  
(Multiple responses permitted: percentages add up to more than 100.)
Street homeless (n=227) In facilities (n=454)
n % n %
Financial problems 116 51.1 274 60.4
Unemployment 63 27.8 198 43.6
Family problems 48 21.1 160 35.2
Health problems 27 11.9 64 14.1
Substance use 19 8.4 – –
Refugees from war 15 6.6 0 0
Bad conditions in previous housing 14 6.2 27 5.9
Evicted from rented housing 12 5.3 23 6.1
Released from prison 11 5.3 14 3.1
Loss of own home 3 1.3 9 2.0
End of stay in institution 2 0.9 7 1.5
Other reason(s) 31 12.3 58 12.8
Financial problems / unemployment only 86 37.9 167 36.8
Financial problems / unemployment and other reason(s) 52 22.9 153 33.7
Only other reason(s) 89 39.2 134 29.5
Similar results have been obtained in the UK since the 1990s, and geographical variations 
in homelessness have been explained by sociodemographic variables (single parents; New 
Commonwealth households), low income, the availability of social rented housing and the urban-
rural character of areas (Bramley, 1993). Recent dynamic approaches highlight the centrality of 
poverty alongside local labour and housing market contexts, and certain demographic, and social 
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support characteristics to the generation of homelessness in the UK (Bramley & Fitzpatrick, 
2018; Fitzpatrick et al., 2013). The homeless count in Greece provides some interesting insights 
into the varied incidence of homelessness across cities and variations in housing and service 
provisions. 
Taking into account the total resident population of the municipalities where the count was 
undertaken, estimates of the time-point prevalence appear to be higher in the three major urban 
centres of the mainland - Piraeus (1.29/1000, population: 163,668), Thessaloniki (0.99/1000, 
population: 315,210), Athens (0.94/1000, population: 664,046) - and smaller in the municipalities 
of Heraklion (0.59/1000, population: 140,730), Trikala (0.32/1000, population: 61,653) and 
Nea Ionia (0.25/1000, population: 67,134). An indicative reference can be made to the USA 
estimates of the point-in-time prevalence of homelessness yielding 1.0/1000 in the early 1980s 
and 1.7/1000 in the late 2010s (NAEH, 2020; AHAR, 2018). Although a robust comparison 
is not feasible, the Greek numbers appear to be high and justify public attention drawn to the 
rise of homelessness since the advent of the sovereign debt crisis. A detailed analysis of data 
suggests that for all municipalities the most often reported reasons for becoming homeless were 
financial hardship and unemployment. For smaller cities like Ioannina, Trikala and Nea Ionia 
family and health related reasons are more important than in major metropolitan centres. Athens 
seems to be unique in the combination of multiple reasons and in reporting incarceration and 
use of closed care facilities.
The above estimates should also be read with caution because time-in-point methods fail 
to capture episodic and hidden homelessness, which prevails in Southern European countries. 
A partial methodological remedy has been provided by estimating the one-year prevalence of 
homelessness through sampling the total population (e.g. in the USA the one-year prevalence of 
1.5% in 2013 is much higher than the point-in-time estimate; Tsai, 2018). There is no Europe-
wide estimate of the prevalence of homelessness but FEANTSA experts in 2009 estimated that, 
each year, about 4.1 million people in the European Union were unsheltered, or in emergency 
or temporary accommodation. In 2017, sampling of the general population in eight European 
countries revealed that the one-year prevalence of homelessness could be significantly higher 
than might be expected on the basis of previous estimates, with a range from 0.4% in Ireland to 
2.0% in Spain (Taylor et al., 2019).
The ratio of the street to the total homeless (street and sheltered) population is often used 
as an indication of unmet need for housing support; in the USA, for example, it has fluctuated 
between 35% and 37% since 2018 (NAEH, 2020). In Greece, policy changes introduced in 
2012 placed emphasis on emergency and temporary accommodation, and in 2014 a supported 
housing scheme was introduced (Arapoglou & Gounis, 2017; Kourachanis, 2017). As a result, 
the Greek policy model was incrementally shaped according to a ‘staircase’ approach.
Κοινωνική Πολιτική 14 • Ιούνιος 2021 • 123
Table 4. Share of street homeless in relation to total homeless and temporarily sheltered homeless





All cities 0.59 0.68
* The count in Piraeus did not include the housing-reintegration scheme because that Municipality withdrew from 
the count.
Table 4 presents the share of the street homeless in relation to the total homeless and the 
temporarily sheltered homeless6. The ratio of the street homeless (interviewed and observed) to 
those accommodated in shelters is very high (i.e. more homeless were reported to be on the streets 
than in shelters), indicating that the largest part of urgent housing need was not met, especially 
in the municipalities of Athens and Piraeus. The ratio of the street homeless (interviewed and 
observed) to those accommodated in shelters and supported housing is also very high (almost 
6 out of 10 homeless sleep in the streets while only four out of ten find some kind of temporary 
or supported shelter). Overall, a 10% difference is observed when comparing the share of the 
street homeless to the temporarily sheltered (67.6%) with the rate of the street homeless to the 
total population (58.6%). The difference is greater (about 20%) in smaller cities like Iraklion 
and highlights the contribution of the housing reintegration scheme to the meeting of housing 
needs. This finding also suggests how the expansion of supported and reintegration schemes 
could make a real change for local policies.
The homeless sleeping on the street were asked which services they used (Table 5). With 
considerable variation between cities, overall nearly half said that they used services that provide 
meals and a quarter that they went to day centres. However, 20% said that they did not use any 
services and, indicative of the problem posed by interviewing this group, as many as 10% did 
not provide usable information.
Table 5. Services used by the homeless who were sleeping on the street, by city
Services Athens (n=92) Thessaloniki (n=53) Piraeus n= 61) Iraklio (n=20) Total (n=236)
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Meals 29 (31.5) 37 (69.8) 25 (41.0) 8 (40.0) 104 (44.1)
Day centre 20 (21.7) 25 (47.2) 13 (21.3) 1 (5.0) 61 (25.8)
Dormitory/hostel 5 (5.4) 3 (5.7) 1 (1.6) 1 (5.0) 10 (4.2)
Other 21 (22.8) 5 (9.4) 11 (18.0) 6 (30.0) 45 (19.1)
None 18 (19.6) 2 (3.8) 21 (34.4) 2 (10.0) 48 (20.3)
No answer 15 (16.3) 3 (5.7) 4 (6.6) 3 (15.0) 25 (10.6)
6. Street homeless includes those planning to sleep outdoors and those observed sleeping outdoors. Total homeless 
include participants in the supported housing- reintegration scheme and persons temporarily accommodated in shelters.
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In relation to reasons for homelessness (Table 6), nearly all those with health problems used 
services and in particular they used day centres in a greater percentage than other homeless 
people. Research has emphasised how day centres become pivotal in the search for healthcare 
services amongst the street homeless, as they respond to their urgent needs and are linked to 
day clinics and public hospitals (Arapoglou et al., 2015). Recent research has also revealed 
how vital such centres are to homeless persons for recovering the feeling of security and for 
countervailing stigmatization, despite the austerity constraints which have severely undermined 
the capacities of staff and volunteers (Vogkli, 2021).
Respondents who were interviewed inside facilities for the homeless were asked how often they 
faced each one of seven possible problems in their daily lives: never, sometimes, often, or every 
day. The problems were finding or accessing: a place to rest during the day (faced “often” or “every 
day” by 27.8%); somewhere to keep belongings (33.0%); washing facilities (17.8%); food and 
water (21.4%); medicines (14.1%); first aid and medical care (10.8%); personal safety (20.9%). 
Table 6. Services used by the homeless who were sleeping on the street, by reasons for homelessness
Services Financial problems Unemployment Family problems Health problems Other reasons
% % % % %
Meals 62.9* 58.7 52.1 51.9 29.0
Day centre 38.8 31.7 25.0 44.4 22.6
Dormitory/hostel 4.3 1.6 8.3 7.4 6.5
Other 13.8 7.9 16.7 22.2 19.4
None 15.5 19.0 10.4 3.7 32.3
* Percentage that used meals services among those who reported homelessness because of financial problems
As is commonly done in social sciences research, these items can be combined into a single 
indicator of everyday difficulties by scoring the four response categories from 0 (never) to 3 (every 
day) and taking the average score over the seven items. The value of Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
measuring the internal consistency of the scale constructed in this way is satisfactorily high, 0.82. 
The validity of the scale is demonstrated by the fact that it bears the expected relationship to various 
factors: more difficulties (higher scores) were reported by the first-time homeless, substance users, 
those with chronic health problems, and those without a job or pension. Potentially, this scale 
represents a useful summary measure contributing to the description of the lives of the homeless.
Difficulties were least in Athens compared to the other major cities in this study (Table 7) and 
this reflects the growth of services, day centres and outreach initiatives of NGOs in inner city areas 
which provide many of the necessities reported in Table 7 (Arapoglou et al., 2015). A similar picture 
emerges for Piraeus but the main concern of the homeless for personal safety seems not to have 
been addressed in this area (see also Table 8 and related comments). However, qualitative and 
ethnographic evidence from inner city Athens suggests that NGO services and grassroot initiatives can 
only partially remedy the exclusions and harms inflicted on the homeless by inadequate provisions of 
public local agencies (Bourlessas, 2018; Bourlessas, 2020; Vogkli, 2021). Moreover, the geographical 
concentration of services in the Athenian metropolises stands witness to uneven provision nationally.
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Table 7. Mean and standard deviation (SD) of the Scale of Everyday Difficulties, by city.  
Scale scores are on a 0-3 range.
City n Mean SD
Athens 212 0.60 0.64
Thessaloniki 124 1.03 0.61
Piraeus 117 0.86 0.46
Iraklio 20 1.29 1.28
Total 491* 0.80 0.66
* Including 18 respondents in three smaller cities.
Apart from facing difficulties in meeting basic needs of everyday life, the homeless person 
is exposed to various threats. In particular, they were asked whether they had been the victim 
of robbery, physical violence, bullying, and sexual abuse or harassment. Table 8 shows that 
just over half (54.4%) answered that one or more of these had occurred, in most cases robbery, 
followed by physical violence and, for female respondents, sexual abuse or harassment. As with 
other items surveyed, there were substantial differences between the cities; in this case, Piraeus 
had higher rates of victimisation than elsewhere.
Table 8. Prevalence of victimisation among interviewees in facilities for the homeless
City Robbery Physical violence Bullying Sexual abuse or harassment None of these
Athens 37.1% 22.0% 5.9% 3.1%/10.0%** 51.2%
Thessaloniki 45.5% 26.0% 5.7% 4.4%/17.2% 48.5%
Piraeus 58.9% 41.1% 16.1% 3.4%/36.4% 33.9%
Iraklio 35.3% 0 0 0/- 64.7%
Total* 44.5% 27.6% 8.4% 3.6%/16.9% 45.6%
* Including 17 respondents in three smaller cities.
** Percentage among males / percentage among females. No females in Iraklion sample.
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
The findings of the pilot homeless count suggest that a large part of the housing needs of the 
homeless remains unmet, especially in large urban centres, despite the growth of emergency 
shelters and services since 2012. Financial hardship and unemployment are factors which 
contribute both separately and in interaction with other stressors to increased homelessness. The 
results of the count also suggest that further analysis could explore the multiplicity of the risks of 
homelessness in Athens, which seem to be more complex than in other cities, and the difficulties 
of family support to the homeless, that seem to be a particular impediment in smaller cities. 
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The count has also revealed an alarming difficulty for younger ages to access housing 
support, especially considering that they are exposed to a combination of risks of homelessness 
(economic strain, unemployment, lack of housing affordability). Related to this is the fact that 
foreign citizenship and use of substances are features which differentiate the profile of the street 
homeless from those using day facilities and shelters. The provision of targeted services and 
shelters to these subgroups has increased since 2015 but is inadequate both in quantitative and 
qualitative terms. Six out of ten homeless sleep in the streets in the major metropolitan areas 
and a high proportion of them has no access at all to any facility for the homeless. Additionally a 
major part of those interviewed during the pilot are permanently homeless (for more than three 
years) facing various threats (e.g. robbery, physical violence, sexual abuse). Our findings also 
signal opportunities for supported housing schemes and rent assistance to enhance preventative 
interventions on such high risk groups.
The pilot count was an opportunity for the Ministry to introduce an institutional forum for 
collaboration, knowledge exchange and learning between central and local authorities and 
NGOs. Its discontinuation by the political administration after 2019 erodes any capacities 
that this experiment may have generated to curtail fragmentation and antagonisms between 
stakeholders. The role of Greek universities is worth mentioning not only for introducing 
surveying techniques but also for facilitating a culture of policy deliberation through pragmatic 
arguments and evidence, for recruiting and training volunteers among students and sensitising 
the local public in the cities of the count. The Census year 2021 offers a unique opportunity for 
repeating the count, capitalising on the existing knowledge, and enhancing collaborations to 
address the challenges of the pandemic.
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Preventing Family Homelessness:  
Evidence from Service Provision in Greece
Antonios Roumpakis1 and Nicholas Pleace2
Abstract
Traditionally Greece demonstrated high rates of homeownership and low levels of social rented 
housing. Housing represented one of the key resources of family asset-based social security in an 
otherwise highly fragmented social security system. The eruption of the sovereign debt crisis led to 
the demise of traditional ‘middle class jobs’, growing job insecurity, and families often being in debt, 
predominantly on housing and personal loans, making the position of many families uncertain and 
at worst insecure. The article presents findings from a two-year project which explored both the 
immediate and longer-term outcomes for families who received support from a pilot Family Support 
Service, designed to prevent housing insecurity and potential homelessness. We present evidence 
on housing conditions, debt repayment and management, employment, poverty and well-being. 
We conclude with a reflection of the Greek housing and social policy responses in the aftermath 
of the sovereign debt crisis and by contextualising our results within the wider European context. 
Keywords: housing; homelessness; debt; Greece; family; welfare
Introduction
Even prior to the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis, the South European welfare states were heavily 
fragmented, with entitlements often linked to occupational status within unequal social security 
systems (Petmesidou 1991; Ferrera 1996) that historically achieved moderate results in battling 
poverty and inequality (Leibfried, 1992). In marked contrast to the North Western EU, protections 
against housing insecurity, after-housing cost poverty and homelessness have remained limited in 
Southern Europe. States like Greece lacked the elaborate integrated homelessness strategies and 
extensive social housing provision (Arapoglou, 2004). Instead, Greek provision to prevent family 
1. Senior Lecturer, Department of Social Work and Social Policy, University of York, UK. Corresponding author’s 
email: antonios.roumpakis@york.ac.uk
2. Professor, Director of Centre for Housing Policy, University of York, UK.
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housing insecurity and homelessness - as is the case for many Southern EU social protection systems 
– focused on families at high risk of homelessness. e.g. when facing eviction (Baptista et al, 2017). A 
‘Northern’ EU policy of comparatively generous housing-cost welfare benefits, which can encompass 
social housing with a secure tenancy at an affordable rent and relatively extensive welfare benefits 
(including in-work welfare benefits for families in low income employment) is less widespread, with 
these sorts of protections centring on social work/social services systems for child protection and 
to prevent child destitution, i.e. state intervention occurs in extremis rather than there being a wide 
spectrum, comparatively well-resourced, system of safety nets (Pleace et al, 2018).
The austerity-driven welfare reforms enacted in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis impacted 
severely on the social fabric and cohesion of South European societies (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 
2012). The reforms had severe repercussions in weakening security in and outside3 of the labour 
markets (see Moreira et al., 2015), increasing and deepening socio-economic inequalities including 
income losses among low- and middle-income groups (Petmesidou, 2011; Martin, 2015; Karamessini 
and Giakoumatos, 2016). The persistence of long-term unemployment, high incidence of poverty 
and household indebtedness parallel to declining household saving rates continue to be among the 
greatest challenges facing South European welfare states (see Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2020). 
Our article explores how these aforementioned challenges intersect with one of the few pillars of 
socio-economic security in Southern Europe welfare regimes; namely homeownership. 
South European countries, and Greece in particular, demonstrated high rates of homeownership 
and low levels of social rented housing together with a strong relationship between family and 
access to housing (Emmanuel, 2006; 2014). Allen et al (2004) identified the importance of housing 
in allowing South European families to redistribute and exchange services of care and support to 
its members, for example, older people, children and non-married members while at the same time 
it would allow its members to mobilise, pool and redistribute resources (see also Papadopoulos 
and Roumpakis, 2013) and accumulate assets that would be transferred to younger generations 
(see also Theodorikakou et al, 2013). We can thus suggest that the high rates of homeownership 
in Southern Europe constitute the family home as a key, asset-based, resource of and for social 
security in an otherwise highly fragmented social security system (see also Kemeny, 1995).
Next, we review the theoretical framework for capturing how families are expected to absorb 
social risks at a time of increased and generalised insecurity in Greece. Then we review the 
key policy developments relating to housing as a key, asset-based, resource of and for social 
security in an otherwise highly fragmented social security system. The article then presents 
the methodological premises underpinning the study and then critically evaluates the findings 
focusing on housing conditions, debt repayment and management, poverty and well-being. Our 
article aims to voice the experiences of families which experienced a dramatic reduction in terms 
of their income because of unemployment and whose housing was potentially under threat. In 
doing so, we present empirical evidence on the immediate and longer-term outcomes for families 
who received support from a pilot Family Support Service. We conclude with a reflection of the 
Greek housing and social policy responses in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis and by 
contextualising our results within the wider European context.
3. For the analytical importance of this distinction and its original formulation, see Papadopoulos, 2005.
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The Transformation of the South European Housing Policy:  
The Greek Case
There have been extensive studies that focused on the implications of the new European economic 
governance and the impact of the austerity measures in Southern Europe. Among others, it has 
been argued that the austerity measures were a direct assault to middle classes both in terms 
of their disposable income and taxation but also in terms of employment protection and job 
losses leading to a prolonged period of institutionalised insecurity (see Vaughan et al, 2016; 
Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2017). Unemployment is also associated with the increase 
of homelessness in Southern Europe (Kenna et al, 2016) there being some wider evidence 
that homelessness is more likely to be triggered by simple poverty in less extensive European 
welfare systems, rather than be associated with combinations of income insecurity and complex 
support needs, as is the case in the most extensive welfare systems in North Western Europe 
(Benjaminsen and Andrade, 2015). Considering that the formation of the Greek middle class 
prior to the eruption of the crisis was anchored in securing a home, it becomes important to 
explore how the crisis affected housing conditions. 
Next, we introduce an analytical periodisation for capturing the development of family strategies 
on home ownership and tenure. We borrow our periodisation from the work of Papadopoulos 
and Roumpakis (2013; 2020) to capture the role of the family as a collective socio-economic 
actor and reflect on its strategies in mobilising, collecting and redistributing resources to its 
members. Again, it is important to highlight that in contrast to northern or continental welfare 
states, in Southern European economies the state and often employers off-loaded the risk of 
social reproduction into families (see Rangone and Solari, 2012; Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 
2013; 2019), with housing protection being one of the cases in point. Patterns of homelessness 
service provision, which tend to be less extensive and less well-resourced in the South and East 
of Europe and centring on charitable, rather than state funded provision, have been seen as 
reflecting wider cultural and political attitudes to social protection systems, rather than being 
explicable simply in terms of differences in GDP (Pleace et al, 2018). Allen et al (2004) argued 
that the weak provision of social housing in Southern Europe, in particular Greece, could be 
explained both by the strong family solidarity networks in place but primarily due to the fact 
the state did not regard social housing provision as its moral (and economic) responsibility. 
Recent studies identify the continuing importance of family as a collective actor in absorbing 
social risks especially when members face the risk of homelessness (Kourachanis, 2018) but at 
the same time highlight how family’s role has been stretched (Mavridis and Mouratidou, 2018). 
Our argument is that the state and employers continue to offload the costs and responsibilities 
for housing to the family, even after the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis, exposing both the 
limits of this approach and its possible repercussions on housing conditions, well-being and 
debt management among Greek families.
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A Tentative Periodisation
The period from after the end of World War II until the mid 1990s and prior to the process of 
joining the European Monetary Union4 can be seen as marking the first period in Greek post-war 
housing policy and experience. During this period, families had a clear aversion to credit risk 
and relied heavily on their own savings for financing the purchase or construction of housing 
(see Mulder, 2006). Families followed ‘conservative’ strategies that prioritised the accumulation 
of assets and real estate as resources for their own housing or for rental income (Papadopoulos 
and Roumpakis, 2013). The state did not offer much support financially but instead tolerated 
as Tsoulouvis (1996) argued the construction of building with no or temporary permissions, 
and facilitated, often for political exchange favours, the expansion of urban planning into new 
territories. As Emmanuel (2014) argues, homeownership in Athens stands out as holding a 
uniquely egalitarian pattern, similar to some extent with other Southern Europe capitals, in 
the sense that both low- and middle-income strata owned their home outright. The outright 
ownership of housing was accompanied with and aversion to credit risk and high levels of 
household savings (see Mulder, 2006).
A second period coincided with the efforts of the Costas Simitis government, in mid 1990s, 
to meet the entry criteria for joining the EMU. The criteria required fiscal constraint in public 
budgets and applying restraint in wage and welfare demands in order to reduce inflation rates. 
By 1999, interest rates dropped to 3.1% from 19.5% in 1994. The latter signalled a change in 
the strategies of families and the aversion to credit risk gave away to a new model for financing 
housing development. The entry to the Eurozone solidified the availability of low-interest rate 
consumer and housing loans, backed up by the European Central Bank (ECB), with households 
becoming increasingly exposed to credit. 
Graph 1. Total Household Debt as% of net disposable income, 2000-2019
Source: OECD Stat.
4. Maloutas et al (2020) offer a similar periodisation based on housing affordability and inequalities.
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As Graph 1 shows, the levels of household debt as a percentage of net disposable income 
increased drastically in all Southern European economies after their entry in the Eurozone, with 
Greece displaying the sharpest increase until the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis. Exposure 
to indebtedness was higher for middle- and higher-income groups (Marsellou and Bassiakos, 
2013). At the same time, available data on household savings as a percentage of net disposable 
income, shown in Graph 2, indicate a drop in total household saving rates among South European 
economies. Similar trends are also identified in Greece with saving rates dropping to 2.6% in 
2004 from 11.4% at the end of 1995 (Dasopoulos, 2009). It can be argued that the attempt to 
encourage the financialisation of housing markets (see Aalbers, 2016) went in pace with a debt-
driven economic growth model that at the one hand financed the government’s budget deficit 
and at the household level ‘compensated’ for declining saving rates (Lapavitsas, 2019). Both 
Graphs 1 and 2 add the German trends as a comparator indicating the opposing trends between 
the South European periphery and Germany.
The third period began with the eruption of the sovereign crisis in Southern Europe. The 
crisis took place in a midst of increased exposure of household debt, comprising mostly housing 
and personal consumption loans (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2013; Emmanuel, 2014). The 
combination of austerity measures and an internal devaluation strategy would expose households 
and families at levels of high debt, worse labour market conditions both in terms of income and 
working arrangements with the state retracting its already meagre levels of public support. For 
the first time, many households faced the risk of evictions or foreclosures – a direct threat to 
family housing as a cornerstone of social security in Southern Europe. 
Graph 2. Total household saving rates as% of net disposable income, 2000-2019
Source: OECD Stat.
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Graph 3. Non- performing Residential Loans in value in (€ thousand) and ratio as a percentage  
of total residential loans (NPL,solo), 2002 - 2020.
Source: Compiled by authors based on Bank of Greece Statistics (NPLS_TIMESERIES_BoG_ENG). Note: Solo 
measures refer to individual operating banks even if they are part of a group.
As it can be seen in Graph 1 and 2, with the exception of Italy, households in Greece, Spain 
and Portugal started deleveraging their debts after 2012 with saving rates however remaining 
negative in Greece and Portugal and much lower in Italy and Spain since their entry in the 
Eurozone in 2000. As shown in Graph 3, the number of ‘non-performing’ housing loans both in 
volume and as a percentage of total housing loans had already increased prior to the crisis In 
Greece, displaying the accelerating reliance on market mechanisms for purchasing residential 
properties. This trend continued after 2009 with the total value of non-performing housing 
loans exceeding €28bn in 2015 and the highest percentage of non- performing loans (in value) 
reaching 44.5% in 2019. 
The periodisation offers us the opportunity to reflect on how the housing market has become 
more reliant on credit and financial markets, with the latter proving volatile and subject to 
significant turbulence pushing many families at the risk of evictions and foreclosures. At the same 
time the periodization captures the different conditions and challenges facing homeowners and 
tenants. For example, families that outright own older residencies and assets might not necessarily 
face the same pressures as those families who purchased their house via a housing loan and 
experience a drastic loss of income5. For the latter, the challenges could be insurmountable with 
repossessions or even in case of rental agreements with evictions posing a direct threat to their 
security (Arapoglou, 2016).
One of the most protective measures adopted in the aftermath of the crisis was the introduction 
of the ‘Katseli law6’ in 2010 which protected first and primary homes from repossessions and 
offered a shield against the mounting pressures from the troika (European Commission, ECB, 
5. This also has specific age characteristics with serious repercussions for the ability of young people to form their 
own families or the need to cohabitate with their parents.
6. Named after the Minister Louka Katseli.
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International Monetary Fund)of lenders to liberalise the housing market. Despite the election of a 
left progressive (SYRIZA) coalition government in 2015, a new law that accelerated the process 
both for evictions and the purchase of non-performing loans (NPLs) was introduced. The new law 
allowed the sale of non-performing loans to hedge and vulture funds along with the introduction 
of a new solvency law. As shown in Graph 3, the drastic drop of NPLs by 2020 relates to their 
voluminous sale in secondary markets to hedge and vulture funds7. From 2021 onwards, a new 
insolvency law has been put in place that removes the protections offered in the ‘Katseli’ law.
At the same time for many of the families that own their property outright, the levy of a unified 
property tax introduced in 2011 coincided with a drastic drop in wages and pensionable income. 
The tax levy was gradually reduced but remains even to this date one of the most unpopular 
measures and constitutes another burden on families’ budgets (Maloutas et al, 2020). The levels 
of housing unaffordability and after housing cost poverty, both for homeowners and tenants are 
among the highest in Europe, with many families declaring that they are not able to keep their 
house warm or meet their monthly utility bills (Pittini et. al. 2017). Analysis conducted in 2017, 
using EU SILC data, reported that: 
In Greece, 43.3% of families with dependent children are overburdened by housing costs. In 
Spain, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and the United Kingdom, this figure is between 12% 
and 15% (FAP/FEANTSA, 2017, p. 58)
As recent research highlights, Greece continues to lack a coherent housing policy or support in 
place in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis (Kourachanis, 2017; 2019). The discontinuation 
of the social housing programme in 2011 was a blow to many working-class families that benefited 
from preferential interest rates and rent subsidies (Emmanuel, 2014). Instead, Arapoglou and 
Gounis (2017) draw attention to the introduction of a crisis-management model that aimed to 
offer minimum levels on income support to participants that could meet the strict eligibility 
criteria. In November 2014, the Greek government introduced the very first pilot (6 month) 
for a Guaranteed Social Income (GSI). The pilot programme ran across 13 municipalities and 
involved almost 19,000 households with the average monthly support estimated at €220 per 
month (Matsaganis, 2017).
In 2015, the SYRIZA government came into power proclaiming the need to tackle the ‘Humanitarian 
crisis’ but remained lukewarm on continuing the GSI. The government did however soon expanded 
the scheme, now rebranded as Social Solidarity Income (SSI), offering access to free health care 
for people who lack a social insurance record, free school meals (vouchers), electricity subsidies, 
access to European support funds and programmes against poverty. Additionally, there were 
schemes that aimed to ‘activate’ the unemployed through support and training schemes based 
however on pre-existing (OAED) training programmes amidst unfavourable structural labour 
market conditions. Evaluations of both GMI and SSI identify major shortcomings, among others, 
in their delivery mechanisms and their effectiveness in lifting beneficiaries out of poverty (Lalioti, 
2016; Roumpakis and Pleace, 2018; Lalioti et al, 2019; Sakellaropoulos et al, 2019).
7. The ‘Hercules’ securatisation scheme, which was originally conceived to run out by 2019, was extended recently, 
upon the request of the Greek government, as NPL are expected to increase once again due to the pandemic.
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Next, we present the methodology and evidence from a two-year project which explored both 
the immediate and longer-term outcomes for families who received support from a pilot Family 
Support Service. As such, this research offers an example of the alternative crisis-management 
model delivered to those facing extreme risks, in the absence of a comprehensive and statutory 
network of support in preventing or dealing with homelessness.
The Family Support Service
The research centred on a Family Support Service provided by PRAKSIS a Greek NGO8, 
supported by the Stavros Niarchos Foundation, a major European and international philanthropic 
organisation9. The Family Support Service provided an initial three-month period of financial, 
practical and emotional support to families who can demonstrate they have experienced job 
loss and whose housing is potentially under threat. The financial support was designed to cover 
rent/housing costs, utility bills and nutrition. The support is focused on practical advice and 
labour market activation, i.e. provision of assistance with looking for and securing paid work. 
Alongside this, Family Support Service workers can also facilitated assistance with parenting, 
family relationships, health and wellbeing, emotional support and support with issues around 
low self-esteem. There was also support with dealing with debt which was a widespread issue 
for the families. Support was flexible and personalised, with a case management approach being 
taken, workers coordinating with other services, when the Family Support Service was unable 
to provide direct support. After the initial three months, support could be rolled forward for 
another three months, after which financial support would cease, although practical and emotional 
support could continue for longer (Roumpakis and Pleace, 2018). The service was aimed at 
families who were at risk of sustained poverty, housing exclusion and potential homelessness 
if they did not receive assistance. The service offered a slightly more generous level of support 
than was available from state programmes.
Methodology
The first stage of the research was conducted in the Autumn of 2016 in Athens and Thessaloniki 
comprising interviews10 with ten families using the Family Support Service. The next stage of the 
research involved a second round of interviews in the Autumn of 2017 with the same families 
and a questionnaire distributed to families who had received the Family Support Service. The 
questionnaire was designed to receive 100 responses, which encompassed a high proportion of 
all the families who had received support and this was achieved. This mixed methods approach 
was designed to capture the lived experience of families as they transitioned through the service, 
alongside gathering statistical data from a random sample of 100 of the families who had 
8. https://praksis.gr 
9. https://www.snf.org/
10. All interviews were conducted in Greek.
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received support. Interviews were conducted in Greek and research instruments, including the 
questionnaire, were translated into Greek. Ethical approval was secured through independent 
review at the University of York.
Housing Conditions, Security and After-housing Cost Poverty
Twenty-five percent of the families that received the PRAKSIS Family Support Service owned 
their home outright, while another 25% were owners still paying a mortgage (housing loan). 
The largest group of responding families rented privately (34%) with a few of them sharing with 
friends or relatives who were paying rent or a mortgage (5%).
Graph 4. Housing insecurity and alternative accommodation
x
Source: Service user questionnaire base: 100 families
The majority of the families (44%) indicated that they were ‘neither happy nor unhappy’ 
with their home. Only 11% replied that were ‘very happy’ with 35% of families however replying 
‘quite happy’. Those who were unhappy with their housing were less numerous, 9% of our 
families replied that they were unhappy with their home, with 5% indicating they were ‘very 
unhappy’. Overall, satisfaction with current housing was not very high, but most of the families 
who responded to the questionnaire were not unhappy with where they were living.
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Service users were unlikely to report infestation, i.e. a problem with mice, rats or insects in 
their home (5%) but 26% indicated that their house had damp and 44% indicated that their home 
needed repairs. Additionally, 34% of the families indicated that their house was too cold and 
28% reported it was too hot. The majority of the families identify that their house needs repairs 
and additional space. Overall, families were satisfied with the share of living and bedroom space 
and also with the available equipment in bathroom and in the kitchen. Interestingly, families 
indicated limited concerns in accessing children’s school or nursery as well as shops, reflecting 
the urban location of much of the housing. Instead, some indicated concerns over access to 
green space (18%) and levels of crime in their neighbourhood (18%).
Graph 5. How easy or hard is it to afford … 
Source: Service user questionnaire Base: 100 families. 
Note: Mortgage/rent payments excludes those who owned their home outright.
From the available literature (Pleace et al., 2008) we know that time spent in temporary 
accommodation can be detrimental to the family’s economic situation and the fear of eviction 
linked to increased levels of stress and deterioration of mental health (Nettleton et al., 1999). 
As shown in Graph 4, families often indicated that they are worried about being evicted from 
their current home (whether on mortgage or private rent) with the actual experience of eviction 
being higher for those who rented privately. For those who did need temporary accommodation, 
7% of the families reported sleeping rough in the past, although none of the families had slept 
in accommodation services for homeless people, or in a house provided by municipality or a 
charitable organisation. The majority of those who needed temporary accommodation relied on 
family or friends (25%) while a few (8%) had also slept temporarily in tents or in a car.
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Graph 5 shows how far families could afford key expenses, i.e. mortgage/rent payments, 
electricity/gas costs, water/sewage costs and property taxes11. With the exception of those who 
owned their house outright, the remaining families primarily replied that it is ‘very difficult’ (47%) 
and ‘quite difficult’ (21%) to afford mortgage or rent payments with only 3% responding that 
they find it ‘very easy’. Once asked about their ability to afford gas and electricity supply, 33% 
of all of our sample found it ‘very difficult’ and 49% ‘quite difficult’ to afford payments, meaning 
thus that 8 out of 10 families faced difficulty in paying these bills. Only one family answered that 
they found it ‘very easy’ to pay electricity and gas bills. The majority of the families reported that 
paying water and sewage charges was ‘neither easy nor difficult’ with one third (31%) however 
being in arrears with payments. Among those who owned a home, whether outright or not, most 
reported that meeting property taxes was ‘very’ (33%) or ‘quite difficult’ (55%), nearly nine out 
ten owner occupiers reporting some problem in paying property taxes. These findings showed 
the lived experience of families facing extreme financial pressures and housing insecurity in 
Greece, echoing the results of larger scale population analysis (FAP/FEANTSA, 2017).
Debt repayments
The families who had generally been working for sustained periods of time, who had careers prior 
to the crisis, were not always used to budgeting in the sense of managing every Euro, rather than 
being in a situation where earnings tended to cover or more than cover expenditure and their 
budgeting only needed to be approximate. The ‘adjustment’ to being without enough, or more 
than enough, money could be a challenge for some of the families, according to the Family Support 
Service staff, suddenly going from, for example, earnings of €1000 to an income of €400 or less 
and having to make challenging decisions around competing - essential – spending priorities. 
Alongside adapting to lower levels of income, the families using the Family Support Service often 
required assistance in managing debts. As noted, these debts could be multiple and significant. 
Part of the role of the financial consultant element of the Family Support Service was to help pay, 
reschedule andmanage debts more broadly. The discussion on financial planning and how to 
prioritise needs and payments was reported as being of benefit by the families who were interviewed. 
The advice on how to manage on a restricted income, maximise the efficiency of spending and on 
dealing with existing debts was highly valued. Two families share their experiences below:
It was a great support to have someone to sit down and go through our financial liabilities. 
They informed us that we need to prioritise the house loan payments in order to apply for 
the ‘Katseli’12 law and negotiate with the bank. Mentally, it was impossible to go through 
this on my own, so stressful.
(Family Interview, October 2016)
11. PRAKSIS Family Support Service did not offer financial support towards the payment of property taxes. We 
included this question in our survey as it serves as a crucial indicator for families’ affordability and possible budget 
restraints.
12. Prevents eviction for families from their primary or only residence. 
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We sat down with the social worker and put all the bills on the table – she was clear that 
I could use the financial support to negotiate with the electricity company. I got 200 Euros 
and went straight to them and managed to arrange instalments. I did not have the money 
to organise this myself.
(Family Interview, October 2016)
Service users who were interviewed generally had a positive view of the advice provided 
around money and debt management by the Family Support Service as it allowed them to put 
their finances back in order and also avert the immediate risk of repossessions and eviction and 
to make their home and possessions more secure. Two families share their views below:
The financial support was such a great relief! The programme enabled us to put our debts 
in order. Since the programme ended, I am not letting the electricity bill to go in debt, I do 
struggle with the rent payments but I am on it.
(Family Interview, September 2017)
The financial support was great – a gift from god. My child has a serious health problem and 
having this support made a huge difference as we need the electricity to run at all times. If they 
had cut the supply I would have reconnected the supply illegally myself … I have done it[before]. 
And now I have to pay the penalty. The medication needs to be kept in the fridge. I would 
never risk this … I went back to the electricity company and made the payment. I explained 
why I did what I did. We have an organised schedule of payments now. Non-negotiable.
(Family Interview, October 2016)
Some of the families had also received what they viewed as being generous support in legal 
advice that had enabled them to prevent evictions and foreclosures. It is important to note here 
that none of the interviewees were aware of alternative legal assistance, which meant that without 
the Family Support Service, some may have experienced eviction or foreclosure/repossession. 
I met the legal consultant and she helped me to put together all the papers to enter the 
‘Katseli Law’. It meant that they could not ask for more money until the hearing of the case 
in court. We are still waiting for the court case. It was a relief.
(Family Interview, October 2016)
A few of the interviewees commented that their overall debt accumulation levels reflected 
financial decisions that were taken on a completely different labour market and welfare support 
reality. They had taken on debts in what was effectively a different world from the one in which 
they now found themselves living, without imagining the problems they would face in repaying 
those debts, two families share their experience below:
My husband used to work for a car mechanic, repairing cars etc. I was also working there 
as a secretary. He was paid really well and I was paid ok. We had enough. Enough to start 
thinking about having our own home. After the crisis his boss kept him in the job as he was 
experienced but he accepted a lower wage. My job was gone. From almost 3000 Euros a 
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month, we dropped to a 1000 Euros – it was a shock! Until we realised what is happening, 
we got in arrears in everything. The social worker helped to renegotiate with the bank – I was 
embarrassed to go and ask them [bank] for a lower payment on my housing loan. We settled 
for half the payment which will means of course that we will probably never pay off the loan! 
(Family Interview, October 2016)
I used to work in the media – before 2008 I had two jobs and made a lot of money. I was in 
the ‘in and out’ of major TV station. There was a lot of money involved and lot of working 
hours. Now all the media enterprises are in trouble… if you told me that the channel and 
the newspaper would close few years ago I would have laughed at your face. I thought that 
my job was secure. I put some money aside but never expected this mess.
(Family Interview, October 2016)
Health and well being
The introduction of co-payments and the gradual privatisation of health care services 
provided by public hospitals led to a substantial increase in the number of Greeks who are 
unable to meet their (self-reported) health needs for medical examination or treatment. 
This is particularly the case for lower- and middle-income groups who identify difficulties 
in meeting their health needs and lacking ability to (co)pay for medical tests and doctoral 
visits (see also Economou, 2015). 
Most of the questionnaire families identified that their health was ‘fair’ (41%) but 28% 
indicated health problems. Although 29% answered that their health is either ‘very good’ or 
‘excellent’, the percentage of families who reported that health concerns made it difficult to 
find work was very high at 90%. It is important to highlight here that families admitted that 
they prioritise absolutely necessary medical treatments and many mentioned, that they do face 
some minor health problems or injuries for which they have not received treatment, due to low 
income or the condition not being covered by social (medical) insurance. Three families talked 
about their experience of health problems and stress:
I have an injury on my hips, which is really expensive. I had to find a job first and then go 
to the hospital. As I have been out of work for so long, I had no access to social insurance. 
I managed to find a job now and went to the hospital. They told me I will be on the list – 6 
months later I have not heard from them. It is painful to work and go up the stairs but … 
‘god bless’. 
(Family Interview, September 2017)
Everything that is happening out there is stressing me out - cannot sleep still. I am worried 
about my kids. My eldest is 16 and soon he will need money for private tuition to take the 
exams. I have no idea how I will afford it. It causes me stress to think I might not be able to 
support him. None of this is his fault. 
(Family Interview, October 2016)
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It is a shameful thing what they have done to us. My son asked for a pair of socks the other 
day. I had no money in my pockets. Nothing. I cried all night. 
(Family Interview, October 2016)
Families responding to the survey reported that have felt sad ‘all’ (13%) or ‘most of the time’ 
(31%) with more than one third reporting they felt sad ‘some of the time’ (36%). Families also 
reported that either physical or mental health concerns interfered with normal life with 10% 
indicating that it happened ‘all the time’, 24% ‘most of the time’ and 39% ‘some of the time’. 
Rather worryingly, many of the families reported that they were not able to feel calm during the 
previous four weeks, with 20% answering that they felt calm ‘little of the time’ (20%) and 27% 
‘rarely’. The results indicated that mental health issues were a major concern for most families 
and might represent a barrier for transitioning to the labour market. 
As a result of the abrupt and, at times, disruptive changes in the labour market, families 
reported, both in the interviews and in the questionnaires, an increased sense of anxiety, loss 
of sleep and feelings of shame. As one family member commented: 
Emotionally, I was a mess – I was a mess before and when I joined the programme […] 
Soon after I found a job, and ever since I am feeling better but I still have a lot of stress 
about what future holds, I am not sleeping well, still worrying that the family income is not 
enough, and my job contract might not be renewed.
(Family Interview, September 2017)
Support with Entering the Labour Market
Many families had been helped into work, with 81% of the 100 families responding to the questionnaire 
reporting the labour market activation offered by the Family Support Service were ‘very good’ or 
‘excellent’, but the challenges of securing employment were evident, with 45% of responding families 
reported that both partners were working 16 hours or more a week. Much of the work that the adults 
in families were able to secure was more precarious, offered shorter hours and was lower paid than the 
work they had prior to the financial crisis, with 67% of families reporting that it was ‘very difficult’ to 
find work that ‘paid enough to live on’. This essentially means that, although the service was largely 
successful at getting people into work, the respondents regarded the current labour market did not 
provide the kind of work that would enable families to have enough to live on. 
The majority of the jobs in the private sector are not paying any contributions towards social 
insurance therefore limiting service users’ access to the relevant health services. Also as few of the 
respondents commented on, they need to work extra shifts or even get a second job, usually on the 
side, to secure the necessary financial resources they needed. Two families described their experiences:
I got a second job. I am working on a late night shift as cleaning lady in café-snack bar. It 
is late hours. I put the children for sleep and I then leave for work. It mostly for Friday and 
Saturday nights – it pays 20 euros a night… I need the extra money as the day job contract 
is not renewable. At least I have not heard that it will be renewed!
(Family Interview, September 2017)
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I do handyman jobs on the side. Some painting, some plumbing. If it is simple I will take 
it. Mostly in the neighbourhood. My oldest son is 16 and he keeps growing – he needs new 
clothes every month! All the money from the regular job is just enough to pay the rent, 
electricity, water, some basic food shopping and public transport. My monthly salary just 
covers the basics! So, the extra money covers everything else. 
(Family Interview, September 2017)
Additionally, many respondents that found a job in the private sector often end up working 
for more hours than those they are paid for. Often this would involve extending hours on the 
spot, adjusting to business demands. Below, three families share their experiences: 
My employer wanted to stay a bit longer – it was Friday night and got really busy. It was 
after midnight and just finished my shift. I ended up staying up to 4 o’clock in the morning. 
We sold out. I was knackered. I asked for my money and got some ‘food to go’ instead. 
(Family Interview, October 2016)
They often want me to stay longer on the job […] I get paid for this … not a lot … not what 
it used to get but I get paid for the extra hours. My boss is ok. 
(Family Interview, September 2017)
I do not mind working hard. I will do it. I have done. I will always do it as long as I am 
standing on my own two feet. The work pays well. If the boss asks me to do some extra 
hours then I will do it. I am thankful.
(Family Interview, October 2016)
Conclusions 
The research highlights the limits of European welfare and housing policy that is posited on an 
assumption that employment opportunities will be widespread, will tend to offer sufficient wages 
and income security to enable families to buy or at least rent on a sustainable basis and that, should 
household income fall because of bad luck, ill-health or relationship breakdown, extended family 
will generally be there to pick up the pieces. By drawing an intersection between social policy 
and housing we are able assess the severity of the austerity reforms and the coping strategies 
of families in relation to housing, their health, well-being, employment and debt management. 
As manifested in the Greek case, the absence of a comprehensive and well-established network 
of support for preventing families from the high risk of homelessness and the combination of a 
low wage and insecure labour market posited substantial challenges to housing as a key, asset-
based, resource of and for social security. 
Straightforward economic risk, rather than the characteristics of families, lay at the root of 
much of the experience of housing precarity with which the Family Support Service was engaging. 
Many of the families were from the social and economic mainstream, only a tiny minority reported 
issues like problematic drug and alcohol use, they had often been stably employed middle class 
households with mortgages prior to the crisis, finding themselves rapidly en route to housing 
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cost poverty, housing precarity and potential homelessness was unexpected, they fell hard and 
fast, finding that there was little to protect them. It was perhaps not surprising that many of our 
respondents admitted to experiencing mental health issues. Still, the ‘crisis-management’ tools 
promoted by the Greek government, under the auspices of the troika of lenders, focused one-
sidedly on activation programmes and have paid less attention in supporting both emotionally 
and practically families with support needs and mental health problems (see also Arapoglou 
and Gounis, 2017). Any financial support, similar to the GSI (or SSI) can, temporarily, alleviate 
immediate risks of housing eviction and repossessions, but does little to support the service users 
in re-entering the labour market and regain a sense of normality, self-confidence and control 
over their lives. 
This research provides an opportunity to reflect also on narratives that homelessness, 
including family homelessness is behavioural in origin, stems from mental illness or is the result 
of some combination of self-destructive choice and mental ill health. Although understanding 
homelessness largely in terms of individual pathology, continue to be strongly and widely asserted 
(Parsell, 2018), this research shows that Greek families receiving help from the Family Support 
Service were not characterised by the supposed ‘characteristics’ of homelessness prior to running 
into sudden and severe difficulty, their trajectories through the risks of housing insecurity and 
homelessness were partially the result of their own decisions and actions, including the choice 
to work with a service that, while it offered much needed financial support, was posited on 
labour market activation, reflecting wider ideas that dealing with poverty and housing exclusion 
is best dealt with by enabling self-exit to a more stable and viable economic position. As has 
been illustrated here, much depends on whether that more stable and viable economic position 
is actually available, supply-side interventions in the labour market have limits, the economy 
has to be generating the jobs that provide the stability and level of income to facilitate an exit 
from poverty.
The realities of a low wage, insecure labour market with limited social protection were 
highlighted by the economic crisis, a lesson reinforced by the economic consequences of the 
pandemic that continues to blight Europe at the time of writing. In response to the pandemic, 
the Greek government introduced a temporary extension of housing benefits and reduction 
in primary housing rent for workers affected by the pandemic to cater immediate rather than 
address chronic needs. Having only recently starting to recover from the impact of the sovereign 
debt crisis, the Greek social policy response to the crisis remained modest. Perhaps rather more 
worryingly, the remarkable low enrolment rate in the furlough scheme is attributed to employers’ 
reluctance to commit to the restriction of dismissals, opting to maintain precarious and casual 
contracts in the labour market (see Moreira et al, 2021). Considering that most of the families 
we interviewed are in insecure jobs with often casual contracts, it would be worth researching 
whether difficulties to afford domestic life resurface, with families climbing back out to a state of 
housing exclusion and falling back into the risk of homelessness (Meert and Bourgeois, 2005).
Our findings suggest that the Greek welfare state continues at large to offload the risk of 
social reproduction, including housing costs and conditions to families. The accumulation of 
household debt and the negative saving rates of Greek households together with the reported 
inability of many families to meet their mortgage and rent payments raise substantial concerns 
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on housing affordability. These extend also to housing and living conditions as many families 
report inability to make utility payments and pay off property taxes. Vulnerabilities in relation 
to housing stability, the risk of after-housing cost poverty can – under the wrong economic 
circumstances – be widespread, moving well beyond the populations that are ‘expected’ to 
be at risk of homelessness. In this sense, European homelessness can be seen to have clear 
macroeconomic and public policy drivers, as is evidenced by the experience of the Greek 
families using the Family Support Service, this is not to reduce housing insecurity, exclusion and 
homelessness to systemic factors, as clearly individual needs, characteristics and experiences, 
as well as individual choice, must play a role, but the limits of seeing family homelessness as 
a family problem, expecting those families and their extended network of kin to generally deal 
with it themselves, are illustrated by this research.
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Youth Housing in a Context of Socio-economic 
Insecurity: The Case of Greece
Dimitra Siatitsa1
Abstract
The paper discusses the issue of youth housing in Greece, in a context of permanent insecurity 
and instability, due to the precarisation of labour and the ongoing “crises’’ conjuncture. Youth 
housing problems in Greece are usually contained by the Greek familial model of welfare, where 
unemployed, low-waged and vulnerable youth depend on family networks for providing shelter. 
In this context, the difficulties faced by youth in transition in their effort to access independent 
housing remain rather underexplored. Although strongly conditioned by cultural norms and 
family housing strategies, youth housing precarity is manifested through the inevitable prolonged 
stay in, or return to the parental residence, difficulties in accessing affordable housing, housing 
cost overburden, lower housing standards and overcrowding. The paper provides an overview 
of main issues discussed in the European and Greek literature, describes key dimensions of 
youth housing in Greece and sets the framework for further research.
Keywords: Youth housing; transition to residential independence; housing precariousness; 
Southern Europe; Greece
Introduction
Housing trajectories and living arrangements of young people transitioning into adulthood in 
Greece have been strongly affected by the multifaceted and consecutive crises of the past years, 
enhancing conditions of insecurity and instability in young peoples’ life courses. In Greece, 
following the Southern European pattern, young people live in extended family arrangements, 
receive parental transfers in cash or in kind (often in exchange for reciprocal support in old 
age), co-reside with their parents beyond adulthood (even during more favorable economic 
conditions), while having a stable job and finding a partner are decisive factors for moving 
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to an independent home (Chtouris, 2012; Emmanouel, 2012). Yet, the prolonged economic 
recession, the challenging conditions of youth employment, together with the reduction of 
family resources, austerity welfare restructurings, and growing housing unaffordability, have 
consolidated a regime of precarity and insecurity that renders the prospect of independent 
housing a particularly tenuous pursuit. The current pandemic introduced new challenges in 
relation to housing, as the economic stagnation and difficulties in labour sectors which employ 
young people, generate further issues of affordability and security, but also issues of cohabitation 
in confinement, especially for youth living with their parents. 
During the last decade, important work has been done on youth and labour (Papadakis 
et al., 2017, Karakioulafi et al., 2014), transition to adulthood (Athanasiades et. al., 2018, 
Tsekeris et. al., 2017, Sakellariou & Koronaiou, 2018), brain drain (Labrianidis, 2014), social 
participation, urban cultures etc. (Chtouris, 2017, Zaimakis, 2016). However, the issue of youth 
housing conditions and pathways has not been extensively and systematically studied until now. 
The reasons for the relative neglect of housing issues might be related to cultural assumptions 
regarding adulthood and independence and the role of the family as the main social support 
system, which have obscured the issue of access to housing as a factor of social emancipation. The 
assumption that young people’s housing needs will be covered by the family obscures growing 
housing hardships and exclusion from the housing market that impede youth empowerment and 
emancipation. At the same time, the reasons might also have to do with difficulties in studying 
the housing sector, as there are few available disaggregated data to systematically record trends 
in the housing sector in relation to youth housing outcomes. Furthermore, in the absence of a 
housing movement or an integrated housing policy, the housing trajectories and practices of 
youth in transition remain unexplored and under-represented. 
Acknowledging the key importance of access to independent housing for young people’s 
transition to adulthood and emancipation, the paper intends to set the framework in order to 
discuss and further investigate youth housing in Greece. It draws from youth studies, demographics 
and housing studies literature, in relation to youth autonomy, living conditions and arrangements, 
youth housing transitions, accessing housing and the position of younger generations in the 
housing market. First the paper refers to recent trends in youth housing in Europe, patterns of 
transition to adulthood and contextual specificities in Greece. Next, it focuses on youth housing 
precarity, basic components and available data. Open questions and methodologies for further 
research are discussed in the concluding section.
Trends in Youth Housing in Europe and Greece
Socio economic precarity and access to housing 
The growing social and economic marginalisation of youth due to conditions of precarity and 
insecurity, especially in the countries mostly affected by the crisis, is discussed in a number 
of studies. It is stressed that such trends are intertwined with demographic downturn and 
intergenerational polarisation and competition, together with social and political regression and 
Κοινωνική Πολιτική 14 • Ιούνιος 2021 • 151
rise of anti-political and far-right attitudes (Chtouris, 2012; Aaasve, 2014; Flash-Eurobarometer, 
2014; EUROSTAT, 2015; Bessant et al., 2017). Young people find it harder to access the labour 
market, they are more likely to be unemployed, work more often in precarious and insecure 
positions doing part time or temporary low-paid jobs, they have lower wages and higher security 
contributions, they are at higher risk of poverty, in some cases even if they have a job (in-work-
poverty), affecting their ability to start an independent life and delaying their transition into 
adulthood (Eurofound, 2014). 
Youth trajectories towards residential autonomy are also strongly conditioned by changes in 
the housing markets and by available forms of social support. During the last decades processes 
of housing financialisation, credit-expansion, social housing privatisations and deregulation of 
housing markets, intense speculation on urban space, and the effects of the global financial crisis, 
have contributed to growing unaffordability and difficulties to access decent housing. According 
to research findings, housing in Europe is increasingly structured by insider-outsider dynamics 
within contexts of labour inequality and housing financialization. More specifically, research in 
different European countries have stressed the following issues: 
 Þ Young generations stay longer in the parental home (Billari & Liefbroer, 2010; Eurofound, 
2014) and have greater incidence of return (boomerang kids) (Arundel & Lennartz, 
2017), but also higher risks of poverty in case of home-leaving (Iacovou & Aassve, 2007; 
Aassve et. al., 2013); 
 Þ They have less access to homeownership, related both to precarious labour conditions 
and shrinking incomes for young workers, but also to housing financialisation, credit 
market cycles and limited access to mortgage lending after the financial crisis (Lersch & 
Dewild, 2014; Arundel & Doling, 2017); 
 Þ Private renting is growing among young adults (generation rent), although it has become 
a rather unaffordable, inadequate and insecure tenure (Byrne, 2020; McKee et al., 2019); 
 Þ There are less housing options for youth, as young people navigate into increasingly 
unaffordable housing markets, while social housing and state assistance are limited 
(Mackie, 2016); 
 Þ Intergenerational inequalities are growing, while there is a stronger impact of family 
background, parental support and wealth in relation to housing outcomes (Arundel, 
2017; Forrest and Yip, 2016).
 Þ Youth homelessness is growing across Europe (FEANTSA, 2017).
Although these are acknowledged as common trends, there are significant contextual variations 
in relation to youth trajectories towards residential independence and youth housing conditions 
in the different European countries. In the following section we discuss different aspects of 
youth’s transition to independent housing, focusing particularly on Southern Europe and Greece.
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Υouth and Transition to Adulthood in Greece
Youth is an heterogeneous category, socially constructed across different contexts.2 The period 
of youth rather refers to the idea and process of transition to adulthood, including several steps 
and milestones such as leaving the parental home, having a stable job, achieving socio-economic 
independence, marrying or having children (Aasve, 2014). Patterns of transition have been 
studied in relation to cultural factors, such as family ties or individualised behaviours, and 
institutional welfare state regimes, with important differences highlighted between North-Central 
and South-East countries.3 Additionally, economic factors, such as rent prices, young people’s 
own labour outcomes and income, their family’s income, general economic cycles and labour 
market conditions, and socio-spatial factors such as social class, gender, ethnicity and spatial 
location play an equally important role (Iacovou, 2010; Christopoulou & Pantalidou, 2018).
Leaving the parental home
The decision of young people to leave the parental home can be affected by: whether or not 
they are in a relationship, whether or not they are studying full-time, their level of financial (in)
dependence, labour market conditions, living costs and the cost of housing (Eurostat, 2015). 
Late home-leaving in Southern Europe has been strongly attributed to cultural factors of 
intergenerational solidarity and dependence, within the framework of the southern European 
familistic welfare regime (Papadopoulos & Roumpakis, 2013). According to Eurostat data (2019), 
Greece has one of the highest rates of young adults aged 18-34 living with their parents (69,4% 
in total, 77,1% for males, 61,8% for females), remaining very high for the age group of 25-34 
(57,8% in total, 68,6% for males, 47,1% for females), while the average age of leaving home is 
29 (30 for males and 27-28 for females), when the EU 28 average is approximately 25 years. 
Cultural norms are attributed to the gender variations recorded, as younger women tend to leave 
the parental home earlier, usually to live with a partner, while at the same time women are more 
likely to co-reside with ageing lonely parents, even when they can afford to live independently 
(Christopoulou & Pantalidou, 2018). The socio-economic crisis had an important impact on 
home-leaving patterns, as these age limits have been steadily rising since 2011 (see Graph 1).
2. Furthermore, youth is diversified across social divisions, such as gender, class, ethnicity, religion, race, and living 
situations in terms of education, training, professional life, family composition, life course phase, defining different 
youth profiles. 
3. An analysis of welfare regimes, and European datasets on the age of leaving the parental home identified three 
clusters of countries: the North-West, characterised by best ‘opportunity structures for independent housing’, 
including an extant private rental sector, strong support from the family for leaving home and late parenthood; the 
North-Eastern, characterised by early childbearing and ‘outstanding unfavourable opportunity structures in terms of 
all components of the welfare mix’, including high unemployment, an underdeveloped private rental sector, limited 
family support and restricted social welfare; and the Southern-West, where restricted social housing provision, strong 
family-cultural supports and very late parenthood, were identified as factors that restrict home-leaving to the latest 
ages (Mandic, 2008).
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Graph 1. Share of young adults living with their parents by age groups across selected countries
Source: EU-SILC, 2019
A number of studies have demonstrated the role of the family as a shock absorber during the 
economic crisis (Karakioulafi et. al, 2013; Athanasiades et. al., 2018). At the same time, it has 
been stressed that austerity measures and household over-indebtedness, severely undermined key 
pillars of the familistic welfare mode of social reproduction and established a regime of generalised 
insecurity (Papadopoulos & Roumpakis, 2013). Family networks have operated as the primary 
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safety net available, and the parental home as a refuge for vulnerable youth (Christopoulou & 
Pantalidou, 2017 and 2018). Under crisis conditions, a growing number of young people return 
to their parents’ home, when losing a job, or after finishing their studies (Tsekeris et. al, 2017). 
Although, inter-generational cohabitation and extended family formation is a common norm in 
southern Europe, the inability to achieve economic and housing independence reinforces life-
plans postponement and feelings of frustration (Athanasiades et. al. 2018)4. 
The higher complexity, instability, unpredictability and protraction of young people’s pathways 
to independent living has been related to two main factors: the prolonging of education periods 
and adverse labour market conditions. In Greece, given also the strong social norms favouring high 
educational qualifications, leaving home for the first time often relates to moving to another city in 
order to study (with the financial support of the family) and has to be considered a rather intermediate 
step in transition to adulthood.5 The diversity of student living situations and the characteristics of a 
discrete ‘student housing sector’ has been also discussed, both in terms of living conditions but also in 
relation to processes of ‘studentification’ of neighbouhoods (see Revington, 2017). Returning home, 
however, relates to a great extent to the ability of young people to sustain an independent household 
after they finish their studies, linked also to the family capacities to support them.
Precarious employment and low wages can shape and limit important life decisions including 
partnership formation, where to live, when to start a family and many other choices that can 
impact the quality of life and well-being of individuals and households (Athanasiades et. al., 
2018: 100). Research based on the EU Labour Market Survey has shown that in Greece despite 
strong cultural biases, having a job lowers the probability of living with one’s parents, while the 
greek family provides refuge not only for unemployed youth but also for those with precarious 
jobs (Christopoulou & Pantalidou, 2018: 17).
Dependence on Family Transfers
The importance of family transfers for younger family members is a longstanding characteristic 
of southern European housing systems (Allen et al., 2004). Intra-family sharing of available 
housing stock or financial support (for sustaining an independent living or buying a house) is 
very common in Greece, associated with benefits and costs for both sides (Maloutas, 2008). 
Family occasional or stable transfers, are an important source of income for young people, 
while sources of income change with age.6 Patterns of family transfers diversify according to 
income and wealth, as lower incomes mostly can afford to provide support by co-residing, while 
4. In a survey conducted by Tsekeris, Pinguli and Georga (2015), it was found that severe economic difficulties are the 
top-ranked factors mentioned by young respondents to explain their decision to cohabit, despite the fact that young adults’ 
choices and decisions are strongly affected by the strong relational family ties that characterise Greek family dynamics.
5. It has been pointed out that education has contrasting effects, as for some young people ongoing participation in education 
delays the departure from the family home by postponing the start of their working careers, while for others it precipitates 
leaving home earlier simply because their educational institution is far from the family home (Beer & Faulkner, 2011:66). 
6. As shown in a study among youth aged 15 to 30 years old for the General Secretariat of Youth in 2005, sources of 
income change in relation to age (20% of those aged 20-24 had income from a stable job, became 56% for those aged 25-30) 
and family status (58% of married people had as main source of income a stable job and 25% from family) (GSY, 2005).
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wealthier households provide both housing and transfers in cash (Emmanouel, 2012). The crisis 
period and recession strengthened the intergenerational dependency of greek families, while at 
the same time it limited their capacity for cash transfers (Christopoulou & Pantalidou, 2017).
Family inheritance and family transfers are a determining factor for young peoples’ access to 
homeownership in Greece,7 while there might be signs of growing dependence on family assets.8 
Contrary to findings from EU comparative studies (see Filandri & Bertolini, 2016; Mackie, 2016), in 
Greece the socio-economic background of young people has less impact on access to homeownership, 
since high percentages of (outright) homeownership are broadly spread across different income 
classes (Maloutas, 1990). Unequal access to mortgage lending and migration, had already created 
trends of decreasing homeownership rates among lower income groups even before the financial 
crisis (Emmanuel, 2004). In the post-crisis period, difficulties in accessing housing credit, drop of 
income, increase in labour precarity, and a new cycle of housing prices increase, have made access to 
homeownership even more unequal, while the age of accessing homeownership is also expected to rise.
Youth Housing Markets 
‘Youth housing markets’ are characterised by shared housing, precarious housing, temporary 
housing and frequent mobility (Beer and Faulkner, 2011). In Greece, where access to homeownership 
is the dominant and desired tenure, private renting is considered a transitory condition, either 
during the education period or in anticipation of acquiring an owned house, often accepting 
unsatisfying housing solutions (Drakouli, 2018). Τhe rental sector in Greece concentrates higher 
percentages of lower income, younger and migrant population. Young people will conform with 
worse conditions in a poorly regulated rental sector, especially in the older parts of the housing 
stock. Also, in relation to prices, it has been observed that young people pay higher rents and 
have shorter leases (1,94 average lease duration) (Oikonomou & Sapounakis, 1996). Besides, 
it is expected that young people will enter the bottom of the housing market, before gradually 
working their way towards greater permanence and quality (Ford et al., 2002; Beer and Faulkner, 
2011). Nevertheless, growing inequity among those who own their house and those who do not, 
will make renting a more permanent solution for many young households, including the migrant 
population that usually reside in the private rental sector. More attention is needed in order to 
understand difficulties and precarious housing conditions that youth face along these trajectories. 
7. According to a survey carried out by the Bank of Greece, in 2009 39.6% of owners (or 28.4% of the total sample) 
stated that they obtained their primary residence via donation or inheritance. The percentage is higher than the 
Eurozone average (20.1% of owners and 12.6% of total households) (Tzamourani, 2013). Similar research results 
are shown by Emmanuel (2016) regarding the way homeowners acquire their home, as nearly 40% of owners had 
benefited from some family property, either as a direct transfer, use concession for free, or financing a new acquisition 
by selling inherited or transferred family properties. 
8. The percentages were slightly lower in the 80s. For example, research conducted by the National Centre of Social 
Research (EKKE) in 1986, for the Region of Attica, showed that 23,1% of housing acquisitions came from inheritance 
or parental donations/transfers, while for the 12,5% of purchases (40,7% of acquisitions) there had been some kind 
of help by the family (Maloutas, 1990). Even though thorougher analysis is needed on the issue, this might reflect 
the growing difficulties in accessing homeownership without family support.
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Youth Housing Precariousness
Housing precariousness is related to notions of vulnerability, insecurity and instability, and 
seeks to incorporate a wide range of housing situations that go beyond homelessness, or poor 
housing conditions (Clair et. al., 2018). The notion of precarity has been more commonly used to 
describe labour and employment conditions of the past decades, referring to work characterized 
by variable levels and degrees of objective (legal status) and subjective (feeling) uncertainty and 
insecurity (ILO, 2011)9. Precarious work is amongst others related to not being able to support 
a household and not providing sufficient resources for a decent life (EP, 2017). Still, the term 
is complex, multifaceted and context-specific.
In their attempt to construct a comparative measure Clair et al. (2018: 4) define housing 
precarioussness as “a state of uncertainty which increases a person’s real or perceived likelihood 
of experiencing an adverse event, caused (at least in part) by their relationship with their 
housing provider, the physical qualities, affordability, security of their home, and access to 
essential services’’. Based on the data available from the European Union Surveys on Income 
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), they operationalise housing precariousness as consisting 
of four components: affordability, quality, security and access to facilities and services. 
Data measuring the first two components are collected yearly through the standard EU-SILC 
survey, while variables to measure security and access to facilities are drawn from two ad hoc 
surveys on housing conditions in 2012 and on access to services in 2016.
Affordability 
Housing affordability, that is the ability of a household to afford to meet all basic needs while 
paying for their housing, strongly affects young people’s housing trajectories, albeit in asymmetrical 
ways depending on social positionally, including gender, citizenship/migration, socio-economic 
status and other aspects of social inequality (Pittini, 2012). Research has been focusing on the 
difficulties and constraints that young adults face within increasingly expensive housing markets, 
gentrifying neighbourhoods and limited affordable housing options (such as social housing), 
settling with temporary, lower quality and less stable housing arrangements (McKee et al 2020, 
Hochstenbach & Boterman, 2015)10. 
9. The ILO specifically focuses on the following categories of precarious work defined by two different contractual relations 
and precarious conditions:: Contractual arrangements: i. The limited duration of the contract (fixed-term, short-term, 
temporary, seasonal, day-labour and casual labour) ii. The nature of the employment relationship (triangular and disguised 
employment relationships, bogus self-employment, subcontracting and agency contracts) Precarious conditions: i. Low 
wage ii. Poor protection from termination of employment iii. Lack of access to social protection and benefits usually 
associated with full-time standard employment iv. Lack of or limited access of workers to exercise their rights at work.
10. Although precarious housing conditions are somehow expected in youth housing markets as an inevitable choice 
and an intermediate step towards better housing, it has been shown that this can be also part of youth housing strategies 
in order to remain in desirable locations (i.e. in highly gentrified areas) or in order to make savings, rather than an 
enforced choice. It is rather the issue of having control over one’s housing choices that determines the level of housing 
precariousness (Hochstenbach & Boterman, 2015). The impact of such youth strategies on housing rents and prices 
in areas undergoing gentrification, touristification or studentification have been also discussed (see Revington, 2017). 
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In Greece, housing prices and rents had remained at a rather affordable level until the early 
‘90s, while significant increases were recorded after the mid 90s, due to credit expansion and 
participation in the eurozone (Emmanouel, 2014). Prices dropped again since 2008, however 
they remained at a much higher level in relation to incomes and wages. Since 2017, after almost 
ten years of real-estate market and construction stagnation (Siatitsa, 2016), there is growing 
economic activity in the sector due to tourism and short term rentals, pushing rents and real-
estate prices (Balampanidis et al., 2021). Taking into account the low level of the minimum wage 
(650€/month), high youth unemployment and the low and unstable wages of young workers in 
relation to housing and living costs in Greece, growing unaffordability is making access to housing 
more difficult for mobile and seasonal workers, students and young people in their early career11. 
Greece has been steadily recording one of the highest rates of housing cost overburden (36,2% 
in total, but 88,2% for poor households), alarmingly higher than the EU28 average (10,1% in total, 
and 37,1% for poor households). The rate remains at equal high levels for young people aged 20 to 
29 (38,9% in total, and 87,9% for poor households). Housing cost overburden is disproportionately 
higher regardless of income for tenants at market price (83,2%), while it is 23,8% for owners with 
mortgage and 25,9% for owners without mortgage. Although this indicator is based on subjective 
perceptions of cost overburden as declared by household members, it is still an issue that needs to 
be addressed. Other indicators related to inability to cope with high housing costs, such as arrears 
in the payment of housing related costs (bills, loans, rents etc), are available for the total population, 
but would need to be further disaggregated in order to see how the youth population is affected. 
Research in the Italian case, has demonstrated that unaffordable housing and rental prices, 
together with the limited access to credit is an important determinant of youth’s decision to leave 
the parental home (Modena & Rondinelli, 2011). Given the changes in housing and property 
provoked by the crisis, and the dynamically changing conditions in the real-estate and housing 
market in the post crisis period, further research is needed in order to understand the effect of 
housing prices and market cycles on youth housing trajectories and living arrangements in Greece.
Housing conditions
Eurostat measures the quality of housing conditions in relation to overcrowding12 and (severe) 
housing deprivation.13 These indicators are higher in Greece compared to the EU28 average, 
and even higher for young people, especially those at risk of poverty: 14,4% of young people 
at risk of poverty aged from 20 to 29 years face severe housing deprivation, while 58,8% of the 
same group live in overcrowded conditions (see table below).
11. It is indicative that after many years, and given the absence of broader housing movements in Greece (see 
Siatitsa, 2016), the issue of rents and unaffordability has generated mobilisations and claims. See for example https://
unrealestate.noblogs.org/. 
12. A person is considered as living in an overcrowded household if the household does not have at its disposal a 
minimum number of rooms. 
13. The percentage of population living in a dwelling which is considered as overcrowded, while also exhibiting 
at least one of the housing deprivation measures (leaking roof, no bath/shower and no indoor toilet, or a dwelling 
considered too dark).
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Table 1. Severe housing deprivation and overcrowding
EU-SILC data 2019 Total population From 20 to 29 years
Severe housing 
deprivation
Total Males Females Total Males Females
Greece_at risk of poverty* 11,7 12,1 11,3 14,4 13,5 15,4
EU28_ at risk of poverty 9,1 9,7 8,5 11 11,3 10,7
Overcrowding
Greece_at risk of poverty 45,7 47 44,5 58,8 56,5 60,9
EU28_ at risk of poverty 26,7 27,8 25,7 35,2 35,9 34,7
* Below 60% of median equivalised income
It is expected that these rates change significantly among different housing tenures, with 
tenants living in higher rates in bad housing conditions. It is indicative that the overcrowding rate 
among the total population is 35% for tenants at market price (19,8% EU28), 30% for tenants 
living for free or at reduced rate (25,2% EU28), 26% for owners with no outstanding mortgage 
(16,7% EU) and 31,4% for owners with a mortgage (7,0% EU28).14 Similarly, severe housing 
deprivation among the total population is 7,7% for tenants at market prices (5,5 EU28), 8,3% 
for tenants living for free (8% EU28), 5,2% for owners with no outstanding mortgage (3.5 EU28) 
and 5,9% for owners with loans (1.4% EU28). Further analysis of the EU-SILC microdata will 
be needed to break down indicators by age, origin and income groups.
Discussing Steps for Further Research
The paper provided a short review on youth housing in Greece, as a first step for mapping different 
dimensions of the issue and available research and data. It is suggested that more systematic 
and in-depth research is needed to address deteriorating housing conditions and the growing 
difficulties that young people are facing in accessing decent housing and achieving residential 
independence, in a context of socio-economic insecurity and precariοusness.
Different research approaches and methodologies for the study of youth housing can be 
applied in order to investigate housing trajectories, strategies and living arrangements of youth 
in transition in relation to their social positionality and to identify key factors of precariousness 
and/or empowerment related with their housing situations towards independent living, as well as 
structural conditions linked to housing (supply/demand, housing prices, housing stock condition, 
urban transformation dynamics etc), that shed light on youth housing trajectories in relation to 
urban inequality and the available forms of social support. 
Two different and complementary research strategies can be mentioned. The one focuses on 
the sequence of housing situations/positions over the course of a person’s or household’s life, 
14. It is worth noting the significant deterioration of these indicators in Greece during the last decade. In 2011, 
overcrowding rates were 29,5% for tenants at market price (18,8% EU28 average), 25,6% for owners with no 
outstanding mortgage (20% EU average) and 21,1% for owners with a mortgage (7,4% EU28).
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and the other can provide in depth descriptions or snapshots of housing conditions experienced 
by different social groups. The housing pathways approach15 can shed light on patterns of 
interaction (practices) concerning housing and home, over time and space, emphasising the 
dynamic nature of housing experience and its inter-relatedness with other aspects of household 
life, in order to identify typologies of youth housing pathways (through cluster analysis) and 
the key contextual/structural drivers that are shaping them, focusing on key turning points 
along these pathways (Clapham et. al., 2012). There is also a great number of studies that in 
the absence of national longitudinal panel data use the yearly surveys of the European Union, 
particularly the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and the Household 
Expenditures Surveys (HES), that provide country level harmonised large datasets, allowing 
also for diachronic or country comparisons.16 These surveys have not been fully exploited in 
the case of Greece and could provide valuable information in relation to youth housing, allowing 
also for the creation of a permanent set of contextualised indicators to support policy making 
and broader awareness on the issue.
The challenge of providing alternatives and equal opportunities for youth in their trajectories 
towards economic and residential sustainability is stressed in various reports, calling for greater 
attention and public intervention (Housing Europe 2018, Mackie 2016). As highlighted by Mackie 
(2016), it is important to ensure that all young people have an equal opportunity to leave the 
family home and live independently (requiring greater awareness of the political, economic and 
cultural forces restricting young people’s transitions) and to improve the suitability and availability 
of housing for young people, especially by improving housing conditions in the private rented 
sector and broadening the supply of alternative forms of affordable housing. 
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Μπαλαμπανίδης. Δ., Παπατζανή, Ε. και Πέττας, Δ. (2021)  
Το AIRBNB στην Πόλη. Ευκαιρία ή Απειλή;, Αθήνα: Πόλις.
Ανδρέας Βελωνάς1 και Μαρία Καλδέλη2
Στο ξέσπασμα μίας οικονομικής κρίσης, αποκύημα της οποίας υπήρξε μία στεγαστική κρίση, την 
απάντηση ήλθε να δώσει το φαινόμενο Airbnb. Η πρακτική της βραχυχρόνιας μίσθωσης ακινήτων 
ξεκίνησε από το 2007, στο πλαίσιο μίας «οικονομίας διαμοιρασμού» και σήμερα αποτελεί ένα σημα-
ντικό μέρος της παγκόσμιας οικονομίας. Συγκεκριμένα, η εναλλακτική περίπτωση στην ενοικίαση 
ακινήτων εισήχθη στην αγορά με τους δικούς της κανόνες μέσα από τις ψηφιακές πλατφόρμες, υπο-
σχόμενη απλοποίηση και αμεσότητα και υποκαθιστώντας τα παραδοσιακά τουριστικά καταλύματα. 
Παράλληλα, το φαινόμενο Airbnb, ενώ ξεκίνησε ως μία ιδέα που οικοδομήθηκε «από τα 
κάτω» (bottom up) κατέληξε να είναι άλλη μία περίπτωση διάχυσης των πόρων «προς τα κάτω» 
(top down). Η προοπτική του ως μία στρατηγική επιβίωσης και αντιμετώπισης των επιπτώσεων 
των πολλαπλών κρίσεων από τους «μικρούς παίκτες» δεν διέγραψε μακρινή πορεία από την στιγ-
μή που λειτούργησε ως ένα πεδίο συσσώρευσης πλούτου για τους «μεγάλους παίκτες». Ο επι-
ταχυνόμενος εκτοπισμός των «μικρών» ιδιοκτητών ακινήτων οφείλεται αφενός στην διαδικασία 
«επαγγελματοποίησης» (professionalization), γεγονός που δεν επιτρέπει οι «μικροί παίκτες» να 
ανταποκριθούν στις αυξημένες απαιτήσεις των πελατών και αφετέρου στο έντονο ενδιαφέρον των 
αντίστοιχων ομάδων συμφερόντων (επενδυτών, εταιριών διαχείρισης ακινήτων, funds κ.λπ.).
Η ελληνική περίπτωση συνιστά το μείγμα της έκρηξης των επιπτώσεων της οικονομικής και 
της στεγαστικής κρίσης αλλά και της υψηλούς ζήτησης για τουριστικά καταλύματα. Έννοιες-κλειδιά 
αποτελούν ο αστικός εξευγενισμός (gentrification) και η τουριστικοποίηση (touristification) προ-
κειμένου να ερμηνευθεί η εκ βάθρων αλλαγή κάποιων παραμελημένων περιοχών και ο μετασχη-
ματισμός τους σε τουριστικά θέρετρα. Δεδομένων αυτών των αλληλοτροφοδοτούμενων εννοιών, 
στην Αθήνα είναι αισθητή τόσο η ανομοιομορφία όσο και ο γεωγραφικά και κοινωνικά άνισος 
τρόπος με τον οποίο αναπτύσσεται το φαινόμενο Airbnb. Χαρακτηριστική είναι η μετάβαση από την 
περίοδο της κρίσης στην περίοδο όπου η βραχυχρόνια μίσθωση ακινήτων συνετέλεσε στην αλλα-
γή των κανόνων ζήτησης και προσφοράς και στη ραγδαία αύξηση των τιμών ενοικίου και αγοράς 
ακινήτων, ενώ η προσφορά οικιστικού αποθέματος περιορίστηκε εξαιρετικά στην πρωτεύουσα. 
Το βιβλίο των Δημήτρη Μπαλαμπανίδη, Εύα Παπατζανή και Δημήτρη Πέττα Το Airbnb στην 
πόλη: Ευκαιρία ή απειλή;, που κυκλοφορεί από τις εκδόσεις Πόλις, στέκεται κριτικά απέναντι στο 
φαινόμενο του Airbnb και στον τρόπο με τον οποίο αναπτύσσεται, τόσο στην Ελλάδα όσο και 
στο εξωτερικό. Οι συγγραφείς, έχοντας το ανάλογο ακαδημαϊκό και ερευνητικό υπόβαθρο και 
χρησιμοποιώντας ένα ευρύ φάσμα επιστημών, δηλαδή επιστήμη του χώρου, την πολεοδομία και 
την κοινωνική γεωγραφία, προσπαθούν να ερμηνεύσουν και να διερευνήσουν το νεοφυές φαι-
νόμενο που επιφέρει αλλαγές στην κατοικία και την κοινωνία. 
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Το βιβλίο έχει έκταση 168 σελίδες. Αποτελείται από τρία μέρη και έντεκα κεφάλαια. Στο πρώ-
το μέρος εισάγονται οι θεμελιώδεις έννοιες της «οικονομίας διαμοιρασμού» και της «οικονομίας 
πλατφόρμας» και επιχειρείται η αποσαφήνιση της σχέσης τους με το φαινόμενο Airbnb. Εν συνε-
χεία, εξετάζεται η συνολική εικόνα των βασικών χαρακτηριστικών του Airbnb στην Ελλάδα και, 
ειδικά, στην πόλη της Αθήνας, εντοπίζοντας τις πολλαπλές σημασίες του για τους αντίστοιχους 
«παίκτες» που συμμετέχουν στην αγορά της βραχυχρόνιας μίσθωσης ακινήτων. 
Το δεύτερο μέρος του βιβλίου καταπιάνεται με την ανάλυση των επιπτώσεων του Airbnb στην 
οικονομία, την κοινωνία και τον (αστικό) χώρο. Ιδιαίτερης σημασίας είναι ο τρόπος με τον οποίο 
το Airbnb επηρεάζει την αγορά ακινήτων και ενοικίων, όπου συνεπάγεται και τον τρόπο επίδρα-
σης των οικονομικών ωφελειών στην τοπική οικονομία. Επιπρόσθετα, θίγεται το ζήτημα του εκτο-
πισμού των μόνιμων κατοίκων και της διάβρωσης του χαρακτήρα των γειτονιών της πόλης της 
Αθήνας. Οι συγγραφείς στο τρίτο μέρος εξηγούν γλαφυρά τους διάφορους τρόπους αντιμετώπι-
σης των πολλαπλών επιπτώσεων του Airbnb. Παραθέτοντας περιπτώσεις από τη σχετική διεθνή 
εμπειρία, ασκώντας κριτική στις προσπάθειες ρυθμιστικής παρέμβασης στην Ελλάδα, εμβαθύνουν 
στην αξιολόγηση «καλών πρακτικών», των διεκδικήσεων «από τα κάτω» και των εναλλακτικών. 
Το βιβλίο ολοκληρώνεται με τον Επίλογο, στον οποίο περιλαμβάνονται συμπεράσματα και νέα 
ερωτήματα που εγείρουν το ενδιαφέρον για περαιτέρω διερεύνηση. Εν κατακλείδι, προκύπτει ότι 
το φαινόμενο Airbnb συνδέεται άμεσα με τα σύγχρονα ζητήματα στέγης που έχουν αναδειχθεί 
στην Ελλάδα. Είναι διττή η σημασία του διότι προκαλεί, μεν, αρνητικές συνέπειες (αύξηση των 
ενοικίων, εκτοπισμός μόνιμων κατοίκων) εντείνοντας τα προβλήματα της τρέχουσας στεγαστικής 
κρίσης, επιδρά και θετικά, δε, αποτελώντας μία σημαίνουσα διέξοδο (συμπληρωματικά εισόδημα 
σε νοικοκυριά που πλήττονται). Σύμφωνα με τους συγγραφείς, η αντιμετώπιση του φαινομένου 
του Airbnb δεν εντοπίζεται στην ούτε στην απόλυτη καταδίκη του ούτε στην απόλυτη επιδοκιμα-
σία του. Οι συνέπειές του σε συνδυασμό με τα προκείμενα της στεγαστικής κρίσης (στεγαστική 
υπερπληρότητα, ενεργειακή φτώχεια, εξώσεις, πλειστηριασμοί, έλλειψη στέγης κ.λπ.) οδηγούν 
στην ανάγκη σχεδιασμού και εφαρμογής ευρύτερων πολιτικών στον τομέα της κατοικίας.
Στο επίμετρο του βιβλίου γίνεται μία απόπειρα παρουσίασης του φαινομένου του Airbnb μέσα σε 
μία περίοδο έντονης συστολής ένεκα της τρέχουσας πανδημίας. Οι συγγραφείς ισχυρίζονται ότι, παρά 
την παγκόσμια παύση των τουριστικών μετακινήσεων, το φαινόμενο του Airbnb αποδείχτηκε ανταγω-
νιστικό και ανθεκτικό καταφέρνοντας να ανταποκριθεί στις νέες απαιτήσεις των επισκεπτών για «αυθε-
ντικές» εμπειρίες, μακριά από τον μαζικό τουρισμό. Τα αντανακλαστικά του Airbnb και η επιβίωσή 
του στα δεδομένα μίας υγειονομικής κρίσης είναι η απόδειξη ότι απορρόφησε τους κραδασμούς, τόσο 
των κρίσεων όσο και των αναγκών που προκύπτουν, και η ένδειξη ότι έχει εξασφαλίσει το μέλλον του. 
Η εργασία των Μπαλαμπανίδη, Παπατζανή και Πέττα είναι μία γνήσια προσπάθεια επιστημο-
νικής και πολυπρισματικής ανάλυσης του φαινομένου του Airbnb που συμβάλλει ουσιαστικά στον 
επιστημονικό διάλογο. Ιδιαίτερες είναι οι πτυχές που αφορούν στην στεγαστική και εργασιακή 
επισφάλεια, γεγονός που προέκυψε μέσω της εδραίωσης των «μεγάλων παικτών» εκτοπίζοντας 
τους «μικρούς». Η πρωτότυπη μελέτη της ανάπτυξης του φαινομένου του Airbnb ανά τα χρόνια, 
τόσο στο εσωτερικό όσο και στο εξωτερικό, και η επίκαιρη ανάλυση περί των βραχυχρόνιων 
μισθώσεων ακινήτων σε συνθήκες πανδημίας συνιστούν ένα εξαιρετικά ενδιαφέρον εγχείρημα, 
διαλευκαίνοντας τα ενδεχόμενα το φαινόμενο του Airbnb να αποτελεί είτε ευκαιρία είτε απειλή.
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Χριστόπουλος, Δ. (2020) 
Αν το Προσφυγικό ήταν Πρόβλημα, θα είχε Λύση, Αθήνα: Πόλις
Κωνσταντίνα Δραντάκη1, Κωνσταντίνος Λεμπέσης2 και Γαρυφαλλιά Τούντα3
Η κρίση διαχείρισης του προσφυγικού στην Ελλάδα εκτυλίχθηκε μέσα σε μια προϋπάρχουσα 
δυσμενή κοινωνικοοικονομική συγκυρία, όπου η χώρα μαστιζόταν από τις επιπτώσεις της ύφε-
σης, των πολιτικών λιτότητας και των επακόλουθων φαινομένων ραγδαίας επιδείνωσης των κοι-
νωνικών προβλημάτων. Οι γεωπολιτικές ανακατατάξεις και οι πολεμικές συγκρούσεις στη Μέση 
Ανατολή και την Αφρική, είχαν ως αποτέλεσμα την μαζική αύξηση των μεταναστευτικών ροών 
προς την Ευρωπαϊκή επικράτεια. Μια από τις κυριότερες πύλες εισόδου ήταν η χώρα μας. Έτσι, 
η πολυπλοκότητα της διαχείρισης του προσφυγικού ζητήματος «ανάγκασε» όχι μόνο την Ελλάδα, 
αλλά και ευρύτερα την Ευρώπη, να το αναδείξουν ως προτεραιότητα.
Το βιβλίο του Δημήτρη Χριστόπουλου, Καθηγητή στο Τμήμα Πολιτικής Επιστήμης και Ιστορίας 
στο Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο, παρουσιάζει με ευσύνοπτο και κατανοητό τρόπο το ίδιο το προσφυγικό 
ζήτημα αλλά και το πλαίσιο διαχείρισης του από τους υπερεθνικούς και εγχώριους οργανισμούς. 
Ο τίτλος του βιβλίου είναι ενδεικτικός του τρόπου με τον οποίο ο συγγραφέας αντιλαμβάνεται τις 
σημερινές διαστάσεις του, καθώς γίνεται εμφανές πως επιχειρείται μια υπέρβαση της επιφανεια-
κής και απλουστευτικής λογικής που συναντάται συχνά στον κυρίαρχο δημόσιο λόγο. Αντίθετα, 
σε αυτή τη μελέτη επιχειρείται η αποκάλυψη της περιπλοκότητας και των βαθύτερων σχέσεων 
που διακατέχουν το συγκεκριμένο κοινωνικό θέμα. Αν η μετανάστευση ήταν πρόβλημα θα είχε 
λύση. Αλλά δεν έχει. Η μετανάστευση για τον συγγραφέα, αποτελεί φαινόμενο που προκαλείται 
από κάποια προβλήματα, γεννώντας με την σειρά της κάποια άλλα. Δεν γίνεται λόγος λοιπόν για 
πρόβλημα, αλλά για φαινόμενο, που τροφοδοτεί προβλήματα, τα περισσότερα εκ των οποίων 
προϋπήρχαν στις χώρες υποδοχής.
Η διαφοροποίηση της ορολογίας που προτείνεται από τον συγγραφέα, πραγματοποιείται με 
σκοπό να επανατοποθετηθεί το πρόβλημα στην πραγματική του διάσταση, η οποία δεν είναι άλλη 
από την ανισότητα. Ο Δ. Χριστόπουλος, αναδεικνύει με σαφήνεια την σημασία της μελέτης του 
προσφυγικού φαινομένου, σε συνάρτηση με το ιστορικό και γεωγραφικό πλαίσιο. Οι ιδιαίτερες 
συνθήκες κάθε ιστορικής περιόδου, αλλά και γεωγραφικής περιοχής καταδεικνύονται με σκοπό 
να «απομαγευθεί» η φαινομενική μοναδικότητά της παρούσας συγκυρίας.
Ο συγγραφέας ανατρέχει στη σύγχρονη ελληνική ιστορία και υπενθυμίζει ότι η γεωγραφική 
θέση της Ελλάδας, είχε ως αποτέλεσμα να καταστεί διαχρονικό πέρασμα ενός τεράστιου αριθ-
μού ανθρώπων. Από την έλευση των προσφύγων ως απότοκο της Μικρασιατικής Καταστροφής, 
των Αλβανών μεταναστών τη δεκαετία του 90 και την ανθρωπιστική κρίση του 2015, η Ελλάδα 
δεν βρίσκεται αντιμέτωπη με ένα πρωτοφανές φαινόμενο. Σύμφωνα με αυτή την οπτική, ο αυτο-
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χθονισμός αποτελεί μία «μυθιδεολογία». Ο «παροντισμός» αποτελεί εμπόδιο στην μελέτη της 
μετανάστευσης, καθώς οδηγεί στην παρουσίαση των φαινομένων ως πρωτόγνωρα και έχει ως 
αποτέλεσμα την αδυναμία εξεύρευσης λύσεων.
Η φαινομενική ελληνική ομοιογένεια και η μονοπολιτισμικότητα παρουσιάζονται ως μύθοι της 
ελληνικής αφήγησης. Η ελληνικότητα δεν αποτελεί μία μονολιθική στατική οντότητα, καθώς η ελλη-
νική ταυτότητα υπήρξε εξ ορισμού πολυπολιτισμική. Πέρα από την απομάγευση του προσφυγικού 
φαινομένου και τη διάλυση των μύθων που έχουν στηθεί γύρω από αυτό, σκόπιμα πολλές φορές, 
ο συγγραφέας επιχειρεί να αναδείξει κάποια ιδιαίτερα χαρακτηριστικά της παρούσας περιόδου. 
Η μετανάστευση ως φαινόμενο, υπάρχει σχεδόν από τις απαρχές της ανθρωπότητας. Στην 
παρούσα συγκυρία όμως, τομή στην συνέχεια της ιστορίας αποτελεί το γεγονός πως η Ελλάδα 
παύει να λειτουργεί πλέον ως διάδρομος αλλά αποκτά χαρακτήρα χώρου στάθμευσης ανθρώ-
πων. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, το μεταναστευτικό μετατρέπεται σε θέμα ασφάλειας, όπου η ταυτότητα του 
Μουσουλμάνου κατατάσσει κάποιον αυτόματα στην κατηγορία του πιθανού τρομοκράτη. Πραγ-
ματοποιείται έτσι μία «ασφαλειοποίηση» της μεταναστευτικής πολιτικής, όπου το μεταναστευτικό 
μετατρέπεται σε ζήτημα ασφαλείας. Την ίδια στιγμή, οι κρατικές πολιτικές και ο κυρίαρχος λόγος 
για την μετανάστευση, εξοικειώνουν την κοινωνία με τις πιο ακραίες και εγκληματικές συμπερι-
φορές κατά των μεταναστών.
Η κατανόηση του προσφυγικού σε ιστορική και συγχρονική, ταυτόχρονα, προοπτική καταδει-
κνύει τη λήθη που χαρακτηρίζει την κοινωνία μας επάνω σε σημαίνουσες ιστορικές και κοινωνικές 
πτυχές της. Παράλληλα, η ξενοφοβία, το μίσος και η άρτια δομημένη φαντασίωση της απειλής, 
είναι εκείνα τα στοιχεία που συνήθως τροφοδοτούν την τρομοκρατία και την, επακόλουθη, ανάγκη 
για ενίσχυση των πολιτικών ασφάλειας και καταστολής. Η στροφή προς μια κουλτούρα και πρα-
κτικές συμπερίληψης, μέσω μιας ενορχηστρωμένης και με πολιτική βούληση δημόσιας πολιτικής, 
μπορεί να απομυθοποιήσει τον χαρακτηρισμό του «τρομοκράτη μετανάστη», σε αντίθεση με την 
κοινωνική περιθωριοποίηση και τον εγκλεισμό στα στρατοπεδικού τύπου camps που επικρατούν 
ως σημερινή πραγματικότητα.
Βέβαια, η ατζέντα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης για τη μη βελτίωση της υπάρχουσας κατάστασης, 
τοποθετεί την Ελλάδα ανάμεσα σε δύο αντικρουόμενους πόλους: από τη μία πλευρά, οι πρόσφυ-
γες και από την άλλη πλευρά, η Ευρώπη. Δημιουργείται με αυτόν τον τρόπο, ένας φαύλος κύκλος 
επικυριαρχίας του ισχυρού με τελικά θύματα τους πιο αδύναμους: τους πρόσφυγες και τους κατοί-
κους των νησιών τα οποία επελέγησαν για αποθήκες ψυχών.
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Η κοινωνική πολιτική στην Ελλάδα χαρακτηρίζεται διαχρονικά από μια εγγενή λογική περιθω-
ριοποίησης των μεταναστών, με αποτέλεσμα τη γεωγραφική και κλαδική ακινησία του πληθυ-
σμού αυτού, αλλά και, κατά προέκταση, της ίδιας της επιστημονικής συζήτησης γύρω από όψεις 
κινητικότητας τους εν γένει. Αυτή ακριβώς η διάσταση αναδεικνύεται μέσα από τη μελέτη που 
παρουσιάζεται, η οποία αναλύει μέσα από το μεθοδολογικό εργαλείο του χρόνου τη σχέση του 
οικονομικού και του κοινωνικού πλαισίου εξέλιξης του φαινομένου της μετανάστευσης. Τα δύο 
κυριότερα ζητήματα που μελετώνται είναι αφενός η σχέση αλληλεπίδρασης μεταξύ μεταναστευτικής 
και εργασιακής πολιτικής και η αφετέρου η επάρκεια των υπαρχόντων επιστημονικών μεθόδων 
για την κατανόηση των επιμέρους εκφάνσεων της μετανάστευσης. Με αφορμή τις μνημονιακές 
επιταγές θεσπίζεται μια “ρυθμιστική τριχοτόμιση” της εργατικής νομοθεσίας, με καθοριστικό άξο-
να την απουσία κατάλληλων προβλέψεων για τη δίκαιη ρύθμιση τόσο της μετανάστευσης όσο και 
της εργασίας των μεταναστών. 
Αρχικά, διαπιστώνεται ότι η εργασία αποτελεί το βασικό νομιμοποιητικό και ενταξιακό στοιχείο 
για τους μετανάστες στην Ελλάδα με συνέπεια η μεταναστευτική πολιτική να λαμβάνει μια έντονη 
εργασιοκεντρική διάσταση. Η παροχή προσωρινής διάρκειας αδειών εργασίας και διαμονής ως 
βασική πολιτική διαχείρισης των μεταναστεύσεων διαχρονικά στην Ελλάδα, ενισχύει στην πράξη 
την εδραίωση και τη διάδοση τόσο της παράτυπης παραμονής όσο και της παράνομης εργασίας. 
Η ιθαγένεια καθίσταται βασικό συστατικό νομιμοποίησης της διάκρισης των δικαιωμάτων που 
δύναται να απολαύσει κάθε μισθωτό της μιας και της άλλης κατηγορίας σε θεσμικό και πρακτικό 
επίπεδο.
Την περίοδο της οικονομικής κρίσης στην Ελλάδα, στο πλαίσιο της συμμόρφωσης στις μνη-
μονιακές επιταγές, παρατηρείται πρώτον η ραγδαία απορρύθμιση του εργατικού δικαίου και της 
κοινωνικής ασφάλισης, δεύτερον η διακήρυξη μιας κενής περιεχομένου εξαγγελίας αντιμετώπισης 
της παραβατικότητας στην εργασιακό, καθώς τρίτον η απουσία ειδικών ρυθμίσεων για τη μετα-
νάστευση και την εργασία των μεταναστών. Παράλληλα, ειδικοί αλλά «ουδέτεροι» φαινομενικά 
κανόνες δικαίου εγκλωβίζουν τους μετανάστες σε συγκεκριμένους εργασιακούς κλάδους, ενώ τα 
εργατικά δικαιώματά τους καθορίζονται εν πολλοίς από το είδος και τη διάρκεια νόμιμης διαμο-
νής τους. Μέσω αυτής της διακριτικής μεταχείρισης των μεταναστών στην αγορά εργασίας που 
οδηγεί σε αυξημένη επισφάλεια και υπερεξάρτηση του εργαζομένου από την εργοδοτική πλευρά, 
επιτείνεται η ευελιξία σε ένα ήδη ελαστικό εργασιακό περιβάλλον. Με πρόσχημα, μεταξύ άλλων, 
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τη ρύθμιση των μεταναστεύσεων, το εργατικό δίκαιο διαβρώνεται ως προς την καταστατική λει-
τουργία και αποστολή του εξυπηρετώντας ευθέως αλλότριες αλλά συγκεκριμένες οικονομικές και 
γεωπολιτικές σκοπιμότητες. 
Ακολουθώντας τα διεθνή πρότυπα, το «μεταναστευτικό» εργατικό δίκαιο για τους μετανάστες 
στην Ελλάδα, εγκλωβίζει μεγάλο μέρος του πληθυσμού αυτού, μέσα από διάφορους μηχανισμούς, 
σε ένα καθεστώς διακρίσεων και εκμετάλλευσης, παραγκωνίζοντας έτσι θεσμικά κατοχυρωμένα 
δικαιώματα. Ορισμένες πολιτικές επιλογές φαίνεται να επηρεάζονται από μια υπόγεια συνεργασία 
πολιτικών και οικονομικών ελίτ με ισχυρούς επιχειρηματίες ή άλλους παίκτες που εξυπηρετούν 
συγκεκριμένα συμφέροντα. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, η μεταναστευτική πολιτική που υιοθετείται αναπα-
ράγει συγκεκριμένα στερεότυπα και παθογένειες. Οι “φωνές” που ακούγονται σε πολιτικό και 
δημόσιο λόγο σε σχέση με την ασφαλειοκεντρική προσέγγιση των μεταναστεύσεων έρχονται σε 
πλήρη αντίθεση με τις διαπιστωμένες ανάγκες σε εργατικά χέρια σε πολλούς κλάδους και επαγ-
γέλματα, αλλά τελούν σε απόλυτη αρμονία με προσπάθειες προώθησης της ευελασφάλειας στην 
ελληνική αγορά εργασίας.
Είναι φανερό ότι η σχέση μεταναστευτικής πολιτικής και ρύθμισης της αγοράς εργασίας είναι 
αμφίδρομη. Η διαχείριση του μεταναστευτικού πίεσε προς αποστεθεροποίηση του ελληνικού εργα-
σιακού περιβάλλοντος, μετατρέποντας την εργασία των μεταναστών σε μοχλό ταχέων διαδικασιών 
διεύρυνσης των στρατηγικών ευελιξίας και απορρύθμισης. Το γεγονός αυτό, σε συνδυασμό με τη 
διόγκωση της οικονομικής κρίση ώθησε γοργά ολόκληρη την ελληνική αγορά εργασίας προς ένα 
γενικευμένο κλίμα επισφάλειας και εξατομικευμένων εργασιακών σχέσεων. Οι συνθήκες αυτές 
αφορούν αρχικά τις περισσότερες ευάλωτες ομάδες του πληθυσμού με χαμηλή διαπραγματευτική 
δύναμη, όμως προοδευτικά επεκτείνονται στο σύνολο του εργατικού δυναμικού με όρους καθο-
λικοποίησης ενός νέου υπερευέλικτου εργασιακού προτύπου. 
K
